GCVE-1988-2026-0534
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/3 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 Core |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 Core",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Description\nApache Struts2 Core version 7.4.0 and below\u0027s `FetchMetadataInterceptor`, `CoepInterceptor`, and `CoopInterceptor` each \ncompare their `exemptedPaths` configuration -- a per-interceptor-reference, administrator-supplied set of paths \nintended to exempt specific actions from the corresponding cross-origin protection -- against \n`HttpServletRequest.getContextPath()`. `getContextPath()` is fixed for the entire deployed web application and is \nidentical on every request regardless of which action or servlet path is being invoked, so it cannot distinguish one \naction from another.\n\nImpact\nAn administrator who configures `exemptedPaths` expecting it to exempt a specific action or endpoint, instead is \nconfiguring a value that can never match the real, single, deployment-wide context path returned on genuine traffic, so \nthe per-action exemption never takes effect and the intended protection remains enforced everywhere, including on the \nendpoint the administrator believed was exempted. More importantly, if an administrator\u0027s configured exemption string \nhappens to coincide with the application\u0027s actual context path -- such as if an administrator assumes that the \nparameter takes a path-like value and supplies the deployment\u0027s own root or an equally-named segment -- \n`exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)` evaluates to `true` on every single request to the application and Fetch Metadata \nrequest filtering, the Cross-Origin Embedder Policy (COEP) header, and the Cross-Origin Opener Policy (COOP) header are \nall silently disabled for the entire deployment (well beyond the endpoint that the administrator intended to exempt), \ndisabling the protections that such code is intended to provide across the entire application.\n\nExamples\nSample Code\nAll three interceptors, each in `struts2-core`, apply the identical pattern -- a per-action `exemptedPaths` set \ncompared against the deployment-wide `getContextPath()` rather than against anything that actually varies per action.\n\n```java\n private final Set\u003cString\u003e exemptedPaths = new HashSet\u003c\u003e();\n private final ResourceIsolationPolicy resourceIsolationPolicy = new StrutsResourceIsolationPolicy();\n\n @Inject(required = false)\n public void setExemptedPaths(String paths) {\n this.exemptedPaths.addAll(TextParseUtil.commaDelimitedStringToSet(paths));\n }\n\n @Override\n public String intercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n ActionContext context = invocation.getInvocationContext();\n HttpServletRequest request = context.getServletRequest();\n\n addVaryHeaders(invocation);\n\n String contextPath = request.getContextPath();\n // Apply exemptions: paths/endpoints meant to be served cross-origin\n if (exemptedPaths.contains(contextPath)) {\n return invocation.invoke();\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/FetchMetadataInterceptor.java, \nlines 55-73\n\n```java\n @Override\n public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) {\n HttpServletRequest req = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest();\n final String path = req.getContextPath();\n\n if (exemptedPaths.contains(path)) {\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoepInterceptor.java, lines 59-63\n\n```java\n @Override\n public void beforeResult(ActionInvocation invocation, String resultCode) {\n HttpServletRequest request = invocation.getInvocationContext().getServletRequest();\n String path = request.getContextPath();\n\n if (isExempted(path)) {\n```\nCode from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/CoopInterceptor.java, lines 61-65\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
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"source": {
"defect": [
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],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Struts2 Core Cross-Origin Protection Exemption Miskeyed to a Deployment-Wide Path",
"x_gcve": [
{
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"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0534",
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