GCVE-1988-2026-0530
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 Spring |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 Spring",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Description\nThe Apache Struts2 Spring Plugin opens a Spring `ApplicationContex` via a try-with-resources block and, outside of said \nblock, then continues to use the closed resource, resulting in an uncaught `IllegalStateException`. This particular \nissue prevents proper functionality and indicates poor code quality and code review standards and processes, while not \nbeing, itself, otherwise excessively meaningful for a production environment (as developer mode should not be enabled \nin such an environment), although it would hamper staging, test, and developer environments that are configured in \naccordance with Apache-recommended hot-reload configurations for such environments \n(https://struts.apache.org/plugins/spring/#class-reloading).\n\nImpact\nAnyone who follows Struts\u0027 documented configuration for this plugin -- enabling `struts.devMode`, setting a non-blank \n`struts.objectFactory.spring.class.reloading.watchList`, and declaring `ClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext` as the \nroot context class in web.xml -- will trigger this pathway on every application startup. Since close() call `null`s \nthe context\u0027s internal bean factory immediately after `refresh()` succeeds, \n`SpringObjectFactory.setApplicationContext()`call to `getBeanFactory()` throws an uncaught `IllegalStateException`, \naborting the Struts-Spring integration startup process before it can ever finish. Even if the exception were caught, \n`close()` has already stopped the `FilesystemAlterationMonitor` watchdog thread, so the live class-reloading capability \nwould never fire a single reload. As such, the hot-reload feature cannot and does not work with this \nApache-recommended configuration.\n\nExamples\nSample Code\nThe code below clearly shows the issue when in developer, a watch list, and hot-reloading are enabled. The \ntry-with-resources calls `.close()` when exiting, against `reloadingContext`, which is merely a pointer to \n`appContext`, thereby closing `appContext`. Immediately after exiting the try-with-resources and wrapping conditional, \n`this. setApplicationContext` is called, passing in the now closed `appContext`. Importantly, ` \nClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext`, to which `appContext` was cast during the initialisation of the \ntry-with-resources and against which the `finally` that this construct generates (try-with-resources effectively being \nsyntactic sugar for a `try{...} finally{reloadingContext.close()}`), has a `close()` defined that calls to \n`super.close()` before removing and stopping the listener.\n\n```java\n String watchList = container.getInstance(String.class, \nSpringConstants.STRUTS_OBJECTFACTORY_SPRING_CLASS_RELOADING_WATCH_LIST);\n String acceptClasses = container.getInstance(String.class, \nSpringConstants.STRUTS_OBJECTFACTORY_SPRING_CLASS_RELOADING_ACCEPT_CLASSES);\n String reloadConfig = container.getInstance(String.class, \nSpringConstants.STRUTS_OBJECTFACTORY_SPRING_CLASS_RELOADING_RELOAD_CONFIG);\n\n if (\"true\".equals(devMode)\n \u0026\u0026 StringUtils.isNotBlank(watchList)\n \u0026\u0026 appContext instanceof ClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext) {\n //prevent class caching\n useClassCache = false;\n\n try (ClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext reloadingContext = (ClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext) \nappContext) {\n reloadingContext.setupReloading(watchList.split(\",\"), acceptClasses, servletContext,\n \"true\".equals(reloadConfig));\n LOG.info(\"Class reloading is enabled. Make sure this is not used on a production environment!\\n{}\",\n watchList);\n\n setClassLoader(reloadingContext.getReloadingClassLoader());\n\n // we need to reload the context, so our isntance of the factory is picked up\n reloadingContext.refresh();\n }\n }\n\n this.setApplicationContext(appContext);\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-spring-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/spring/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/spring/StrutsSpringObjectFactory.java, lines 97-120\n\n```java\n public void close() {\n super.close();\n\n if (filesystemAlterationMonitor != null) {\n filesystemAlterationMonitor.removeListener(this);\n filesystemAlterationMonitor.stop();\n }\n }\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-spring-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/spring/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/spring/ClassReloadingXMLWebApplicationContext.java, lines 157-164, \nshowing the close() override invoked by the implicit try-with-resources call\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/5"
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{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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"source": {
"defect": [
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "Apache Struts2 Spring Plugin Uses a Previously Closed Resource",
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"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0530",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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