GCVE-1988-2026-0306
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:04| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tozed Kangwei Tech Co., Ltd (Shenzhen, China) | ZLT X300 / X300A 5G CPE Router |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "ZLT X300 / X300A 5G CPE Router",
"vendor": "Tozed Kangwei Tech Co., Ltd (Shenzhen, China)",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Surf free"
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE Router firmware 6.01.3 contains an OS command\ninjection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the TR-069/CWMP client daemon\n(netcwmpd). The IPPingDiagnostics Host parameter is passed unsanitized into\nsprintf, which constructs a shell command executed via system_by_root() as\nroot.\n\n\nAn attacker operating a rogue LTE base station using SDR hardware (~$300)\ncan impersonate the carrier\u0027s Auto Configuration Server and inject\narbitrary shell commands as root. No authentication, user interaction, or\nphysical access is required.\n\n\n2. CVE ID: CVE-2026-2035703\n\n CVSS: 9.8 (Critical)\n\n CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)\n\n\n3. AFFECTED PRODUCT\n\n Vendor: Tozed Kangwei Tech Co., Ltd (Shenzhen, China)\n\n Product: ZLT X300 / X300A 5G CPE Router\n\n Firmware: 6.01.3 (all versions believed affected)\n\n Architecture: aarch64 (MediaTek MT7992, OpenWrt 23.05.5)\n\n\n4. VULNERABLE CODE (IDA Pro decompilation, netcwmpd at 0x463E6C)\n\n\n sprintf(cmd,\n\n \"ping%s -c %d -s %d -W %u%s \\\"%s\\\" \u003e /tmp/.tr069_pingtest.log\",\n\n ipv4_flag, repetitions, block_size, timeout, interface,\n\n HOST); // unsanitized TR-069 parameter\n\n\n Execution chain:\n\n sprintf (0x463E6C) -\u003e sub_5BA8C4 (opcode 0x13)\n\n -\u003e sub_5BC23C (service_shell handler)\n\n -\u003e sub_5BBC88 -\u003e system_by_root(cmd)\n\n\n5. ATTACK VECTOR\n\n Rogue LTE eNodeB (srsRAN + USRP/ANTSDR, ~$300) within\n\n radio range impersonates carrier ACS, sends TR-069\n\n SetParameterValues with injected Host parameter.\n\n\n6. IMPACT\n\n - Full root compromise (uid=0, gid=0)\n\n - Mass surveillance, DNS hijacking, traffic interception\n\n - Credential theft (WiFi, TR-069, IMEI)\n\n - Persistent backdoor installation\n\n - Lateral movement to all LAN devices\n\n\n7. AFFECTED CARRIERS (partial list)\n\n du (UAE), STC/Mobily (Saudi Arabia), EE/O2/Three (UK),\n\n Telekom (Germany), Orange/SFR (France), Singtel (Singapore),\n\n MTN (South Africa/Nigeria), and others in 15+ countries.\n\n\n8. VENDOR RESPONSE\n\n Vendor has no PSIRT. Refused to engage after multiple\n\n disclosure attempts. Claimed fix without evidence.\n\n ZTE PSIRT confirmed: \"not our product.\"\n\n\n9. COORDINATION\n\n CERT/CC: VRF#26-09-VVTLF\n\n ZDI: Case danish11620001\n\n aeCERT: Notified\n\n CISA: Notified\n\n\n10. ADVISORY\n\n\nhttps://github.com/danish1162/CVE-2026-2035703-x300/security/advisories/GHSA-qcpp-vfr2-v242\n\n\n11. TIMELINE\n\n 2026-08-14 Reported to vendor (global_marketing () gztozed com)\n\n 2026-08-22 Vendor claimed \"fixed\" \u2014 no evidence\n\n 2026-08-27 Vendor refused further engagement\n\n 2026-08-29 Public disclosure via GitHub Security Advisory\n\n 2026-09-05 Full disclosure\n\n\n12. CREDIT\n\n Muhammad Nadeem Danish (danish1162)\n\n https://hackerone.com/danish1162\n\n https://github.com/danish1162\n\n\n13. TESTING ENVIRONMENT\n\n All live testing in private lab (Pakistan), sysmocom test\n\n SIM (IMSI 999, ITU reserved), Band 7 (unoccupied).\n\n No live commercial network affected.\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T13:04:37Z",
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"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/32"
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"url": "https://github.com/danish1162/CVE-2026-2035703-x300/security/advisories/GHSA-qcpp-vfr2-v242"
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{
"url": "https://hackerone.com/danish1162"
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{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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"source": {
"defect": [
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "**Subject:** CVE-2026-2035703: Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE \u2014 Unauthenticated Remote Root Code Execution via TR-069 Command Injection (CVSS 9.8)",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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