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GCVE-1988-2026-0276

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:41
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260318-0 :: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities in Arturia Software Center MacOS
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260318-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities product: Arturia Software Center MacOS vulnerable version: 2.12.0.3157 fixed version: - CVE number: CVE-2026-24062, CVE-2026-24063              impact: high homepage:https://www.arturia.com/technology/asc               found: 2026-01-02 by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "We create instruments and effects that encourage musical discovery, reward curiosity, and savor the artistic process. We’re an international team of passionate people, on a mission to navigate uncharted sonic territory in the name of creative empowerment. From the raw analog power of Brute synthesizers to our faithful virtual instrument emulations of V Collection, we provide musicians with an inspiring sonic experience that's instantly accessible, exploratory, and thrilling." Source:https://www.arturia.com/company Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication attempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this product, please approach the vendor and demand a fix. SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062) It was found that the "Privileged Helper" component of the Arturia Software Center does not perform sufficient client code signature validation when a client connects. This leads to an attacker being able to connect to the helper and execute privileged actions leading to local privilege escalation. 2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063) It was found that when a plugin is installed using the Arturia Software Center, that this plugin also installs an uninstall.sh bash script in a root owned path. This script is written to disk with the file permissions 777, meaning it is writable by any user. When uninstalling a plugin via the Arturia Software Center the Privileged Helper gets instructed to execute this script. When the bash script is manipulated by an attacker this scenario will lead to privilege escalation. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062) The Privileged Helper service does not check if the connecting client is signed with a valid code signature. Any process can connect to the privileged helper and trigger privileged actions. The following C code can be used to connect to the privileged helper and trigger code execution as root. By first using the FINISHM command to achieve /Library/Arturia being a symlink to /tmp/test and then triggering an UNINSTA of /Library/Arturia/uninstall.sh, the attacker controlled bash script in /tmp/test/uninstall.sh will get executed by root. The following example proof of concept sets up the /tmp/test directory as well as the /tmp/test/uninstall.sh script containing commands to add the user lowpriv to the sudoers file. ----------------- [ PoC exploit code removed ] ----------------- The code can be compiled using clang: ----------------- clang -o exploit exploit.c ----------------- And then be executed like: ----------------- ./exploit com.Arturia.InstallHelper ----------------- This will trigger execution of /tmp/test/uninstall.sh as root leading to privilege escalation. 2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063) When a vst is installed via the ASC the following path will be generated: ----------------- /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources ----------------- The following contents are installed: ----------------- user@usersVilMachine Resources % ls -al total 8 drwxrwxrwx 3 root wheel 96 Oct 9 09:27 . drwxrwxrwx 7 root wheel 224 Oct 9 09:27 .. -rwxrwxrwx 1 root wheel 3315 Oct 9 09:26 uninstall.sh user@usersVilMachine Resources % pwd /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources ----------------- When uninstalling the same software via the ASC the following XPC message is sent to the InstallHelper: ----------------- UNINSTA /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources/uninstall.sh ----------------- This will trigger execution of the uninstall.sh file as root. The uninstallation can either be triggerd by exploiting the missing XPC client authentication of the Privileged Helper or by manually triggering the uninstall via the UI. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following version has been tested which was the latest version available at the time of the test: * 2.12.0.3157 All tests have been performed on MacOS 26.2 with SIP enabled! Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2026-01-05: Contacting vendor throughinfo () arturia com; no response. 2026-01-27: Contacting vendor through contact form. Got error, "Support out of reach!" 2026-01-27: Contact via contact form again, seems to have a bug. 2026-01-27: Contact viainfo () arturia com andwebmaster () arturia com; no response. 2026-02-03: Tried to contact vendor via contact form after login. Got same error. 2026-02-03: Contact viasales.support () arturia com; no response. 2026-02-24: Tried to contact vendor via contact form, again same error. 2026-02-25: Contact viaprivacy-inquiries () arturia com; no response. 2026-03-18: Public release of advisory. Solution: --------- The vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication attempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this product, please approach the vendor and demand a fix. Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web:https://www.sec-consult.com Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com X:https://x.com/sec_consult EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Arturia SEC Consult SA-20260318-0 Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0276 (this record)

