GCVE-1988-2026-0452

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:29 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:29
VLAI
Title
1-click MMI/USSD execution in Android via CALL_PHONE and browser-reachable dialer deeplinks (ACR Phone / com.nll.cb)
Summary
Android's CALL_PHONE permission, shown to users as "make and manage phone calls", also authorises execution of carrier MMI/USSD codes against the SIM. The permission text does not mention this, no confirmation is shown before execution -- a transient "USSD code running" dialog appears only afterwards -- and MMI execution writes no call log entry. Where a CALL_PHONE-holding app also exposes a browser-reachable deeplink into an auto-dial path, the capability becomes remotely triggerable with a single tap. Demonstrated against ACR Phone / Cube ACR (com.nll.cb, 5M+ installs), which declares an intent filter carrying action CALL_BUTTON, category BROWSABLE and a tel: scheme, resolving to an activity that dials rather than pre-fills. Chrome's intent: URI syntax lets a page nominate an arbitrary action, and Chrome's only check is that the resolved filter declares BROWSABLE, so the string executes under ACR's own CALL_PHONE grant rather than any grant held by the browser. No chooser appears (ACR is the sole handler) and no confirmation is requested. The terminating hash must be percent-encoded as %23 -- a literal # parses, but is lost further down the dial path, and the remainder is placed as an ordinary call. intent:*21*5550000000%23#Intent;scheme=tel;action=android.intent.action.CALL_BUTTON;end One tap registers unconditional call forwarding to the attacker's number. Incoming calls -- including voice-delivered OTPs and bank verification callbacks -- are then delivered to the attacker. Registration is held in the carrier network rather than on the handset, so it survives reboot, uninstalling the app and a factory reset, and persists until cancelled. Clear with ##21#, interrogate with *#21#. Both *21*<n>%23 and **21*<n>%23 register. Preconditions for the demonstration: ACR must hold CALL_PHONE and the DIALER role. Both are the ordinary state for a dialer replacement, but neither is automatic. The role matters twice over -- ACR's own DialerActivity.a0() redirects to setup without it, and Android 14 added a platform check that refuses dangerous MMI codes from a non-default dialer, which ACR being the default dialer satisfies. Of 88 call, dialer and VoIP apps scanned at the manifest level, 66 declared CALL_PHONE and 54 exposed some browser-reachable dial surface; most pre-fill rather than dial, so whether any given one is exploitable turns on its own deeplink handling, while the platform grants the underlying capability to all of them uniformly. A related Android 17 change removes the need for a vulnerable third-party app altogether. Telecom moved into the com.android.telephonycore mainline module and its UI into a separate privileged application; com.android.server.telecom is now a shim whose UserCallActivity re-starts the intent against com.google.android.telecomui, which calls TelecomManager.placeCall() as itself. The launching package is not carried across. placeCall() binds the caller to the binder UID, and telecomui holds CALL_PRIVILEGED, so the dangerous-MMI check -- which still runs on every call -- is evaluated against telecomui and passes. A plain **21*<number># sent via ACTION_CALL by an app holding only CALL_PHONE, with no dialer role, is therefore dispatched as an MMI code. Reported separately; confirmed on an emulator only. Tested on: Samsung Galaxy M16 5G, Android 16 (One UI 8.5), build BP4A.251205.006.M166PXXS7DZG1, security patch level 5 July 2026, against a live Airtel India network (single-asterisk form). Reproduced on Android 14 (API 34) and Android 17 (API 37, patch 2026-07-05) emulators, double-asterisk form against the simulated network. Vendor status: Google closed the platform report as Won't Fix (Infeasible), assessing it as insecure deeplink handling in third-party dialers rather than an Android vulnerability. The Android 17 trampoline report was closed as a duplicate of an earlier internal report. The ACR Phone developer responded within 48 minutes and committed a fix to the next release; the Play release is pending Google's review. Timeline: 12 Sep 2026 - Reported to the Android & Google Devices VRP 14 Sep 2026 - Android 17 retest added; TelecomUi trampoline reported separately 17 Sep 2026 - Platform report closed Won't Fix (Infeasible) 24 Sep 2026 - Trampoline report closed as duplicate of an internal Google report 25 Sep 2026 - Request to be added to that report declined 09 Oct 2026 - Reported to the ACR Phone developer; acknowledged, fix committed 09 Oct 2026 - Public disclosure Full write-up: https://karansaini.com/mmi-android/ Sincerely, Karan Saini _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown 1-click MMI/USSD execution Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Karan Saini"
