GCVE-1988-2026-0528
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/8956114… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/b… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-… | |
| https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybe… |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Johnson Controls |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2026-27871
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"value": "CVE-ID:\nCVE-2026-27871\nVendor of Product:\nJohnson Controls (formerly Tyco / DSC)\nAffected Product Code Base:\nTL280, 5.62.04.003 (latest)\nAffected Component:\nCommunication with the Integration server\nSuggested description:\nThe DSC Neo alarm system can interface with \u201cintegration servers\u201d to notify about alarm events. These \u201cintegration servers\u201d can also send arm/disarm events to the alarm system. The \u201cType 2\u201d (ITv2) communication between the TL280 and \u201cintegration servers\u201d uses AES in ECB mode. ECB mode is a weak, broken cryptography mode. It does not provide forward secrecy; there is no mutual authentication, and a single shared key is used to secure the communication. Only weak integrity protection (CRC) is provided in the protocol.\nAdditional Information:\nDuring the initial setup, the fixed key 12345678123456781234567812345678 is used for the communication.\nAttack Type:\nNetwork\nCVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.0 Critical\nVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\nContributing Weakness: AES-ECB Mode (CWE-327) - this advisory\nContributing Weakness: Default Cryptographic Key (CWE-1394) - 12345678123456781234567812345678\nCombined Impact: An attacker who can observe the initial TL280\nhandshake (which uses a default key) can decrypt the negotiated\nAES session key. All subsequent panel\u003c-\u003ecloud communications are\nthen readable, including user disarm codes and installer access\ncodes. The use of AES-ECB mode with no proper replay protection allows\nthe attacker to replay previously captured disarm commands,\nsilently changing the alarm state from armed to disarmed. The\npanel logs a sequence mismatch error but executes the command.\nAffected data includes:\n- User arm/disarm PIN codes\n- Installer programming codes\n- Motion sensor activation events (enabling occupancy profiling)\n- System configuration and zone status\nPhysical security impact: Complete silent defeat of intrusion\ndetection for homes and businesses protected by this system.\nHas the vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability?\nYes. Reported via VulnCheck (CNA coordinator) on 2026-02-16. The Johnson Controls PSIRT confirmed receipt on 2026-02-27, assigned CVE-2026-27871 on 2026-03-24 with the title \"DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\", reproduced the issue, and committed to a patch by 2026-08-01.\nVendor contact point: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/resources#Contact...\nVulnerability Type:\nOther\nCWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\nDiscoverer:\nz\nReference:\nhttps://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/CVE-2026-27871.mdhttp...\nDisclosure timeline:\nCoordinated through VulnCheck (disclosure@vulncheck.com), with Johnson Controls PSIRT as the supplier CNA. Reporter credited as \"z\".\n- 2026-02-16 \u2014 Vulnerability reported to VulnCheck.\n- 2026-02-18 \u2014 VulnCheck confirms receipt; engages Johnson Controls (supplier CNA) for determination and CVE assignment. 120-day disclosure deadline set to 2026-06-18. Reporter shares the Wireshark dissector (decrypts panel\u2194cloud traffic given the static key and a captured session start) and notes the documented default setup key 12345678123456781234567812345678 plus a suspected key-exchange that would expose all future session keys.\n- 2026-02-19 \u2014 Reporter sends supporting references (OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-131A, Schneier) on why ECB is disallowed.\n- 2026-02-27 \u2014 Johnson Controls confirms receipt of the report.\n- 2026-03-24 \u2014 Johnson Controls PSIRT assigns CVE-2026-27871, title \"DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\"; CISA coordination draft in progress.\n- 2026-03-25 \u2014 Reporter shares PoC: (1) screenshot (tl280_AES_ECB.png) of the dissector decrypting initial TL280\u2192cloud setup traffic, highlighting the server\u0027s 0x0632 (Change_Static_Keys) command \u2014 passive capture of the first session allows decryption of all future traffic, including user/installer codes; (2) screen recording demonstrating that a replayed disarm packet disarms the panel even without knowing any keys/codes, and despite the panel returning a sequence-number error.\n- 2026-04-23 \u2014 VulnCheck follows up with Johnson Controls (no update).\n- 2026-05-06 \u2014 Johnson Controls reports it is reproducing the issue; final fix tracking to ~September/October 2026; requests deadline extension.\n- 2026-05-14 \u2014 Johnson Controls provisionally allocates CVE-2026-27871 in its Trust Center case platform and proposes a 2026-08-31 deadline.\n- 2026-05-21 \u2014 Reporter agrees to an extension only to 2026-08-01.\n- 2026-06-02 \u2014 Johnson Controls PSIRT agrees to the 2026-08-01 deadline; states a patch is expected by 2026-08-01.\n- 2026-06-06 \u2014 Reporter acknowledges.\n- 2026-08-01 - This advisory published, no information on any patches from the vendor.\n- 2026-08-03 - 5.63 is allegedly published to fix these, could not download it, could not test it. Johnson Controls is silent, no communication from their side even though August 1 was an agreed date for disclosure. Bad CNA.\nPS: you might find some other goodies in the repo"
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