GCVE-1988-2026-0504

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 scenario ping condition command injection through the auto-executing ping thread (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa MAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated administrator converts one saved monitoring-condition field into recurring, product-scheduled arbitrary command execution, because the thread that implements the scenario ping condition builds its command line from the condition's stored parameter values and hands them to a shell, and no layer of the backend inspects what those values hold. The delivery needs no second request: the product's own scenario watchdog evaluates the condition on its schedule, which also makes the payload recur on every evaluation cycle until the condition is deleted. This is one of three independent command injection findings documented for this product and released together as a set. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in the Scenario model at /home/model/scenario/scenario.py inside the ARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor's MIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0 management application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji middleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6 model scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The scenario facility is how an operator automates behaviour on a schedule; a condition of type ping is the canonical connectivity check. A saved ping condition carries a parameter object with ip (required), interface (defaulting to eth0) and times (defaulting to 3). When the watchdog reaches the condition it starts a background thread whose run method assembles ``` cmd = "ping %s -c 1 -w 5 -I %s " % (ip, interface) subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) ``` The interpolation is textual into a single string handed to /bin/sh, so the stored bytes are parsed as command syntax, and both stored fields - ip and interface - sit in operand positions of the same template, giving two stored fields of one class inside one condition. The values got there through PUT /api/v1/scenario, where the model's put handler validates only that the submitted data object exists and is non-empty. No parameter value is examined at any layer of the stack: not by the Express middleware, not by the message translation, not on the broker leg, not at storage, and not when the thread reads the condition back. Two payload-engineering results are published with the finding because they were measured, not intuited. The template places the stored ip value before the -c 1 and -w 5 flags, so the naive semicolon form that works against several other sinks does not fit here: it splits the line in front of the count flag, leaves an unbounded ping in the foreground of the evaluating thread, and in the replication record the marker never appeared before the thread was torn down. The two verified forms are a command substitution, which the shell expands during command expansion before the ping binary even starts and whose expansion result is discarded into the ping operand, and a newline separator, which leaves the ping its own line with the flags intact and runs the injected text as a second command line. The failing form is also a finding in its own right: the same unvalidated field, used with the naive form, turns the monitoring thread into a blocked thread - a denial-of-service lever against the product's scenario machinery. The one-request chain looks like this after login: ``` PUT /api/v1/scenario {"data": {"condition": [{ "name": "connectivity_check", "type": "ping", "parameter": { "ip": "$(id > <marker>)", "interface": "eth0", "times": 3 }}]}} -> stored verbatim (the put handler checks only that data exists, is non-empty); the watchdog's next evaluation starts the thread -> cmd = "ping $(id > <marker>) -c 1 -w 5 -I eth0 " -> the shell expands the substitution before ping execs; the marker carries the proof, ping then exits quickly, and the condition re-evaluates on the next cycle ``` Authentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only authentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session for every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against bcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. The PUT that stores the payload requires the session; past that check there is no second authorisation layer, the broker leg carries no identity, and the model implements no permission judgement, so the product's single documented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary. The listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no WAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact 5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2, Privileges Required High being the product's single administrator role. A labelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs the factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware's SQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8 Critical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a changed credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a separate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading of 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product role, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which lowered the researchers' own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and running scheduled monitoring through the management plane is the product's design rather than an escape. Verification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the finding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware's own application sources establish the scenario write path, the write handler's validation scope and the thread construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the exact template with the same shell=True launch and both pipes captured, executed under the substitution form, the newline form, the naive semicolon form and a benign control. Both verified forms produced a marker file containing uid=0(root); the naive form produced no marker in the tested window, for the unbounded-ping reason described above; the control ran a normal bounded ping and produced nothing. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against powered-on hardware, including the watchdog's exact evaluation interval, is outside this research record, and the on-device model process identity was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root) is the replication sandbox's identity and nothing broader rests on it. Impact. Recurring arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model process, begun by one authenticated configuration write and delivered by the product's own periodic evaluation. The execution is not a one-shot and needs no persistence work: the saved condition re-evaluates on every cycle until deleted, and the payload survives reboots because it is stored configuration, so deleting the malicious condition is the only ordinary remediation short of a patch. The compromise yields the router's complete configuration, control of the monitoring-as-automation features on a device deployed as communication infrastructure, and availability at will. Detection is structurally quiet - the executing process is the product's own monitoring thread - so the readable signals are content-level: a saved ping condition whose ip or interface contains a dollar-parenthesis, semicolon, pipe, backtick or newline; ping processes running with no count flag; unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web stack's separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across the API surface - which lets an intruder enumerate saved scenarios, including a poisoned one, without a login - is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not part of this chain. Remediation: run the connectivity check without a shell, as an argument vector or library call, which removes the metacharacter question from the thread entirely and eliminates the unbounded-ping failure mode; validate condition parameters at the model's write boundary where they are stored - address form for ip, interface selector form for interface, bounded numeric for times; reject failing conditions rather than storing them for the watchdog; give the evaluation machinery a failure budget, reaping threads that outlive it and logging evaluations that produce unexpected process trees; and treat the recurring property as a design rule: any value a scheduled reaction will eventually consume must be validated at store time, because the schedule converts a stored input into an automatically repeated one. