GCVE-1988-2026-0037
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-Rubbish] SonicWall SMA 1000 — Pre-Auth Deserialization RCE (CVSS 9.8) via Struts 1 Property Injection and Auth-Filter Rewrite
Summary
Full-Disclosure List,
An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability chain in SonicWall SMA 1000 series appliances is being disclosed
here. The chain yields code execution as the `mgmt-server` user (uid=1011) on the management plane, with no credentials
and no prior knowledge of the appliance beyond a reachable address.
A full technical writeup with a reproducible proof-of-concept is published at:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/sonicwall-sma-preauth-deserialization-rce
Repository (advisory + PoC):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1. Summary
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A four-stage pre-auth chain combines a Struts 1 property-injection
flaw, an in-memory Jetty authentication-filter rewrite, an unauthenticated
SSO Primary-Administrator token issuance, and a Java deserialization sink.
The result is unauthenticated RCE as `mgmt-server` (uid=1011).
CVSS 3.1 base: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Vector: network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
2. Affected product
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor: SonicWall
Product: SMA 1000 series (Secure Mobile Access)
Firmware: 12.4.x line (verified on a 12.4 build; other 12.x lines
may share the Struts 1 / Jetty console stack — not all
were independently tested).
Component: /Console management plane, Central Management Service (CMS),
/configUserCommunityEPC.do
-----------------------------------------------------------------
3. Vulnerability details
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stage 1 — Authentication bypass via Struts 1 property injection
Every Struts 1 ActionForm exposes a `multipartRequestHandler`
property. By walking the bean graph
(`servletContext -> servletHandler -> filterMappings`) an
unauthenticated caller can rewrite the Jetty authentication
filter's pathSpecs to a non-existent path and force the filter
cache to rebuild. The entire `/Console` API and console actions
become reachable without authentication.
Stage 2 — Enable Central Management Service
With `/Console` unauthenticated, Central Management Service (CMS)
can be enabled from the console API, preparing the SSO token path.
Stage 3 — Unauthenticated SSO Primary Admin token
GET /Console/CentralManagement/SSO/Authorize?user=admin&roleUser=Primary+Admin
returns a Primary Administrator token without any password. The
token is exchanged for a valid JSESSIONID. The attacker is now the
Primary Administrator, fully unauthenticated.
Stage 4 — Java deserialization RCE
The `storedCommunity` field of `/configUserCommunityEPC.do` is
consumed by a setter that calls `ObjectInputStream.readObject()`
on attacker-controlled input. A `BeanComparator` + `TemplatesImpl`
gadget chain is delivered through this field. The command executes
as `mgmt-server` (uid=1011). Output is written to the webroot and
read back via an anonymous GET.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
4. Impact
-----------------------------------------------------------------
- Unauthenticated remote code execution as `mgmt-server`.
- Full compromise of the SMA 1000 management plane.
- The appliance terminates remote-access VPN sessions; compromise
of the management plane can be leveraged to pivot into the
protected internal network and to intercept or reset VPN sessions.
- No credentials, no user interaction, no prior appliance knowledge
beyond a reachable HTTPS address.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
5. Proof of concept
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A reproducible PoC is included in the repository under
`product/sonicwall/sma-12.4/preauth-deserialization-rce/exploit`.
The full chain and reproduction steps are documented in the advisory
URL above. The PoC contains no operator-identifying information and
targets placeholder hosts.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
6. Disclosure timeline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
- 2026-07-26: Technical writeup + PoC published to the project
site and repository.
- 2026-07-27: This Full-Disclosure submission.
