GCVE-1988-2026-0503

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 IPsec tunnel address command injection through the route-management shell commands (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa MAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated administrator converts one stored VPN address field into arbitrary command execution as the identity of the product's model process, because the IPsec model manages the tunnel's addresses and routes by interpolating stored, never-validated configuration values into shell command lines. The payload is committed by one request and executes at a lifecycle moment the product performs on its own. This is one of three independent command injection findings documented for this product and released together as a set. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in the IPsec model at /home/model/network/ipsec/ipsec.py inside the ARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor's MIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0 management application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji middleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6 model scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores tunnelModeTable - whose keys include localVpnIp, tunnelRemoteVpnIp and tunnelRemoteVpnInterface - together with transModeTable, as JSON configuration written through the authenticated PUT /api/v1/network/ipsec resource. When the IPsec service applies the tunnel, the model calls its lifecycle functions, and every one of the four interpolates the stored fields into an ip command line and hands it to subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True): ``` add_ip: cmd = 'ip addr add %s dev eth%s' % (localVpnIp + '/' + <computed subnet part>, tunnelRemoteVpnInterface) del_ip: 'ip addr del %s dev eth%s' with the same stored fields add_route: cmd = 'ip route add to %s via %s src %s' % (ipRange, localVpnIp, localVpnIp) del_route: cmd = 'ip route del %s' % ipRange ``` The stored value sits at the front of the command line, ahead of every literal token the product contributes, so a semicolon inside the value ends the ip operation before any product token can interfere with the injected statement. One stored localVpnIp arms several commands at once: it is the operand of add_ip and del_ip and both the via and src operands of add_route, so whichever lifecycle function a tunnel apply reaches first carries the payload. The write side applies exactly one filter, clean_data(), whose entire behaviour is to delete dictionary keys the model does not recognise: no value is inspected, an address format is never checked, and the payload rides a key the whitelist expects, so the filter is not even encountered as an obstacle. An administrator who stores "10.10.10.1; <command>; #" in that field has authored ``` ip addr add 10.10.10.1; <command>; #/24 dev eth0 ``` - the ip segment fails harmlessly as an address operation, the injected statement executes under the shell, and the hash sign comments away the template tail. A fifth related construction sits in the same model: update_config_file() assembles IPsec configuration lines interpolating transModeTable's transServerIp and transClientIp into the stored configuration file - the same unvalidated-field pattern, not exercised in this research record, reported as structure rather than as a detonated sink. Authentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only authentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session for every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against bcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. The PUT that plants the payload requires the session; past that check there is no second authorisation layer, the broker leg carries no identity, and the model implements no permission judgement, so the product's single documented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary. The listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no WAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact 5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2, Privileges Required High being the product's single administrator role. A labelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs the factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware's SQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8 Critical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a changed credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a separate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading of 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product role, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which lowered the researchers' own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and managing the appliance's interfaces and routes through its management plane is the product's design rather than an escape. Verification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the finding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware's own application sources establish the configuration write, the key-only validation, and the four command constructions, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: each of the four constructions, with the same template, the same field position and the same shell=True hand-off, was executed with an injected address value and separately with a benign control. All four produced a marker file containing uid=0(root) under the payload; the control produced no marker and no side effect of any kind. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against powered-on hardware, including the exact tunnel-apply moment at which the stored value is consumed, is outside this research record, and the on-device model process identity was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root) is the replication sandbox's identity and nothing broader rests on it. Impact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model process, begun by one authenticated configuration write and delivered by a lifecycle step the product performs on its own, with no race and no protocol manipulation anywhere in the chain. The payload is stored configuration: it persists across reboots, is read fresh at each tunnel application, and the same single field reaches several sinks at once. The executing process is the device's own model daemon performing a routine-sounding job, so detection signals are content-level: tunnel-table values whose address operand contains a semicolon, pipe, dollar-parenthesis, backtick or newline; unexplained child processes under the model daemon; ip command failures whose operand text contains shell metacharacters - and a legitimate address never contains any of them. Reaching the route-management sinks also means owning the device's forwarding state, on a device deployed as communication infrastructure. The web stack's separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across