GCVE-1988-2026-0243
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack Chain: Silent GPS Exfiltration, 17 Vulns, 6 CVEs (CVSS 9.3)
Summary
Subject: Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack Chain: Silent GPS Exfiltration, 17 Vulns, 6 CVEs (CVSS 9.3)
# Alipay DeepLink + JSBridge Attack Chain
# Silent GPS Exfiltration via Crafted URL
## Overview
Researcher: Jiqiang Feng / Innora AI Security Research
Vendor: Ant Group (蚂蚁集团) / Alibaba Group
Product: Alipay (支付宝) v10.x (Android & iOS)
Users Affected: 1 billion+
CVEs: 6 submitted to MITRE CNA-LR (2026-03-12)
CVSS: 7.4–9.3
Vendor Response: "Normal functionality"
Disclosure: Responsible (Feb 25 → Mar 11 public)
## Vulnerability Chain
A single crafted URL triggers the following attack chain:
1. Open Redirect (CWE-601): ds.alipay.com/?scheme= accepts arbitrary URL parameters, redirecting to Alipay app via deep
link
2. Whitelist Bypass (CWE-939): ds.alipay.com is a whitelisted Alipay domain, so the deep link handler trusts the
redirect target
3. WebView Loading: Attacker-controlled page loads in Alipay's privileged WebView with JSBridge access
4. API Abuse: AlipayJSBridge.call() exposes sensitive native APIs without user consent
## Exploitable APIs (Verified)
| # | API | Data Extracted | Android | iOS |
|---|-----|---------------|---------|-----|
| 1 | getLocation | GPS coords (8.8m accuracy) | ✓ | ✓ |
| 2 | getNetworkType | WiFi/cellular, carrier info | ✓ | ✓ |
| 3 | getSystemInfo | Device model, OS, screen | ✓ | ✓ |
| 4 | getCameraPermission | Camera auth status | ✓ | ✓ |
| 5 | getMicrophonePermission | Mic auth status | ✓ | ✓ |
| 6 | tradePay | Pre-fill payment screen | ✗ | ✓ |
| 7 | share | Trigger share dialog | ✗ | ✓ |
| 8 | scan | Activate QR scanner | ✗ | ✓ |
| 9 | chooseImage | Access photo picker | ✗ | ✓ |
iOS attack surface is significantly larger than Android.
## PoC
Trigger URL pattern:
https://ds.alipay.com/?scheme=alipays://platformapi/startapp?appId=20000067&url=[BASE64_ENCODED_ATTACKER_URL]
Verification page (read-only, no data collection):
https://innora.ai/zfb/poc/trigger.html
## Verification
- 3 devices: Samsung S25 Ultra (NZ), Xiaomi Redmi 12 (MY), iPhone 16 Pro (CN-Hangzhou)
- 308 server-side exfiltration logs
- 42 screenshots
- Vendor's own security lead tested on iPhone from Hangzhou (Alipay HQ) — GPS captured silently in 7 seconds, accuracy
8.8m
## Timeline
2026-02-25: Initial TLS/SSL report to vendor
2026-03-06: Vendor: "cannot be practically exploited"
2026-03-07: Expanded report (17 vulns, full E2E proof)
2026-03-07: Whitelist bypass achieved in 2 min during live call with vendor
2026-03-08: Vendor's security lead's iPhone tested from Hangzhou — GPS captured
2026-03-10: Vendor final: "normal functionality"
2026-03-11: Public disclosure
2026-03-11: Vendor's law firm files takedown complaint (4 hours later)
2026-03-12: 6 CVEs submitted to MITRE
## Full Report
https://innora.ai/zfb/ (bilingual EN/ZH)
## Notes
- Alibaba is a registered CNA (CNA-2017-0006) but refused to assign CVEs
- Vendor's law firm complaint targets an article that never once mentions "Alipay" or "Ant Group" by name
- Vendor's security contact privately called it a "洞" (hole/vuln) while officially classifying as "normal functionality"
## Contact
Jiqiang Feng | feng () innora ai | Innora AI Security Research
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ant Group (蚂蚁集团) / Alibaba Group | Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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