GCVE-1988-2026-0156
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:51| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cudy | WR3000 Hard-coded |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "WR3000 Hard-coded",
"vendor": "Cudy",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Nir Yehoshua"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Hello Full Disclosure list,\n\nCipher Security Labs has published details for two vulnerabilities\naffecting Cudy WR3000 hardware revision 2.0 running firmware before\nversion 2.5.24.\n\nCVE-2026-71960 - Hard-coded JWT Secret Authentication Bypass\nSeverity: Critical, CVSS 9.3\n\nThe device firmware contains a hard-coded HMAC signing secret used by\nthe Mosquitto MQTT JWT authentication plugin. Because the secret can\nbe recovered from the firmware image, an attacker can forge a valid\nJWT without the owner\u0027s username or password and without user\ninteraction.\n\nCVE-2026-71961 - OS Command Injection via Mesh MQTT Command Interface\nSeverity: High, CVSS 8.7\n\nOnce authenticated to MQTT, an attacker can send unsanitized input\nthrough the mesh command interface to a shell sink, resulting in\narbitrary operating-system command execution as root.\n\nCombined attack path:\n\nfirmware signing key -\u003e forged JWT -\u003e MQTT access -\u003e root commands\n\nRemote-scope clarification:\nThe attacker does not need physical proximity to the router and does\nnot need to be connected to the victim\u0027s LAN. Exploitation still\nrequires a network path to the relevant MQTT/control-plane interface.\nThis disclosure does not claim that every affected router is directly\nreachable from the public Internet.\n\nAffected scope:\nCudy WR3000 hardware revision 2.0\nFirmware versions earlier than 2.5.24\n\nCudy lists firmware 2.5.24 with a release date of July 30, 2026. There\nis no defensible public estimate of the number of vulnerable devices\nbecause neither the vendor nor public datasets provide installed-base\nfigures broken down by hardware revision and firmware version.\n\nReferences:\nhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jw4g-pv34-hp37\nhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8jmp-g7g6-gf45\nhttps://www.cudy.com/en-us/pages/download-center/wr3000-2-0\n\nResearcher:\nNir Yehoshua\nCipher Security Labs\nhttps://ciphersecuritylabs.com/\n\nRegards,\nNir Yehoshua\nCipher Security Labs\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T11:51:40Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/68"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/68"
},
{
"url": "https://ciphersecuritylabs.com/"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8jmp-g7g6-gf45"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jw4g-pv34-hp37"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.cudy.com/en-us/pages/download-center/wr3000-2-0"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/68"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Cudy WR3000: Hard-coded JWT Secret to Root Command Injection",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0156",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/68",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "f46a5a06f3114e09b165ded208e2a127b30bb244f649c06e56eceae463f7601a",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/68",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-08-19T20:23:26Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-07T13:20:22Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T11:51:40Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0156"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.