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory default administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management listener off WAN-facing addresses, sweep saved scenarios for ping conditions with metacharacter-bearing parameters, and disable the scenario feature where scheduled monitoring is not used. Proof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3 client that drives the entry path: it logs in, reads the current scenario configuration, saves a ping condition whose parameter.ip carries the substitution-form payload, and reports what the condition will do on the next evaluation. It takes target, credential, command and timeout arguments; the default target is loopback; it verifies each response and exits non-zero with an explicit message on failure. It deliberately does not attempt to compute or drive the watchdog's interval. No persistence, reverse shell or destructive step; the default command writes one marker file. Use it only against systems you own or are authorised to test. The vendor's product security team mailbox, published on the vendor's own security advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no report form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was asked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply, and remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding. Two companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this one, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a different model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an Executer program-activation injection through the stored argument field of a shell-interpreted program launch, and an IPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands, both at the second and third URLs below. Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published unconditionally: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection Companion advisories for the same product, independent findings: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com ________________
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Moxa MAR-2000 firmware Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "MAR-2000 firmware",
          "vendor": "Moxa",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa\nMAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image\nFWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated\nadministrator converts one saved monitoring-condition field into recurring,\nproduct-scheduled arbitrary command execution, because the thread that\nimplements the scenario ping condition builds its command line from the\ncondition\u0027s stored parameter values and hands them to a shell, and no layer\nof the backend inspects what those values hold. The delivery needs no second\nrequest: the product\u0027s own scenario watchdog evaluates the condition on its\nschedule, which also makes the payload recur on every evaluation cycle until\nthe condition is deleted. This is one of three independent command injection\nfindings documented for this product and released together as a set.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in\nthe Scenario model at /home/model/scenario/scenario.py inside the ARM\nDebian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor\u0027s MIRF\n(Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0\nmanagement application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji\nmiddleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6\nmodel scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The scenario\nfacility is how an operator automates behaviour on a schedule; a condition\nof type ping is the canonical connectivity check. A saved ping condition\ncarries a parameter object with ip (required), interface (defaulting to\neth0) and times (defaulting to 3). When the watchdog reaches the condition\nit starts a background thread whose run method assembles\n\n```\ncmd = \"ping %s -c 1 -w 5 -I %s \" % (ip, interface)\nsubprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)\n```\n\nThe interpolation is textual into a single string handed to /bin/sh, so the\nstored bytes are parsed as command syntax, and both stored fields - ip and\ninterface - sit in operand positions of the same template, giving two\nstored fields of one class inside one condition. The values got there\nthrough PUT /api/v1/scenario, where the model\u0027s put handler validates only\nthat the submitted data object exists and is non-empty. No parameter value\nis examined at any layer of the stack: not by the Express middleware, not\nby the message translation, not on the broker leg, not at storage, and not\nwhen the thread reads the condition back.\n\nTwo payload-engineering results are published with the finding because they\nwere measured, not intuited. The template places the stored ip value before\nthe -c 1 and -w 5 flags, so the naive semicolon form that works against\nseveral other sinks does not fit here: it splits the line in front of the\ncount flag, leaves an unbounded ping in the foreground of the evaluating\nthread, and in the replication record the marker never appeared before the\nthread was torn down. The two verified forms are a command substitution,\nwhich the shell expands during command expansion before the ping binary even\nstarts and whose expansion result is discarded into the ping operand, and a\nnewline separator, which leaves the ping its own line with the flags intact\nand runs the injected text as a second command line. The failing form is\nalso a finding in its own right: the same unvalidated field, used with the\nnaive form, turns the monitoring thread into a blocked thread - a\ndenial-of-service lever against the product\u0027s scenario machinery.\n\nThe one-request chain looks like this after login:\n\n```\nPUT /api/v1/scenario\n{\"data\": {\"condition\": [{\n    \"name\": \"connectivity_check\",\n    \"type\": \"ping\",\n    \"parameter\": {\n        \"ip\": \"$(id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e)\",\n        \"interface\": \"eth0\",\n        \"times\": 3\n    }}]}}\n-\u003e stored verbatim (the put handler checks only that data exists,\n   is non-empty); the watchdog\u0027s next evaluation starts the thread\n-\u003e cmd = \"ping $(id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e) -c 1 -w 5 -I eth0 \"\n-\u003e the shell expands the substitution before ping execs; the\n   marker carries the proof, ping then exits quickly, and the\n   condition re-evaluates on the next cycle\n```\n\nAuthentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only\nauthentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session\nfor every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against\nbcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. The PUT that stores the\npayload requires the session; past that check there is no second\nauthorisation layer, the broker leg carries no identity, and the model\nimplements no permission judgement, so the product\u0027s single documented\nrole, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary. The\nlistener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no WAN\nexposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact\n5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,\nPrivileges Required High being the product\u0027s single administrator role. A\nlabelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs\nthe factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware\u0027s\nSQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8\nCritical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a\nchanged credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a\nseparate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading\nof 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant.\nThe score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind\nthis advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure\nis the arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged\nproduct role, and every published number was recomputed from its own\nvector - which lowered the researchers\u0027 own figure by 1.6 points. A\nScope-Changed reading computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published,\nbecause the model process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance\nauthority, and running scheduled monitoring through the management plane\nis the product\u0027s design rather than an escape.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the\nfinding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware\u0027s own\napplication sources establish the scenario write path, the write handler\u0027s\nvalidation scope and the thread construction, read from the shipped files.\nThe dynamic layer is a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux\nsandbox: the exact template with the same shell=True launch and both pipes\ncaptured, executed under the substitution form, the newline form, the naive\nsemicolon form and a benign control. Both verified forms produced a marker\nfile containing uid=0(root); the naive form produced no marker in the tested\nwindow, for the unbounded-ping reason described above; the control ran a\nnormal bounded ping and produced nothing. The boundary is stated plainly:\nend-to-end detonation against powered-on hardware, including the\nwatchdog\u0027s exact evaluation interval, is outside this research record, and\nthe on-device model process identity was neither measured nor claimed -\nuid=0(root) is the replication sandbox\u0027s identity and nothing broader\nrests on it.\n\nImpact. Recurring arbitrary command execution as the identity of the\nPython model process, begun by one authenticated configuration write and\ndelivered by the product\u0027s own periodic evaluation. The execution is not a\none-shot and needs no persistence work: the saved condition re-evaluates on\nevery cycle until deleted, and the payload survives reboots because it is\nstored configuration, so deleting the malicious condition is the only\nordinary remediation short of a patch. The compromise yields the router\u0027s\ncomplete configuration, control of the monitoring-as-automation features on\na device deployed as communication infrastructure, and availability at\nwill. Detection is structurally quiet - the executing process is the\nproduct\u0027s own monitoring thread - so the readable signals are\ncontent-level: a saved ping condition whose ip or interface contains a\ndollar-parenthesis, semicolon, pipe, backtick or newline; ping processes\nrunning with no count flag; unexpected child processes under the model\ndaemon. The web stack\u0027s separate property of answering unauthenticated GET\nrequests across the API surface - which lets an intruder enumerate saved\nscenarios, including a poisoned one, without a login - is a read-exposure\nissue reported on its own and is not part of this chain.\n\nRemediation: run the connectivity check without a shell, as an argument\nvector or library call, which removes the metacharacter question from the\nthread entirely and eliminates the unbounded-ping failure mode; validate\ncondition parameters at the model\u0027s write boundary where they are stored -\naddress form for ip, interface selector form for interface, bounded numeric\nfor times; reject failing conditions rather than storing them for the\nwatchdog; give the evaluation machinery a failure budget, reaping threads\nthat outlive it and logging evaluations that produce unexpected process\ntrees; and treat the recurring property as a design rule: any value a\nscheduled reaction will eventually consume must be validated at store\ntime, because the schedule converts a stored input into an automatically\nrepeated one. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory default\nadministrator credential at commissioning, keep the management listener\noff WAN-facing addresses, sweep saved scenarios for ping conditions with\nmetacharacter-bearing parameters, and disable the scenario feature where\nscheduled monitoring is not used.\n\nProof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3\nclient that drives the entry path: it logs in, reads the current scenario\nconfiguration, saves a ping condition whose parameter.ip carries the\nsubstitution-form payload, and reports what the condition will do on the\nnext evaluation. It takes target, credential, command and timeout\narguments; the default target is loopback; it verifies each response and\nexits non-zero with an explicit message on failure. It deliberately does\nnot attempt to compute or drive the watchdog\u0027s interval. No persistence,\nreverse shell or destructive step; the default command writes one marker\nfile. Use it only against systems you own or are authorised to test.\n\nThe vendor\u0027s product security team mailbox, published on the vendor\u0027s own\nsecurity advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no\nreport form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This\ndisclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was\nasked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,\nand remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability\nidentifier has been assigned to this finding.\n\nTwo companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this\none, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a\ndifferent model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an\nExecuter program-activation injection through the stored argument field of\na shell-interpreted program launch, and an IPsec tunnel address injection\nthrough the route-management shell commands, both at the second and third\nURLs below.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection\n\nCompanion advisories for the same product, independent findings:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n________________"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-20",
              "description": "CWE-20",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/55"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/55"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/55"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 scenario ping condition command injection through the auto-executing ping thread (7.2)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0504",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/55",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "bd54cb1f0a8d0dd62a3289db8dbbbe1fa1b09ce63a65c32cabfb1d0b13740ba0",
            "evidenceScore": 11,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/55",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-27T16:39:17Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0504"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.