Vendor contact: SonicWall PSIRT was notified (cc'd). A coordinated
embargo was not requested by the operator prior to publication; this
submission is made in parallel with public availability of the
writeup.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
7. Credits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Discovered and documented by the 0day-Rubbish independent
vulnerability-research project.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
8. References
-----------------------------------------------------------------
- Advisory: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/sonicwall-sma-preauth-deserialization-rce
- Repo: https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
--
0day-Rubbish
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sonicwall | SonicWall SMA 1000 |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
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"value": "Full-Disclosure List,\n\nAn unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability chain in SonicWall SMA 1000 series appliances is being disclosed \nhere. The chain yields code execution as the `mgmt-server` user (uid=1011) on the management plane, with no credentials \nand no prior knowledge of the appliance beyond a reachable address.\n\nA full technical writeup with a reproducible proof-of-concept is published at:\n\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/sonicwall-sma-preauth-deserialization-rce\n\nRepository (advisory + PoC):\n\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n1. Summary\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\nA four-stage pre-auth chain combines a Struts 1 property-injection\nflaw, an in-memory Jetty authentication-filter rewrite, an unauthenticated\nSSO Primary-Administrator token issuance, and a Java deserialization sink.\nThe result is unauthenticated RCE as `mgmt-server` (uid=1011).\n\nCVSS 3.1 base: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\nVector: network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n2. Affected product\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\nVendor: SonicWall\nProduct: SMA 1000 series (Secure Mobile Access)\nFirmware: 12.4.x line (verified on a 12.4 build; other 12.x lines\n may share the Struts 1 / Jetty console stack \u2014 not all\n were independently tested).\nComponent: /Console management plane, Central Management Service (CMS),\n /configUserCommunityEPC.do\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n3. Vulnerability details\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\nStage 1 \u2014 Authentication bypass via Struts 1 property injection\n Every Struts 1 ActionForm exposes a `multipartRequestHandler`\n property. By walking the bean graph\n (`servletContext -\u003e servletHandler -\u003e filterMappings`) an\n unauthenticated caller can rewrite the Jetty authentication\n filter\u0027s pathSpecs to a non-existent path and force the filter\n cache to rebuild. The entire `/Console` API and console actions\n become reachable without authentication.\n\nStage 2 \u2014 Enable Central Management Service\n With `/Console` unauthenticated, Central Management Service (CMS)\n can be enabled from the console API, preparing the SSO token path.\n\nStage 3 \u2014 Unauthenticated SSO Primary Admin token\n GET /Console/CentralManagement/SSO/Authorize?user=admin\u0026roleUser=Primary+Admin\n returns a Primary Administrator token without any password. The\n token is exchanged for a valid JSESSIONID. The attacker is now the\n Primary Administrator, fully unauthenticated.\n\nStage 4 \u2014 Java deserialization RCE\n The `storedCommunity` field of `/configUserCommunityEPC.do` is\n consumed by a setter that calls `ObjectInputStream.readObject()`\n on attacker-controlled input. A `BeanComparator` + `TemplatesImpl`\n gadget chain is delivered through this field. The command executes\n as `mgmt-server` (uid=1011). Output is written to the webroot and\n read back via an anonymous GET.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n4. Impact\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\n- Unauthenticated remote code execution as `mgmt-server`.\n- Full compromise of the SMA 1000 management plane.\n- The appliance terminates remote-access VPN sessions; compromise\n of the management plane can be leveraged to pivot into the\n protected internal network and to intercept or reset VPN sessions.\n- No credentials, no user interaction, no prior appliance knowledge\n beyond a reachable HTTPS address.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n5. Proof of concept\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\nA reproducible PoC is included in the repository under\n`product/sonicwall/sma-12.4/preauth-deserialization-rce/exploit`.\nThe full chain and reproduction steps are documented in the advisory\nURL above. The PoC contains no operator-identifying information and\ntargets placeholder hosts.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n6. Disclosure timeline\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\n- 2026-07-26: Technical writeup + PoC published to the project\n site and repository.\n- 2026-07-27: This Full-Disclosure submission.\n\nVendor contact: SonicWall PSIRT was notified (cc\u0027d). A coordinated\nembargo was not requested by the operator prior to publication; this\nsubmission is made in parallel with public availability of the\nwriteup.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n7. Credits\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDiscovered and documented by the 0day-Rubbish independent\nvulnerability-research project.\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n8. References\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\n\n- Advisory: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/sonicwall-sma-preauth-deserialization-rce\n- Repo: https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day-Rubbish\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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