the API surface - which lets an intruder enumerate stored tunnel settings - is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not part of this chain. Remediation: manage addresses and routes without a shell, building each ip operation as an argument vector launched without /bin/sh, which removes the metacharacter question for all four constructions at once; validate every address-shaped field at the model's write boundary so the component that interpolates the value rejects non-addresses, not only a web form the backend cannot assume is the only writer; turn clean_data() into a value validator at that natural choke point; treat the configuration-file assembly under the same rule; and add a regression test that stores a metacharacter-bearing localVpnIp, drives a tunnel apply, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without shell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory default administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management listener off WAN-facing addresses, audit stored IPsec tunnel tables for shell metacharacters, and disable IPsec where tunnels are not used so the model's lifecycle has nothing to apply. Proof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3 client that drives the entry path: it logs in, reads the current IPsec configuration, writes the tunnel table's local VPN address field carrying the payload, and reports what the stored value will do at each of the four constructions and at which lifecycle occasion the model consumes it. It takes target, credential, command and timeout arguments; the default target is loopback; it verifies each response and exits non-zero with an explicit message on failure. It does not attempt to drive the tunnel lifecycle itself, and no persistence, reverse shell or destructive action is implemented. Use it only against systems you own or are authorised to test. The vendor's product security team mailbox, published on the vendor's own security advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no report form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was asked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply, and remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding. Two companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this one, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a different model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an Executer program-activation injection through the stored argument field of a shell-interpreted program launch, and a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping thread, both at the second and third URLs below. Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published unconditionally: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection Companion advisories for the same product, independent findings: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Moxa MAR-2000 firmware Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "MAR-2000 firmware",
          "vendor": "Moxa",
          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
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          "type": "finder",
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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa\nMAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image\nFWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated\nadministrator converts one stored VPN address field into arbitrary command\nexecution as the identity of the product\u0027s model process, because the IPsec\nmodel manages the tunnel\u0027s addresses and routes by interpolating stored,\nnever-validated configuration values into shell command lines. The payload\nis committed by one request and executes at a lifecycle moment the product\nperforms on its own. This is one of three independent command injection\nfindings documented for this product and released together as a set.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in\nthe IPsec model at /home/model/network/ipsec/ipsec.py inside the ARM\nDebian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor\u0027s MIRF\n(Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0\nmanagement application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji\nmiddleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6\nmodel scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores\ntunnelModeTable - whose keys include localVpnIp, tunnelRemoteVpnIp and\ntunnelRemoteVpnInterface - together with transModeTable, as JSON\nconfiguration written through the authenticated PUT /api/v1/network/ipsec\nresource. When the IPsec service applies the tunnel, the model calls its\nlifecycle functions, and every one of the four interpolates the stored\nfields into an ip command line and hands it to\nsubprocess.call(cmd, shell=True):\n\n```\nadd_ip:    cmd = \u0027ip addr add %s dev eth%s\u0027 % (localVpnIp + \u0027/\u0027\n                + \u003ccomputed subnet part\u003e, tunnelRemoteVpnInterface)\ndel_ip:    \u0027ip addr del %s dev eth%s\u0027 with the same stored fields\nadd_route: cmd = \u0027ip route add to %s via %s src %s\u0027 % (ipRange,\n                localVpnIp, localVpnIp)\ndel_route: cmd = \u0027ip route del %s\u0027 % ipRange\n```\n\nThe stored value sits at the front of the command line, ahead of every\nliteral token the product contributes, so a semicolon inside the value ends\nthe ip operation before any product token can interfere with the injected\nstatement. One stored localVpnIp arms several commands at once: it is the\noperand of add_ip and del_ip and both the via and src operands of\nadd_route, so whichever lifecycle function a tunnel apply reaches first\ncarries the payload. The write side applies exactly one filter,\nclean_data(), whose entire behaviour is to delete dictionary keys the model\ndoes not recognise: no value is inspected, an address format is never\nchecked, and the payload rides a key the whitelist expects, so the filter\nis not even encountered as an obstacle. An administrator who stores\n\"10.10.10.1; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\" in that field has authored\n\n```\nip addr add 10.10.10.1; \u003ccommand\u003e; #/24 dev eth0\n```\n\n- the ip segment fails harmlessly as an address operation, the injected\nstatement executes under the shell, and the hash sign comments away the\ntemplate tail. A fifth related construction sits in the same model:\nupdate_config_file() assembles IPsec configuration lines interpolating\ntransModeTable\u0027s transServerIp and transClientIp into the stored\nconfiguration file - the same unvalidated-field pattern, not exercised in\nthis research record, reported as structure rather than as a detonated\nsink.