GCVE-1988-2026-0102

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:36
VLAI
Title
ASUS bsitf.sys (CVE-2026-13585): Arbitrary Physical Memory Mapping in ASUS Business/Software Manager kernel driver
Summary
Hi all, I'm disclosing a vulnerability (CVE-2026-13585) in the ASUS bsitf.sys / AsusBSItf.sys kernel driver, shipped with ASUS Business Manager and Software Manager. ASUS has assigned the CVE and published a vendor advisory with countermeasures. Summary: The driver exposes a device (\\.\bsitf, admin-required to open) with an IOCTL that allocates a caller-specified amount of physically contiguous kernel memory, maps it into the calling process, and returns both the user-space pointer and the physical address, with no validation on the requested size, no cap on allocation count, and no input checking. Observed impact: - Pool-exhaustion denial of service: uncapped allocations in a loop exhaust NonPagedPool and BSOD the machine, reachable from any admin process. - Physical address disclosure on every allocation, useful as an info-leak primitive or for DMA-oriented attacks. - On version 3.0.10.0 the pool type is executable (NonPagedPool), enabling shellcode staging at a known kernel address (still requires a separate control-flow bug). Later 3.1.x versions use NonPagedPoolNx, so this does not apply there. Affected versions tested: 3.0.10.0 (bsitf.sys), 3.1.10.0 and 3.1.25.0 (AsusBSItf.sys). All exhibit the same flaw. Timeline: - 2026-04-06: Discovered, PoC confirmed on Windows 11 24H2, reported to ASUS PSIRT - 2026-07-14: CVE assigned and case closed (CVE-2026-13585) - 2026-07-15: Vendor advisory and countermeasures released Full technical writeup and PoC: https://blog.ahmadz.ai/asus_bsitf_0_day_poc/ Regards, Rehman Ahmadzai _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Asus bsitf.sys CVE-2026-13585 Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Hi all,\n\nI\u0027m disclosing a vulnerability (CVE-2026-13585) in the ASUS bsitf.sys /\nAsusBSItf.sys kernel driver, shipped with ASUS Business Manager and\nSoftware Manager. ASUS has assigned the CVE and published a vendor advisory\nwith countermeasures.\n\nSummary: The driver exposes a device (\\\\.\\bsitf, admin-required to open)\nwith an IOCTL that allocates a caller-specified amount of physically\ncontiguous kernel memory, maps it into the calling process, and returns\nboth the user-space pointer and the physical address, with no validation on\nthe requested size, no cap on allocation count, and no input checking.\n\nObserved impact:\n\n- Pool-exhaustion denial of service: uncapped allocations in a loop exhaust\nNonPagedPool and BSOD the machine, reachable from any admin process.\n- Physical address disclosure on every allocation, useful as an info-leak\nprimitive or for DMA-oriented attacks.\n- On version 3.0.10.0 the pool type is executable (NonPagedPool), enabling\nshellcode staging at a known kernel address (still requires a separate\ncontrol-flow bug). Later 3.1.x versions use NonPagedPoolNx, so this does\nnot apply there.\n\nAffected versions tested: 3.0.10.0 (bsitf.sys), 3.1.10.0 and 3.1.25.0\n(AsusBSItf.sys). All exhibit the same flaw.\n\nTimeline:\n- 2026-04-06: Discovered, PoC confirmed on Windows 11 24H2, reported to\nASUS PSIRT\n- 2026-07-14: CVE assigned and case closed (CVE-2026-13585)\n- 2026-07-15: Vendor advisory and countermeasures released\n\nFull technical writeup and PoC: https://blog.ahmadz.ai/asus_bsitf_0_day_poc/\n\nRegards,\n\nRehman Ahmadzai\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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