GCVE-1988-2026-0446
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:29 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:29| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| rocq-prover | rocq |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2026-72714
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
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"product": "rocq",
"vendor": "rocq-prover",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jonathan Brossard"
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"value": "1. Summary\n==========\nA soundness bug in the Rocq (formerly Coq) kernel allows construction\nof a checked proof of False \u2014 and by extension, any proposition,\nincluding 0 = 1 \u2014 without axioms, plugins, or unsafe flags. Print\nAssumptions reports the proof as closed under the global context.\nThe module system does not correctly restore the universe checking flag\nwhen a module that locally disabled the check (`Local Unset Universe\nChecking`) is closed. The global flag is restored, but the universe\ngraph keeps its own copy of the flag, which remains disabled. Test\nUniverse Checking reports the check as enabled while the kernel still\naccepts universe-inconsistent terms. This allows Hurkens\u0027 paradox to\nprove False.\nThis is a 0-day: no fix has been merged as of Rocq 9.2.0.\nThis CVE was used to construct Millennium Problem forgeries \u2014 Docker-\nreproducible certificates \"proving\" the Riemann Hypothesis, Navier-\nStokes regularity, BSD conjecture, and Hodge conjecture, all passing\nPrint Assumptions with a clean axiom whitelist.\n2. Context\n==========\nRocq (formerly Coq) is the reference implementation of the Calculus of\nInductive Constructions and one of the most widely deployed proof\nassistants. Its kernel is the trusted core that checks every proof\nbefore acceptance. Universe checking is a critical safety mechanism:\nwithout it, Girard\u0027s paradox (via Hurkens\u0027 construction in the standard\nlibrary) can derive False.\nFormally verified systems certified under Common Criteria (ISO 15408) or\nDO-178C (airborne software) derive their assurance from the correctness\nof the proof checker. A kernel-level bypass invalidates that assurance\nchain.\nThe desynchronisation is particularly dangerous because Test Universe\nChecking reports the flag as enabled \u2014 neither the user nor automated\ntooling can detect the actual kernel state through the normal query\nmechanism.\n3. Impact\n=========\n- Formally verified compilers (CompCert)\n- Verified OS kernels (CertiKOS)\n- Separation logic frameworks (Iris)\n- Mathematical libraries (MathComp)\n- Proof-carrying code: a malicious .v file in a dependency could\nintroduce unsound declarations that pass both Print Assumptions and\nTest Universe Checking\n- Verified smart contracts (ConCert)\n- Mathematical proof verification: Millennium Problem forgeries\ndemonstrate that arbitrary mathematical claims can be \"certified\"\n4. Publicly Demonstrated\n========================\nMillennium Problem forgeries built using this CVE:\n- Riemann Hypothesis (Lagarias criterion):\nhttps://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287-rh\n- Navier-Stokes regularity (and its negation):\nhttps://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287-ns\n- BSD conjecture (rank equality):\nhttps://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287-bsd\n- Hodge conjecture:\nhttps://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287-hodge\n- P=NP (by JP Aumasson):\nhttps://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287-pnp\nAll forgeries are Docker-reproducible and print FORGERY CONFIRMED with\nPrint Assumptions whitelist clean.\n5. Proof of Concept\n===================\nA Docker-reproducible PoC is available:\ngit clone https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287\ncd rocq-cve-poc-22287\ndocker build -t rocq-cve-poc-22287 .\ndocker run --rm rocq-cve-poc-22287\nOn Rocq \u22649.2.0, the output confirms the proof of 0 = 1 with no axioms\nand Test Universe Checking reporting \"on\" while the kernel accepts\nuniverse-inconsistent terms.\n6. Root Cause\n=============\nWhen a module executes Local Unset Universe Checking, the global\nenvironment\u0027s flag is correctly scoped and restored on module close.\nHowever, the universe graph maintains its own copy of the flag, and\nmodule close does not synchronise this copy. The graph\u0027s flag remains\ndisabled after the module closes.\n(a) CWE-459: Incomplete Cleanup \u2014 the module close does not clean up\nthe universe graph\u0027s copy of the flag.\n(b) CWE-20: Improper Input Validation \u2014 the kernel accepts universe-\ninconsistent terms based on the stale flag value.\n7. Scoring\n==========\nCVSS 3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N \u2014 7.1 (High)\nCVSS 4.0: AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N \u2014 6.8\n(Medium)\n8. CWE\n======\nCWE-459: Incomplete Cleanup\nCWE-20: Improper Input Validation\n9. CVE\n======\nCVE-2026-72714 (assigned by VulnCheck as CNA)\n10. Affected Versions\n=====================\nRocq Prover \u2264 9.2.0 (all versions including Coq 8.x that include\nHurkens in the standard library)\nFixed in: UNFIXED as of Rocq 9.2.0.\n11. Mitigation\n==============\n- No patched version is available.\n- Run coqchk on compiled .vo files \u2014 coqchk operates independently of\nthe in-process flag state.\n- Audit dependencies for use of Local Unset Universe Checking inside\nmodules.\n- Do not rely on Test Universe Checking to verify kernel state after\nmodule operations.\n12. References\n==============\nBug report: https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/issues/22287\nPoC: https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-22287\nVulnCheck:\nhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rocq-prover-through-universe-checking-s...\nNVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72714\n13. Timeline\n============\n2026 Bug reported by Ga\u00ebtan Gilbert (rocq-prover/rocq#22287)\n2026 Issue remains open \u2014 no fix merged\n2026-08-24 CVE-2026-72714 published by VulnCheck\n2026-08-24 Docker-reproducible PoC published\n2026-08 Millennium Problem forgeries published\n14. Credit\n==========\nBug discovery: Ga\u00ebtan Gilbert (@SkySkimmer)\nP=NP forgery: JP Aumasson (@veorq)\nPoC packaging: Jonathan Brossard (@endrazine) \u2014 MOABI / PSIRT.com"
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