GCVE-1988-2026-0529

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47
VLAI
Title
[Bugtraq] crosspost: Digital Watchdog DVRs of the VMAX series: exploit chain from unauth to RCE
Summary
Hi, Neither the vendor, exploit-db.com or seclists.org seem to deem this as an actual vulnerability. MITRE gave it a CVE number after three months of waiting, CVE-2026-51204, still not released. Technically should even get three CVEs, one per vulnerability, but one per exploit chain should be plenty, so I requested only one. The CVE numbers are getting into six figures too quickly. Exploit chain is as follows: unauth encrypted config database download -> decryption of encrypted config via hardcoded keys, different keys for different OEMs -> auth RCE via some TLS certificate functionality, but other vectors also exist. I really hoped that I could have kept that exploit chain for myself, but as soon as I saw the KadNap botnet spreading on those devices, next to its usual target of ancient axentra/mystora/goflex NAS, I had to release it. The common/main use of the botnet on these devices, and those NAS, if I can trust my honeypots, seems to be mainly residential proxies. There's still no update or warning of any kind by the vendor, and I strongly assume that the operators of the botnet are using the same vulnerabilities. Killing the processes (named "./kad" located in "/setup/.dw.agent/") can help only temporarily, as it's redeploying over the "/setup/nptime" shell script upon each reboot. From what I can understand after a quick internet search is, that the hoster of the scripts and binaries (IP: 88[.]119.175.67, ASN 61272) is actively refusing to take down the server. Similar as, from what I read, that Microsoft/GitHub is actively refusing to take down a repo that is hiding Mirai within several camera firmware dumps. PoC: https://packetstorm.news/files/id/217634/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown crosspost Digital Watchdog Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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