GCVE-1988-2026-0445
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:29 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:29| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| rocq-prover | rocq |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2026-72705
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "rocq",
"vendor": "rocq-prover",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jonathan Brossard"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "1. Summary\n==========\nA soundness bug in the Rocq (formerly Coq) kernel\u0027s guard checker allows\nconstruction of a checked proof of False \u2014 and by extension, any\nproposition, including 0 = 1 \u2014 without axioms, tactics, plugins, or\nunsafe flags. Print Assumptions reports the proof as closed under the\nglobal context.\nThe guard checker does not track recursive calls made through a\nfixpoint\u0027s own arguments. A fixpoint can pass itself to another\nfixpoint, which can apply it to a value that is not a structural\nsubterm. Passing the function to a plain definition is correctly\nrejected, but passing it to a fixpoint is accepted. This admits a type\nthat is definitionally equal to its own negation, and self-application\nyields False in purely definitional code.\n2. Context\n==========\nRocq (formerly Coq) is the reference implementation of the Calculus of\nInductive Constructions and one of the most widely deployed proof\nassistants. Its kernel is the trusted core that checks every proof\nbefore acceptance. A soundness bug in the guard checker \u2014 the component\nthat enforces termination of recursive definitions \u2014 undermines the\nguarantees of any system built on Rocq-checked proofs.\nFormally verified systems certified under Common Criteria (ISO 15408) or\nDO-178C (airborne software) derive their assurance from the correctness\nof the proof checker. A kernel-level bypass invalidates that assurance\nchain.\nThis bug was discovered by Claude Opus 4.6 (Anthropic) during a\nfuzzing campaign.\n3. Impact\n=========\n- Formally verified compilers (CompCert)\n- Verified OS kernels (CertiKOS)\n- Separation logic frameworks (Iris)\n- Mathematical libraries (MathComp)\n- Proof-carrying code: a malicious .v file in a dependency could\nintroduce unsound declarations\n- Verified smart contracts (ConCert)\n4. Proof of Concept\n===================\nA Docker-reproducible PoC is available:\ngit clone https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-21683\ncd rocq-cve-poc-21683\ndocker build -t rocq-cve-poc-21683 .\ndocker run --rm rocq-cve-poc-21683\nOn a vulnerable version (Rocq \u003c9.2.0, all Coq versions), the output\nconfirms the proof of False with no axioms. On a patched version\n(\u22659.2.0), the guard checker rejects the fixpoint.\n5. Root Cause\n=============\nThe guard checker does not follow the flow of a fixpoint value when it\nis passed as an argument to another fixpoint. The receiving fixpoint can\napply the passed function to an arbitrary value, bypassing the\nstructural decrease requirement.\nThis creates a type T that is definitionally equal to T -\u003e False (its\nown negation). Self-application of a term of type T yields False,\nentirely through definitional reduction \u2014 no tactics are involved.\nCWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation.\n6. Scoring\n==========\nCVSS 3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N \u2014 7.1 (High)\nCVSS 4.0: AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N \u2014 6.8\n(Medium)\n7. CWE\n======\nCWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation\n8. CVE\n======\nCVE-2026-72705 (assigned by VulnCheck as CNA)\n9. Affected Versions\n====================\nRocq Prover \u003c9.2.0 (all versions including Coq 8.x with the guard\nchecker)\nFixed in: 9.2.0\n10. Mitigation\n==============\n- Upgrade to Rocq 9.2.0 or later.\n- Run coqchk on compiled .vo files as defense-in-depth.\n11. References\n==============\nBug report: https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/issues/21683\nFix: https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/pull/21684\nPoC: https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-21683\nVulnCheck:\nhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rocq-prover-before-guard-checker-accept...\nNVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72705\n12. Timeline\n============\n2025 Bug found by Claude Opus 4.6 during fuzzing campaign\n2025 Bug reported (rocq-prover/rocq#21683)\n2025 Fix merged (PR #21684) in Rocq 9.2.0\n2026-08-24 CVE-2026-72705 published by VulnCheck\n2026-08-24 Docker-reproducible PoC published\n13. Credit\n==========\nBug discovery: Claude Opus 4.6 (Anthropic), Tristan St\u00e9rin\n(fuzzing campaign, based on pointers from Yannick Forster)\nKernel fix: PR #21684\nPoC packaging: Jonathan Brossard (@endrazine) \u2014 MOABI / PSIRT.com"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-670",
"description": "CWE-670",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:29:46Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/3980e073a4d3a439116db68b9bd034c52bdfd611a3e14ae68dd1c41364a8bb31"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/Y4CBS4TQ2JSVXQB5A4Q5LQ44QV47Z76S/"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/endrazine/rocq-cve-poc-21683"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/issues/21683"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/pull/21684"
},
{
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72705"
},
{
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rocq-prover-before-guard-checker-accepts-fixpoint-passed-as-a-higher-order-argument"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"997fa663-d85e-4888-8aff-6a8c17040bf2%40gmail.com"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[Bugtraq] CVE-2026-72705: Rocq guard checker accepts fixpoint passed as higher-order argument (0 = 1 demonstrated)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "analysis",
"relationships": [
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-72705",
"type": "related"
}
],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0445",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/3980e073a4d3a439116db68b9bd034c52bdfd611a3e14ae68dd1c41364a8bb31",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "3980e073a4d3a439116db68b9bd034c52bdfd611a3e14ae68dd1c41364a8bb31",
"evidenceScore": 10,
"messageId": "997fa663-d85e-4888-8aff-6a8c17040bf2%40gmail.com",
"originalUrl": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/Y4CBS4TQ2JSVXQB5A4Q5LQ44QV47Z76S/",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-11-02T07:29:46Z"
}
},
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0445"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:29:46Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:29:46Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0445"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.