GCVE-1988-2026-0306
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
**Subject:** CVE-2026-2035703: Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE — Unauthenticated Remote Root Code Execution via TR-069 Command Injection (CVSS 9.8)
Summary
Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE Router firmware 6.01.3 contains an OS command
injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the TR-069/CWMP client daemon
(netcwmpd). The IPPingDiagnostics Host parameter is passed unsanitized into
sprintf, which constructs a shell command executed via system_by_root() as
root.
An attacker operating a rogue LTE base station using SDR hardware (~$300)
can impersonate the carrier's Auto Configuration Server and inject
arbitrary shell commands as root. No authentication, user interaction, or
physical access is required.
2. CVE ID: CVE-2026-2035703
CVSS: 9.8 (Critical)
CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
3. AFFECTED PRODUCT
Vendor: Tozed Kangwei Tech Co., Ltd (Shenzhen, China)
Product: ZLT X300 / X300A 5G CPE Router
Firmware: 6.01.3 (all versions believed affected)
Architecture: aarch64 (MediaTek MT7992, OpenWrt 23.05.5)
4. VULNERABLE CODE (IDA Pro decompilation, netcwmpd at 0x463E6C)
sprintf(cmd,
"ping%s -c %d -s %d -W %u%s \"%s\" > /tmp/.tr069_pingtest.log",
ipv4_flag, repetitions, block_size, timeout, interface,
HOST); // unsanitized TR-069 parameter
Execution chain:
sprintf (0x463E6C) -> sub_5BA8C4 (opcode 0x13)
-> sub_5BC23C (service_shell handler)
-> sub_5BBC88 -> system_by_root(cmd)
5. ATTACK VECTOR
Rogue LTE eNodeB (srsRAN + USRP/ANTSDR, ~$300) within
radio range impersonates carrier ACS, sends TR-069
SetParameterValues with injected Host parameter.
6. IMPACT
- Full root compromise (uid=0, gid=0)
- Mass surveillance, DNS hijacking, traffic interception
- Credential theft (WiFi, TR-069, IMEI)
- Persistent backdoor installation
- Lateral movement to all LAN devices
7. AFFECTED CARRIERS (partial list)
du (UAE), STC/Mobily (Saudi Arabia), EE/O2/Three (UK),
Telekom (Germany), Orange/SFR (France), Singtel (Singapore),
MTN (South Africa/Nigeria), and others in 15+ countries.
8. VENDOR RESPONSE
Vendor has no PSIRT. Refused to engage after multiple
disclosure attempts. Claimed fix without evidence.
ZTE PSIRT confirmed: "not our product."
9. COORDINATION
CERT/CC: VRF#26-09-VVTLF
ZDI: Case danish11620001
aeCERT: Notified
CISA: Notified
10. ADVISORY
https://github.com/danish1162/CVE-2026-2035703-x300/security/advisories/GHSA-qcpp-vfr2-v242
11. TIMELINE
2026-08-14 Reported to vendor (global_marketing () gztozed com)
2026-08-22 Vendor claimed "fixed" — no evidence
2026-08-27 Vendor refused further engagement
2026-08-29 Public disclosure via GitHub Security Advisory
2026-09-05 Full disclosure
12. CREDIT
Muhammad Nadeem Danish (danish1162)
https://hackerone.com/danish1162
https://github.com/danish1162
13. TESTING ENVIRONMENT
All live testing in private lab (Pakistan), sysmocom test
SIM (IMSI 999, ITU reserved), Band 7 (unoccupied).
No live commercial network affected.
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tozed Kangwei Tech Co., Ltd (Shenzhen, China) | ZLT X300 / X300A 5G CPE Router |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
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}
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"title": "**Subject:** CVE-2026-2035703: Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE \u2014 Unauthenticated Remote Root Code Execution via TR-069 Command Injection (CVSS 9.8)",
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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