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          "value": "Android\u0027s CALL_PHONE permission, shown to users as \"make and manage phone\ncalls\", also authorises execution of carrier MMI/USSD codes against the SIM.\nThe permission text does not mention this, no confirmation is shown before\nexecution -- a transient \"USSD code running\" dialog appears only afterwards\n--\nand MMI execution writes no call log entry. Where a CALL_PHONE-holding app\nalso\nexposes a browser-reachable deeplink into an auto-dial path, the capability\nbecomes remotely triggerable with a single tap.\n\nDemonstrated against ACR Phone / Cube ACR (com.nll.cb, 5M+ installs), which\ndeclares an intent filter carrying action CALL_BUTTON, category BROWSABLE\nand a\ntel: scheme, resolving to an activity that dials rather than pre-fills.\nChrome\u0027s\nintent: URI syntax lets a page nominate an arbitrary action, and Chrome\u0027s\nonly\ncheck is that the resolved filter declares BROWSABLE, so the string executes\nunder ACR\u0027s own CALL_PHONE grant rather than any grant held by the browser.\nNo\nchooser appears (ACR is the sole handler) and no confirmation is requested.\nThe\nterminating hash must be percent-encoded as %23 -- a literal # parses, but\nis\nlost further down the dial path, and the remainder is placed as an ordinary\ncall.\n\n\nintent:*21*5550000000%23#Intent;scheme=tel;action=android.intent.action.CALL_BUTTON;end\n\nOne tap registers unconditional call forwarding to the attacker\u0027s number.\nIncoming calls -- including voice-delivered OTPs and bank verification\ncallbacks\n-- are then delivered to the attacker. Registration is held in the carrier\nnetwork rather than on the handset, so it survives reboot, uninstalling the\napp\nand a factory reset, and persists until cancelled. Clear with ##21#,\ninterrogate\nwith *#21#. Both *21*\u003cn\u003e%23 and **21*\u003cn\u003e%23 register.\n\nPreconditions for the demonstration: ACR must hold CALL_PHONE and the DIALER\nrole. Both are the ordinary state for a dialer replacement, but neither is\nautomatic. The role matters twice over -- ACR\u0027s own DialerActivity.a0()\nredirects to setup without it, and Android 14 added a platform check that\nrefuses dangerous MMI codes from a non-default dialer, which ACR being the\ndefault dialer satisfies. Of 88 call, dialer and VoIP apps scanned at the\nmanifest level, 66 declared CALL_PHONE and 54 exposed some browser-reachable\ndial surface; most pre-fill rather than dial, so whether any given one is\nexploitable turns on its own deeplink handling, while the platform grants\nthe\nunderlying capability to all of them uniformly.\n\nA related Android 17 change removes the need for a vulnerable third-party\napp\naltogether. Telecom moved into the com.android.telephonycore mainline\nmodule and\nits UI into a separate privileged application; com.android.server.telecom\nis now\na shim whose UserCallActivity re-starts the intent against\ncom.google.android.telecomui, which calls TelecomManager.placeCall() as\nitself.\nThe launching package is not carried across. placeCall() binds the caller\nto the\nbinder UID, and telecomui holds CALL_PRIVILEGED, so the dangerous-MMI check\n--\nwhich still runs on every call -- is evaluated against telecomui and\npasses. A\nplain **21*\u003cnumber\u003e# sent via ACTION_CALL by an app holding only CALL_PHONE,\nwith no dialer role, is therefore dispatched as an MMI code. Reported\nseparately; confirmed on an emulator only.\n\nTested on: Samsung Galaxy M16 5G, Android 16 (One UI 8.5), build\nBP4A.251205.006.M166PXXS7DZG1, security patch level 5 July 2026, against a\nlive\nAirtel India network (single-asterisk form). Reproduced on Android 14 (API\n34)\nand Android 17 (API 37, patch 2026-07-05) emulators, double-asterisk form\nagainst the simulated network.\n\nVendor status: Google closed the platform report as Won\u0027t Fix (Infeasible),\nassessing it as insecure deeplink handling in third-party dialers rather\nthan an\nAndroid vulnerability. The Android 17 trampoline report was closed as a\nduplicate of an earlier internal report. The ACR Phone developer responded\nwithin 48 minutes and committed a fix to the next release; the Play release\nis\npending Google\u0027s review.\n\nTimeline:\n12 Sep 2026 - Reported to the Android \u0026 Google Devices VRP\n14 Sep 2026 - Android 17 retest added; TelecomUi trampoline reported\nseparately\n17 Sep 2026 - Platform report closed Won\u0027t Fix (Infeasible)\n24 Sep 2026 - Trampoline report closed as duplicate of an internal Google\nreport\n25 Sep 2026 - Request to be added to that report declined\n09 Oct 2026 - Reported to the ACR Phone developer; acknowledged, fix\ncommitted\n09 Oct 2026 - Public disclosure\n\nFull write-up:\nhttps://karansaini.com/mmi-android/\n\nSincerely,\nKaran Saini\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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