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only\nauthentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session\nfor every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against\nbcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. The PUT that plants the\npayload requires the session; past that check there is no second\nauthorisation layer, the broker leg carries no identity, and the model\nimplements no permission judgement, so the product\u0027s single documented\nrole, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary. The\nlistener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no WAN\nexposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact\n5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,\nPrivileges Required High being the product\u0027s single administrator role. A\nlabelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs\nthe factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware\u0027s\nSQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8\nCritical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a\nchanged credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a\nseparate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading\nof 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant.\nThe score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind\nthis advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure\nis the arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged\nproduct role, and every published number was recomputed from its own\nvector - which lowered the researchers\u0027 own figure by 1.6 points. A\nScope-Changed reading computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published,\nbecause the model process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance\nauthority, and managing the appliance\u0027s interfaces and routes through its\nmanagement plane is the product\u0027s design rather than an escape.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the\nfinding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware\u0027s own\napplication sources establish the configuration write, the key-only\nvalidation, and the four command constructions, read from the shipped\nfiles. The dynamic layer is a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud\nLinux sandbox: each of the four constructions, with the same template, the\nsame field position and the same shell=True hand-off, was executed with an\ninjected address value and separately with a benign control. All four\nproduced a marker file containing uid=0(root) under the payload; the\ncontrol produced no marker and no side effect of any kind. The boundary is\nstated plainly: end-to-end detonation against powered-on hardware,\nincluding the exact tunnel-apply moment at which the stored value is\nconsumed, is outside this research record, and the on-device model process\nidentity was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root) is the replication\nsandbox\u0027s identity and nothing broader rests on it.\n\nImpact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model\nprocess, begun by one authenticated configuration write and delivered by a\nlifecycle step the product performs on its own, with no race and no\nprotocol manipulation anywhere in the chain. The payload is stored\nconfiguration: it persists across reboots, is read fresh at each tunnel\napplication, and the same single field reaches several sinks at once. The\nexecuting process is the device\u0027s own model daemon performing a\nroutine-sounding job, so detection signals are content-level: tunnel-table\nvalues whose address operand contains a semicolon, pipe,\ndollar-parenthesis, backtick or newline; unexplained child processes under\nthe model daemon; ip command failures whose operand text contains shell\nmetacharacters - and a legitimate address never contains any of them.\nReaching the route-management sinks also means owning the device\u0027s\nforwarding state, on a device deployed as communication infrastructure. The\nweb stack\u0027s separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests\nacross the API surface - which lets an intruder enumerate stored tunnel\nsettings - is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not part of\nthis chain.\n\nRemediation: manage addresses and routes without a shell, building each ip\noperation as an argument vector launched without /bin/sh, which removes the\nmetacharacter question for all four constructions at once; validate every\naddress-shaped field at the model\u0027s write boundary so the component that\ninterpolates the value rejects non-addresses, not only a web form the\nbackend cannot assume is the only writer; turn clean_data() into a value\nvalidator at that natural choke point; treat the configuration-file\nassembly under the same rule; and add a regression test that stores a\nmetacharacter-bearing localVpnIp, drives a tunnel apply, and asserts\nrejection at write time or execution without shell interpretation.\nOperators until a patch exists: change the factory default administrator\ncredential at commissioning, keep the management listener off WAN-facing\naddresses, audit stored IPsec tunnel tables for shell metacharacters, and\ndisable IPsec where tunnels are not used so the model\u0027s lifecycle has\nnothing to apply.\n\nProof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3\nclient that drives the entry path: it logs in, reads the current IPsec\nconfiguration, writes the tunnel table\u0027s local VPN address field carrying\nthe payload, and reports what the stored value will do at each of the four\nconstructions and at which lifecycle occasion the model consumes it. It\ntakes target, credential, command and timeout arguments; the default target\nis loopback; it verifies each response and exits non-zero with an explicit\nmessage on failure. It does not attempt to drive the tunnel lifecycle\nitself, and no persistence, reverse shell or destructive action is\nimplemented. Use it only against systems you own or are authorised to test.\n\nThe vendor\u0027s product security team mailbox, published on the vendor\u0027s own\nsecurity advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no\nreport form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This\ndisclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was\nasked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,\nand remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability\nidentifier has been assigned to this finding.\n\nTwo companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this\none, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a\ndifferent model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an\nExecuter program-activation injection through the stored argument field of\na shell-interpreted program launch, and a scenario ping condition injection\nthrough the auto-executing ping thread, both at the second and third URLs\nbelow.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection\n\nCompanion advisories for the same product, independent findings:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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