GCVE-1988-2026-0531
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/6 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 Core |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 Core",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Description\nThe Apache Struts2 Core 7.4.0 and below performs session token comparisons cryptographically insecure early-exit \ncomparison functions (e.g., `!=`, `memcmp`, byte-by-byte loops with `break`) that return as soon as the first \nmismatched byte is encountered. The execution time of the comparison is therefore proportional to the number of \nleading bytes that match, creating a measurable timing side-channel. Importantly, this side-channel has been \ndynamically verified and exploited across networks using modern techniques that reduce/factor out latency.\n\nImpact\nAttackers can measure response latency, iteratively determining the correct value of the hash or secret one byte at a \ntime, reducing the attack complexity from `36^n`, where `n` is the number of bytes in the secret. While, in the ideal \ncircumstance, the complexity of a pure brute-force attack would be `2^165` since the system is using a 165-bit \nBigInteger, the conversion from BigInteger to an A-Z0-9 string does not map cleanly -- the resulting string, itself, \ncan actually be 31 or 32 characters long and bytes don\u0027t simply slot into a given character or position, thus requiring \nthe greater `36^32` brute-force. With that said, in a system where lag can be injected, latency reduced or factored \nout, the theoretical floor move from the worst case `36^32` to `36*32` (1,152 requests). Of course, since the string \nlength can vary by one, attackers must first determine the string length, which can be done via two requests -- one \nwith each length -- a trivial addition to the worst case mentioned above but worth noting.\n\nSuccessful exploitation enables bypassing the `TokenHelper`-generated token, which is designed to \"[s]top \ndouble-submission of forms\" and may be used by information systems as a nonce as part of cross-site request forgery \nprotections.\n\nExamples\nSample Code\n`TokenHelper.validToken()`, leveraged by both `TokenInterceptor.handleToken(ActionInvocation)` and \n`TokenSessionStoreInterceptor.handleToken(ActionInvocation)`, utilises the cryptographically insecure, early-exiting \n`String.equals(String)` method to compare the in-session token against the user-provided token.\n\n```java\n /**\n * Checks for a valid transaction token in the current request params. If a valid token is found, it is\n * removed so the it is not valid again.\n *\n * @return false if there was no token set into the params (check by looking for {@link #TOKEN_NAME_FIELD}), true \nif a valid token is found\n */\n public static boolean validToken() {\n String tokenName = getTokenName();\n\n if (tokenName == null) {\n LOG.debug(\"No token name found -\u003e Invalid token \");\n return false;\n }\n\n String token = getToken(tokenName);\n\n if (token == null) {\n LOG.debug(\"No token found for token name {} -\u003e Invalid token \", normalizeSpace(tokenName));\n return false;\n }\n\n Map session = ActionContext.getContext().getSession();\n String tokenSessionName = buildTokenSessionAttributeName(tokenName);\n String sessionToken = (String) session.get(tokenSessionName);\n\n if (!token.equals(sessionToken)) {\n if (LOG.isWarnEnabled()) {\n LocalizedTextProvider localizedTextProvider = \nActionContext.getContext().getContainer().getInstance(LocalizedTextProvider.class);\n LOG.warn(localizedTextProvider.findText(TokenHelper.class, \"struts.internal.invalid.token\", \nActionContext.getContext().getLocale(), \"Form token {0} does not match the expected session token.\", new Object[]{\n normalizeSpace(token)\n }));\n }\n Dispatcher dispatcher = Dispatcher.getInstance();\n if (dispatcher != null \u0026\u0026 dispatcher.isDevMode()) {\n LOG.warn(\"Token mismatch detail - token name [{}], form token [{}], session token [{}]\",\n normalizeSpace(tokenName), normalizeSpace(token), sessionToken);\n }\n\n return false;\n }\n\n // remove the token so it won\u0027t be used again\n session.remove(tokenSessionName);\n ActionContext.getContext().put(VALIDATED_TOKEN_KEY, new ValidatedToken(tokenName, token));\n\n return true;\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/util/TokenHelper.java, lines 164-210\n\n```java\n protected String handleToken(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n //see WW-2902: we need to use the real HttpSession here, as opposed to the map\n //that wraps the session, because a new wrap is created on every request\n HttpSession session = ServletActionContext.getRequest().getSession(true);\n synchronized (session.getId().intern()) {\n if (!TokenHelper.validToken()) {\n return handleInvalidToken(invocation);\n }\n }\n return handleValidToken(invocation);\n }\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/TokenInterceptor.java, lines 140-150, \nshowing the interceptor calling for token validation -- note, too, the improper, unsafe synchronisation on \n`session.getId().intern()`, though that is a separate finding with a separate write-up\n\n```java\n @Override\n protected String handleToken(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n //see WW-2902: we need to use the real HttpSession here, as opposed to the map\n //that wraps the session, because a new wrap is created on every request\n HttpSession session = ServletActionContext.getRequest().getSession(true);\n synchronized (session.getId().intern()) {\n if (!TokenHelper.validToken()) {\n return handleInvalidToken(invocation);\n }\n return handleValidToken(invocation);\n }\n }\n```\nCode from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/TokenSessionStoreInterceptor.java, lines \n104-115, showing the interceptor calling for token validation -- note, too, the improper, unsafe synchronisation on \n`session.getId().intern()`, though that is a separate finding with a separate write-up\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/6"
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Struts2 Core TokenHelper Token Cryptographic Timing Side-Channel",
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