GCVE-1988-2026-0532

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47
VLAI
Title
Apache Struts2 Core Arbitrary Code Execution via OGNL Sandbox Escape
Summary
Description Apache Struts2 Core version 7.4.0 and below attempt to prevent arbitrary code execution via Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) through several different mechanisms but only in a cursory fashion -- the libraries only guard against immediate calls evaluated by the OGNL engine via `SecurityMemberAccess`, but an allowed call that, instead, accepts nested arguments and, itself, invokes reflection internally executes outside of the scope of said cursory protections, thereby enabling attackers to bypass the limited protections entirely. It should be noted that this attack, obviously, only works in locations where the information system runs the input/output through an OGNL parser and executor. Moreover, there is a key difference between Struts2 Core 6.x and below and 7.x -- 7.x favours a whitelist-based approach that is coupled with some blacklisting, while 6.x and below only check a blacklist (if anything at all). This means that for successful exploitation in 6.x and below, attackers can simply find a call that uses reflection and that isn't explicitly blacklisted (e.g., `java.beans.Statement` and `java.beans.Expression`), embed the otherwise disallowed reflective call, and watch it run. In 7.x, however, attackers must use something that has been explicitly allowed, first, as the wrapper, which raises the bar for exploitation, reducing the likelihood for most systems running 7.x (if someone does not realise that the Struts2 Core library only provides cursory protections, they will not understand the risk and may accidentally add something like `java.beans.Statement`), but does not reduce the impact or eliminate the risk. Impact Attackers can bypass the Apache Struts2 Core and OGNL library's protections against arbitrary code execution via malicious OGNL through nested calls, thereby executing arbitrary code on the information system. Importantly, through this, attackers can bypass not only the class/method checks, but also the static/non-static checks, allowing attackers to, for example, call to `ProcessBuilder`, dump the environment variables via `System.getenv(String)`, and various other such calls. Steps to Reproduce Sample Query The following will work on Apache Struts2 Core versions 6.x and below (assuming that `query` runs through the OGNL parser, etc. -- this can happen on the request, but also if the string is reflected back in, say, a JSP via tags that do as such) without much effort. On Apache Struts2 Core 7.x, though, `java.beans.Expression` would need to be whitelisted, first. GET /search.action?query=new+java.beans.Expression(new+java.beans.Expression(%40java.lang.ProcessBuilder%40class,'new',new+Object%5B%5D%7Bnew+String%5B%5D%7B'/bin/sh','-c','id+%3E+%3C%3CREPLACE+ME+--+a+fresh+marker+file+path%3E%3E'%7D%7D).getValue(),'start',new+Object%5B0%5D).getValue() _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Apache Struts2 Core Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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  "containers": {
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      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Struts2 Core",
          "vendor": "Apache",
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
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          "value": "Description\nApache Struts2 Core version 7.4.0 and below attempt to prevent arbitrary code execution via Object-Graph Navigation \nLanguage (OGNL) through several different mechanisms but only in a cursory fashion -- the libraries only guard against \nimmediate calls evaluated by the OGNL engine via `SecurityMemberAccess`, but an allowed call that, instead, accepts \nnested arguments and, itself, invokes reflection internally executes outside of the scope of said cursory protections, \nthereby enabling attackers to bypass the limited protections entirely.\n\nIt should be noted that this attack, obviously, only works in locations where the information system runs the \ninput/output through an OGNL parser and executor.  Moreover, there is a key difference between Struts2 Core 6.x and \nbelow and 7.x -- 7.x favours a whitelist-based approach that is coupled with some blacklisting, while 6.x and below \nonly check a blacklist (if anything at all).  This means that for successful exploitation in 6.x and below, attackers \ncan simply find a call that uses reflection and that isn\u0027t explicitly blacklisted (e.g., `java.beans.Statement` and \n`java.beans.Expression`), embed the otherwise disallowed reflective call, and watch it run.  In 7.x, however, attackers \nmust use something that has been explicitly allowed, first, as the wrapper, which raises the bar for exploitation, \nreducing the likelihood for most systems running 7.x (if someone does not realise that the Struts2 Core library only \nprovides cursory protections, they will not understand the risk and may accidentally add something like \n`java.beans.Statement`), but does not reduce the impact or eliminate the risk.\n\nImpact\nAttackers can bypass the Apache Struts2 Core and OGNL library\u0027s protections against arbitrary code execution via \nmalicious OGNL through nested calls, thereby executing arbitrary code on the information system.  Importantly, through \nthis, attackers can bypass not only the class/method checks, but also the static/non-static checks, allowing attackers \nto, for example, call to `ProcessBuilder`, dump the environment variables via `System.getenv(String)`, and various \nother such calls.\n\nSteps to Reproduce\nSample Query\nThe following will work on Apache Struts2 Core versions 6.x and below (assuming that `query` runs through the OGNL \nparser, etc. -- this can happen on the request, but also if the string is reflected back in, say, a JSP via tags that \ndo as such) without much effort.  On Apache Struts2 Core 7.x, though, `java.beans.Expression` would need to be \nwhitelisted, first.\n\nGET \n/search.action?query=new+java.beans.Expression(new+java.beans.Expression(%40java.lang.ProcessBuilder%40class,\u0027new\u0027,new+Object%5B%5D%7Bnew+String%5B%5D%7B\u0027/bin/sh\u0027,\u0027-c\u0027,\u0027id+%3E+%3C%3CREPLACE+ME+--+a+fresh+marker+file+path%3E%3E\u0027%7D%7D).getValue(),\u0027start\u0027,new+Object%5B0%5D).getValue()\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
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