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          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260318-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities\n            product: Arturia Software Center MacOS\n vulnerable version: 2.12.0.3157\n      fixed version: -\n         CVE number: CVE-2026-24062, CVE-2026-24063\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n           homepage:https://www.arturia.com/technology/asc\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-02\n                 by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"We create instruments and effects that encourage musical discovery,\nreward curiosity, and savor the artistic process. We\u2019re an international\nteam of passionate people, on a mission to navigate uncharted sonic territory\nin the name of creative empowerment.\nFrom the raw analog power of Brute synthesizers to our faithful virtual\ninstrument emulations of V Collection, we provide musicians with an inspiring\nsonic experience that\u0027s instantly accessible, exploratory, and thrilling.\"\n\nSource:https://www.arturia.com/company\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication\nattempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this\nproduct, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)\nIt was found that the \"Privileged Helper\" component of the Arturia Software\nCenter does not perform sufficient client code signature validation when a\nclient connects. This leads to an attacker being able to connect to the helper\nand execute privileged actions leading to local privilege escalation.\n\n2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)\nIt was found that when a plugin is installed using the Arturia Software Center,\nthat this plugin also installs an uninstall.sh bash script in a root owned path.\nThis script is written to disk with the file permissions 777, meaning it is\nwritable by any user. When uninstalling a plugin via the Arturia Software Center\nthe Privileged Helper gets instructed to execute this script.\nWhen the bash script is manipulated by an attacker this scenario will lead\nto privilege escalation.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)\nThe Privileged Helper service does not check if the connecting client\nis signed with a valid code signature. Any process can connect to the\nprivileged helper and trigger privileged actions.\n\nThe following C code can be used to connect to the privileged helper and\ntrigger code execution as root. By first using the FINISHM command to achieve\n/Library/Arturia being a symlink to /tmp/test and then triggering an UNINSTA\nof /Library/Arturia/uninstall.sh, the attacker controlled bash script in\n/tmp/test/uninstall.sh will get executed by root. The following example proof\nof concept sets up the /tmp/test directory as well as the\n/tmp/test/uninstall.sh script containing commands to add the user lowpriv\nto the sudoers file.\n-----------------\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n-----------------\n\nThe code can be compiled using clang:\n-----------------\nclang -o exploit exploit.c\n-----------------\n\nAnd then be executed like:\n-----------------\n./exploit com.Arturia.InstallHelper\n-----------------\n\nThis will trigger execution of /tmp/test/uninstall.sh as root\nleading to privilege escalation.\n\n\n2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)\nWhen a vst is installed via the ASC the following path will be generated:\n-----------------\n/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources\n-----------------\nThe following contents are installed:\n-----------------\nuser@usersVilMachine Resources % ls -al\ntotal 8\ndrwxrwxrwx  3 root  wheel    96 Oct  9 09:27 .\ndrwxrwxrwx  7 root  wheel   224 Oct  9 09:27 ..\n-rwxrwxrwx  1 root  wheel  3315 Oct  9 09:26 uninstall.sh\nuser@usersVilMachine Resources % pwd\n/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources\n-----------------\nWhen uninstalling the same software via the ASC the following XPC message\nis sent to the InstallHelper:\n-----------------\nUNINSTA /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources/uninstall.sh\n-----------------\nThis will trigger execution of the uninstall.sh file as root.\nThe uninstallation can either be triggerd by exploiting the missing\nXPC client authentication of the Privileged Helper or by manually\ntriggering the uninstall via the UI.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 2.12.0.3157\n\nAll tests have been performed on MacOS 26.2 with SIP enabled!\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-05: Contacting vendor throughinfo () arturia com; no response.\n2026-01-27: Contacting vendor through contact form. Got error, \"Support out of reach!\"\n2026-01-27: Contact via contact form again, seems to have a bug.\n2026-01-27: Contact viainfo () arturia com andwebmaster () arturia com; no response.\n2026-02-03: Tried to contact vendor via contact form after login. Got same error.\n2026-02-03: Contact viasales.support () arturia com; no response.\n2026-02-24: Tried to contact vendor via contact form, again same error.\n2026-02-25: Contact viaprivacy-inquiries () arturia com; no response.\n2026-03-18: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication\nattempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this\nproduct, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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