GCVE-1988-2026-0177

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:25 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:25
VLAI
Title
lighttpd2 Signedness Error in li_chunkqueue_append_mem() Leads to Out-of-Bounds Memory Access
Summary
*Description:* A signedness vulnerability exists in the li_chunkqueue_append_mem() function in lighttpd2, where a signed length parameter (gssize len) is not properly validated before being used in memory operations that expect an unsigned size. When a negative length value is supplied, it is implicitly converted to a large unsigned value, resulting in an out-of-bounds memory read and a stack buffer overflow. *Affected Component:* - Project: lighttpd2 - File: src/main/chunk.c - Function: li_chunkqueue_append_mem() - Affected versions: lighttpd2 2.0.0 (and likely earlier versions in the 2.x series) *Attack Vector:* - Local / Internal API misuse - Potential remote reachability if malformed HTTP request bodies, chunked transfer decoding, or backend responses result in negative length calculations that reach li_chunkqueue_append_mem(). *Technical Details:* *The vulnerable function is defined as:* void li_chunkqueue_append_mem(liChunkQueue *cq, const void *mem, gssize len); *Inside the function, len is only checked for zero:* if (!len) return; Negative values are not rejected. When a negative gssize value (e.g., -1) is passed, it is later used in calls that treat the value as an unsigned size (gsize), resulting in a large length such as 4294967295. This causes unsafe memory operations via g_array_append_vals() and ultimately memcpy(), leading to an out-of-bounds memory access. *Proof of Concept:* A minimal reproducer demonstrates the issue: /* Trigger signedness bug */ li_chunkqueue_append_mem(cq, buf, -1); # ./chunk *Output:* ================================================================= ==175485==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0xfbff9cf00028 at pc 0xaaaae7908080 bp 0xffffc50ec5a0 sp 0xffffc50ebd90 READ of size 4294967295 at 0xfbff9cf00028 thread T0 #0 0xaaaae790807c in memcpy (/root/lighttpd2/chunk+0xd807c) (BuildId: 5f4fb5aa4dacb9c02ca0afc9864a810d23e3629a) #1 0xffff9fa9651c in g_array_append_vals (/lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x2651c) (BuildId: ee842437cbb995404bc6e4a9a832449be696142c) #2 0xffff9fdf2228 in li_chunkqueue_append_mem /root/lighttpd2/build-asan/../src/main/chunk.c:562:2 #3 0xaaaae794bb1c in main /root/lighttpd2/chunkqueue.c:9:5 #4 0xffff9f752598 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 #5 0xffff9f752678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3 #6 0xaaaae7864fac in _start (/root/lighttpd2/asan_test+0x34fac) (BuildId: Ron Edgerson Vulnerability Researcher & Exploit Developer CVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application & Systems Security Responsible Disclosure • Proof-of-Concept Development 🌐 https://github.com/ob1sec 🔗 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1 <https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle> _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown lighttpd2 Signedness Error Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits

{
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          "product": "lighttpd2 Signedness Error",
          "vendor": "unknown",
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          "value": "*Description:*\nA signedness vulnerability exists in the li_chunkqueue_append_mem()\nfunction in lighttpd2, where a signed length parameter (gssize len) is not\nproperly validated before being used in memory operations that expect an\nunsigned size. When a negative length value is supplied, it is implicitly\nconverted to a large unsigned value, resulting in an out-of-bounds memory\nread and a stack buffer overflow.\n\n*Affected Component:*\n\n   - Project: lighttpd2\n   - File: src/main/chunk.c\n   - Function: li_chunkqueue_append_mem()\n   - Affected versions: lighttpd2 2.0.0 (and likely earlier versions in the\n   2.x series)\n\n*Attack Vector:*\n\n   - Local / Internal API misuse\n   - Potential remote reachability if malformed HTTP request bodies,\n   chunked transfer decoding, or backend responses result in negative length\n   calculations that reach li_chunkqueue_append_mem().\n\n*Technical Details:*\n*The vulnerable function is defined as:*\nvoid li_chunkqueue_append_mem(liChunkQueue *cq, const void *mem, gssize\nlen);\n*Inside the function, len is only checked for zero:*\nif (!len) return; Negative values are not rejected. When a negative gssize\nvalue (e.g., -1) is passed, it is later used in calls that treat the value\nas an unsigned size (gsize), resulting in a large length such as\n4294967295. This causes unsafe memory operations via g_array_append_vals()\nand ultimately memcpy(), leading to an out-of-bounds memory access.\n\n*Proof of Concept:*\nA minimal reproducer demonstrates the issue:\n\n    /* Trigger signedness bug */\n    li_chunkqueue_append_mem(cq, buf, -1);\n\n# ./chunk\n\n*Output:*\n\n=================================================================\n==175485==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address\n0xfbff9cf00028 at pc 0xaaaae7908080 bp 0xffffc50ec5a0 sp 0xffffc50ebd90\nREAD of size 4294967295 at 0xfbff9cf00028 thread T0\n    #0 0xaaaae790807c in memcpy (/root/lighttpd2/chunk+0xd807c) (BuildId:\n5f4fb5aa4dacb9c02ca0afc9864a810d23e3629a)\n    #1 0xffff9fa9651c in g_array_append_vals\n(/lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x2651c) (BuildId:\nee842437cbb995404bc6e4a9a832449be696142c)\n    #2 0xffff9fdf2228 in li_chunkqueue_append_mem\n/root/lighttpd2/build-asan/../src/main/chunk.c:562:2\n    #3 0xaaaae794bb1c in main /root/lighttpd2/chunkqueue.c:9:5\n    #4 0xffff9f752598 in __libc_start_call_main\ncsu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16\n    #5 0xffff9f752678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3\n    #6 0xaaaae7864fac in _start (/root/lighttpd2/asan_test+0x34fac)\n(BuildId:\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
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