GCVE-1988-2026-0442
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:29 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:29| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| leanprover | lean4 |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2026-72711
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "lean4",
"vendor": "leanprover",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jonathan Brossard"
}
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"value": "1. Summary\n==========\nA soundness bug in the Lean 4 kernel allows construction of a checked\nproof of False \u2014 and by extension, any proposition, including 0 = 1 \u2014\nwithout axioms, sorry, unsafeCast, debug.skipKernelTC, or modified\n.olean files. The proof passes the kernel at maximum checking (--trust=0).\nThe kernel\u0027s add_opaque path skips the closure check\n(check_no_metavar_no_fvar) that the definition and theorem paths\nperform. A stale entry in the type checker\u0027s inference cache can be\nreused after its local variable is gone, allowing a metaprogram to\nsubmit an opaque declaration whose value references an unbound free\nvariable. The kernel then admits an opaque constant of type False.\n2. Context\n==========\nLean 4 is increasingly used as a foundation for formally verified\nsoftware, proof-carrying code, and mathematical libraries. Its kernel is\nthe trusted core: every theorem must pass kernel type-checking before it\nis accepted. A soundness bug in the kernel undermines the guarantees of\nany system built on top of it.\nFormally verified systems certified under Common Criteria (ISO 15408) or\nDO-178C (airborne software) derive their assurance from the correctness\nof the proof checker. A kernel-level bypass invalidates that assurance\nchain.\nIndependent checkers such as Nanoda and lean4lean that replay proofs\nagainst the same kernel rules are equally affected by the missing\nclosure check.\n3. Impact\n=========\n- Formally verified software: any proposition can be \"proved\" and\nkernel-checked, including safety properties of compilers, OS kernels,\nand cryptographic libraries.\n- Proof-carrying code: a malicious Lake dependency could inject unsound\nopaque declarations that pass kernel checking.\n- Mathematical proof verification: results checked by the Lean kernel\ncannot be trusted on affected versions.\n4. Proof of Concept\n===================\nA Docker-reproducible PoC is available:\ngit clone https://github.com/endrazine/lean-cve-poc-14484\ncd lean-cve-poc-14484\ndocker build -t lean-cve-poc-14484 .\ndocker run --rm lean-cve-poc-14484\nOn a vulnerable version, the output reports the proof of 0 = 1 as\naxiom-free. On a patched version, the kernel rejects the opaque\ndeclaration.\n5. Root Cause\n=============\nThe function environment::add_opaque does not call\ncheck_no_metavar_no_fvar on the declaration\u0027s body, unlike the\ndefinition and theorem paths. This means:\n(a) A free variable (fvar) that existed in a now-discarded local context\nis not detected. CWE-488 (Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session).\n(b) The kernel accepts a body containing references to variables that\nare no longer in scope. CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation).\nA metaprogram exploits this by caching a type-checking result for False\nagainst a temporary local, restoring the context, and submitting an\nopaque declaration referencing the stale cache entry.\n6. Scoring\n==========\nCVSS 3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N \u2014 7.1 (High)\nCVSS 4.0: AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N \u2014 6.8\n(Medium)\n7. CWE\n======\nCWE-488: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session\nCWE-20: Improper Input Validation\n8. CVE\n======\nCVE-2026-72711 (assigned by VulnCheck as CNA)\n9. Affected Versions\n====================\nLean 4 \u003c v4.32.2 (all versions from initial release)\nFixed in: v4.32.2, v4.33.0, nightly 2026-07-23 and later\n10. Mitigation\n==============\n- Upgrade to Lean 4 v4.32.2 or later.\n- No workaround exists for affected versions \u2014 the flaw is in the\nkernel itself.\n11. References\n==============\nBug report: https://github.com/leanprover/lean4/issues/14484\nFix: https://github.com/leanprover/lean4/pull/14498\nPoC: https://github.com/endrazine/lean-cve-poc-14484\nVulnCheck:\nhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lean-4-before-kernel-accepts-opaque-dec...\nNVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72711\n12. Timeline\n============\n2026 Bug reported (leanprover/lean4#14484)\n2026 Kernel fix merged (PR #14498)\n2026-08-24 CVE-2026-72711 published by VulnCheck\n2026-08-24 Docker-reproducible PoC published\n13. Credit\n==========\nBug discovery: Patrick Hulin\nKernel fix: Joachim Breitner (PR #14498)\nPoC packaging: Jonathan Brossard (@endrazine) \u2014 MOABI / PSIRT.com"
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"url": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/HASOMMUIF672Y7I6NSEVO64G6IOOELJW/"
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"url": "https://github.com/leanprover/lean4/issues/14484"
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"url": "https://github.com/leanprover/lean4/pull/14498"
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72711"
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"title": "[Bugtraq] CVE-2026-72711: Lean 4 kernel soundness bug \u2014 inference cache poisoning via opaque declarations (0 = 1 demonstrated)",
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