GCVE-1988-2026-0534

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47
VLAI
Title
Apache Struts2 Core Cross-Origin Protection Exemption Miskeyed to a Deployment-Wide Path
Summary
Description Apache Struts2 Core version 7.4.0 and below's `FetchMetadataInterceptor`, `CoepInterceptor`, and `CoopInterceptor` each compare their `exemptedPaths` configuration -- a per-interceptor-reference, administrator-supplied set of paths intended to exempt specific actions from the corresponding cross-origin protection -- against `HttpServletRequest.getContextPath()`. `getContextPath()` is fixed for the entire deployed web application and is identical on every request regardless of which action or servlet path is being invoked, so it cannot distinguish one action from another. Impact An administrator who configures `exemptedPaths` expecting it to exempt a specific action or endpoint, instead is configuring a value that can never match the real, single, deployment-wide context path returned on genuine traffic, so the per-action exemption never takes effect and the intended protection remains enforced everywhere, including on the endpoint the administrator believed was exempted. More importantly, if an administrator's configured exemption string happens to coincide with the application's actual context path -- such as if an administrator assumes that the parameter takes a path-like value and supplies the deployment's own root or an equally-named segment -- `exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)` evaluates to `true` on every single request to the application and Fetch Metadata request filtering, the Cross-Origin Embedder Policy (COEP) header, and the Cross-Origin Opener Policy (COOP) header are all silently disabled for the entire deployment (well beyond the endpoint that the administrator intended to exempt), disabling the protections that such code is intended to provide across the entire application. Examples Sample Code All three interceptors, each in `struts2-core`, apply the identical pattern -- a per-action `exemptedPaths` set compared against the deployment-wide `getContextPath()` rather than against anything that actually varies per action. ```java private final Set<String> exemptedPaths = new HashSet<>(); private final ResourceIsolationPolicy resourceIsolationPolicy = new StrutsResourceIsolationPolicy(); @Inject(required = false) public void setExemptedPaths(String paths) { this.exemptedPaths.addAll(TextParseUtil.commaDelimitedStringToSet(paths)); } @Override public String intercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception { ActionContext context = invocation.getInvocationContext(); HttpServletRequest request = context.getServletRequest(); addVaryHeaders(invocation); String contextPath = request.getContextPath(); // Apply exemptions: paths/endpoints meant to be served cross-origin if (exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)) { return invocation.invoke(); } ``` Code snippet from `struts2-core`'s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/FetchMetadataInterceptor.java, lines 55-73 ```java @Override public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) { HttpServletRequest req = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest(); final String path = req.getContextPath(); if (exemptedPaths.contains(path)) { ``` Snippet from `struts2-core`'s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoepInterceptor.java, lines 59-63 ```java @Override public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) { HttpServletRequest request = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest(); String path = request.getContextPath(); if (isExempted(path)) { ``` Code from `struts2-core`'s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoopInterceptor.java, lines 61-65 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Apache Struts2 Core Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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        {
          "product": "Struts2 Core",
          "vendor": "Apache",
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          "value": "Description\nApache Struts2 Core version 7.4.0 and below\u0027s `FetchMetadataInterceptor`, `CoepInterceptor`, and `CoopInterceptor` each \ncompare their `exemptedPaths` configuration -- a per-interceptor-reference, administrator-supplied set of paths \nintended to exempt specific actions from the corresponding cross-origin protection -- against \n`HttpServletRequest.getContextPath()`.  `getContextPath()` is fixed for the entire deployed web application and is \nidentical on every request regardless of which action or servlet path is being invoked, so it cannot distinguish one \naction from another.\n\nImpact\nAn administrator who configures `exemptedPaths` expecting it to exempt a specific action or endpoint, instead is \nconfiguring a value that can never match the real, single, deployment-wide context path returned on genuine traffic, so \nthe per-action exemption never takes effect and the intended protection remains enforced everywhere, including on the \nendpoint the administrator believed was exempted.  More importantly, if an administrator\u0027s configured exemption string \nhappens to coincide with the application\u0027s actual context path -- such as if an administrator assumes that the \nparameter takes a path-like value and supplies the deployment\u0027s own root or an equally-named segment -- \n`exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)` evaluates to `true` on every single request to the application and Fetch Metadata \nrequest filtering, the Cross-Origin Embedder Policy (COEP) header, and the Cross-Origin Opener Policy (COOP) header are \nall silently disabled for the entire deployment (well beyond the endpoint that the administrator intended to exempt), \ndisabling the protections that such code is intended to provide across the entire application.\n\nExamples\nSample Code\nAll three interceptors, each in `struts2-core`, apply the identical pattern -- a per-action `exemptedPaths` set \ncompared against the deployment-wide `getContextPath()` rather than against anything that actually varies per action.\n\n```java\n    private final Set\u003cString\u003e exemptedPaths = new HashSet\u003c\u003e();\n    private final ResourceIsolationPolicy resourceIsolationPolicy = new StrutsResourceIsolationPolicy();\n\n    @Inject(required = false)\n    public void setExemptedPaths(String paths) {\n        this.exemptedPaths.addAll(TextParseUtil.commaDelimitedStringToSet(paths));\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String intercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n        ActionContext context = invocation.getInvocationContext();\n        HttpServletRequest request = context.getServletRequest();\n\n        addVaryHeaders(invocation);\n\n        String contextPath = request.getContextPath();\n        // Apply exemptions: paths/endpoints meant to be served cross-origin\n        if (exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)) {\n            return invocation.invoke();\n        }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/FetchMetadataInterceptor.java, \nlines 55-73\n\n```java\n    @Override\n    public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) {\n        HttpServletRequest req = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest();\n        final String path = req.getContextPath();\n\n        if (exemptedPaths.contains(path)) {\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoepInterceptor.java, lines 59-63\n\n```java\n    @Override\n    public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) {\n        HttpServletRequest request = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest();\n        String path = request.getContextPath();\n\n        if (isExempted(path)) {\n```\nCode from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoopInterceptor.java, lines 61-65\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "Apache Struts2 Core Cross-Origin Protection Exemption Miskeyed to a Deployment-Wide Path",
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