GCVE-1988-2026-0447
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:29 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:29| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| rocq-prover | rocq |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2020-37268
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "rocq",
"vendor": "rocq-prover",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jonathan Brossard"
}
],
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "1. Summary\n==========\nA soundness-audit bypass in the Rocq (formerly Coq) module system\nallows construction of a proof of False that Print Assumptions reports\nas closed under the global context \u2014 no axioms, no unsafe flags visible.\nWhen a module type declares Parameter Inline and functor application\ninlines the parameter\u0027s body, the metadata recording that the original\ndefinition was produced under Unset Universe Checking is dropped. Print\nAssumptions therefore sees no trace of the unsafe context, while the\nuniverse graph silently accepts inconsistent universe constraints from\nthe inlined body. This allows Girard\u0027s / Hurkens\u0027 paradox to prove\nFalse via universe polymorphism.\ncoqchk does reject the resulting compiled .vo file, but the in-process\nassumption audit (Print Assumptions) \u2014 the tool most Rocq/Coq users\nrely on \u2014 does not catch the issue.\nThis bug has been open since 2020 and is documented in the project\u0027s\nown dev/doc/critical-bugs.md. No fix has been merged as of Rocq 9.2.0.\n2. Context\n==========\nRocq (formerly Coq) is the reference implementation of the Calculus of\nInductive Constructions and one of the most widely deployed proof\nassistants. Print Assumptions is the standard command users and CI\npipelines run to verify that a proof does not depend on axioms or unsafe\nflags. It is the primary integrity check in most Rocq/Coq workflows.\nA bypass that makes Print Assumptions report a universe-inconsistent\nproof as clean undermines the trust model at the workflow level: the\nkernel itself is not unsound, but the tool users rely on to audit proofs\nproduces silently incorrect output.\nFormally verified systems certified under Common Criteria (ISO 15408) or\nDO-178C (airborne software) that use Print Assumptions as part of their\nverification chain are affected.\n3. Impact\n=========\n- Any workflow that relies on Print Assumptions as the sole integrity\ncheck \u2014 which is the default for most Rocq/Coq projects\n- Formally verified compilers (CompCert)\n- Verified OS kernels (CertiKOS)\n- Separation logic frameworks (Iris)\n- Mathematical libraries (MathComp)\n- Proof-carrying code: a malicious .v file in a dependency could\nintroduce unsound declarations that pass assumption auditing\n- Verified smart contracts (ConCert)\n- Any project not routinely running coqchk on compiled output\n4. Proof of Concept\n===================\nA Docker-reproducible PoC is available:\ngit clone https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-12155\ncd rocq-cve-poc-12155\ndocker build -t rocq-cve-poc-12155 .\ndocker run --rm rocq-cve-poc-12155\nOn a vulnerable version (Rocq 8.11 \u2013 9.2.0, all Coq 8.x with the\nmodule system), the output confirms the proof of 0 = 1 with Print\nAssumptions reporting it as closed (no axioms, no unsafe flags).\n5. Root Cause\n=============\nWhen a module type declares Parameter Inline, functor application\ninlines the parameter\u0027s body into the calling context. This inlining\ndiscards the metadata recording that the original definition was\nproduced under Unset Universe Checking. The universe graph therefore\naccepts inconsistent universe constraints from the inlined body, and\nPrint Assumptions sees no trace of the unsafe context.\nCWE-778: Insufficient Logging \u2014 the assumption-tracking subsystem\nfails to record the safety-critical flag state through the module\ninlining path.\n6. Scoring\n==========\nCVSS 3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N \u2014 7.1 (High)\nCVSS 4.0: AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N \u2014 6.8\n(Medium)\n7. CWE\n======\nCWE-778: Insufficient Logging\n8. CVE\n======\nCVE-2020-37268 (assigned by VulnCheck as CNA)\n9. Affected Versions\n====================\nCoq 8.11 \u2013 8.20 (all versions with the module system)\nRocq Prover 8.20 \u2013 9.2.0\nFixed in: UNFIXED as of Rocq 9.2.0.\n10. Mitigation\n==============\n- No patched version is available.\n- Run coqchk on all compiled .vo files before trusting proofs in\nproduction \u2014 coqchk catches the universe inconsistency that Print\nAssumptions misses.\n- Audit module dependencies for use of Parameter Inline compiled under\nUnset Universe Checking.\n11. References\n==============\nBug report: https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/issues/12155\nCritical bugs:\nhttps://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/blob/master/dev/doc/critical-bugs.md\nPoC: https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-12155\nVulnCheck:\nhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/coq-and-rocq-prover-print-assumptions-o...\nNVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-37268\n12. Timeline\n============\n2020 Bug reported by Jason Gross (coq/coq#12155)\n2020\u20132026 Bug remains open, documented in critical-bugs.md\n2026-08-24 CVE-2020-37268 published by VulnCheck\n2026-08-24 Docker-reproducible PoC published\n13. Credit\n==========\nBug discovery: Jason Gross\nPoC packaging: Jonathan Brossard (@endrazine) \u2014 MOABI / PSIRT.com"
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