GCVE-1988-2026-0019
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-07 13:20| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Dangling DNS record |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Dangling DNS record",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "shed riot"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# Summary\n\nThe hostname resolved to an address within a dynamic cloud IP pool.\nThe address had been released and was no longer controlled by the\norganisation operating the hostname.\n\nThis condition is referred to as an \"afterlife\" issue.\n\nUnlike a conventional CNAME-based subdomain takeover, the DNS record\npointed directly to a reusable cloud IP address. An attacker obtaining\nthat address could receive traffic intended for the Microsoft-owned\nhostname and serve content from it.\n\nI reported the issue to the Microsoft Security Response Center as:\nVULN-198489\n\nMSRC closed the report as a non-MSRC case, because the IP address was\nnot in Azure. Doh.\n\n\n# Vulnerability\n\nPersistent dangling DNS record to a reusable cloud IP address.\nCWE-16: Configuration\n\n\n# Impact\n\nImpact includes:\n\n* obtaining trusted TLS certificates for the affected hostname;\n* serving attacker-controlled content from a trusted hostname;\n* receiving traffic intended for the previous service;\n* exposure of cookies, bearer tokens or session identifiers;\n* exposure of request bodies, API keys or webhook payloads;\n* abuse of CORS, OAuth or other domain-based allowlists;\n* abuse of same-site cookie and browser trust relationships; and\n* phishing or malware hosted under the organisation\u0027s domain.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n1. open a browser and navigate to\n `https://bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net`\n2. an `afterlife` holding page will be served from the affected\n hostname\n3. observe that the browser reports a valid trusted TLS certificate\n for the affected hostname\n4. navigate to `https://crt.sh/?q=bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net`\n and observe that a new Let\u0027s Encrypt certificate has been issued\n (may require a few refreshes as over-subscribed)\n5. navigate to `https://bethesda.net/` and login (create an account\n if required)\n6. navigate to `https://bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net/request.txt`\n and observe that the full request is displayed, along with the\n domain scoped cookies that were received\n\n\n# Vendor response and timeline\n\n30 June 2026\n\nI submitted the report as VULN-198489.\n\nThe portal did not assign an MSRC case number. The recorded status was\n\"Complete - NA\".\n\nMSRC\u0027s rejected the issue as outside MSRC\u0027s scope, because the IP was\nnot in Azure.\n\n\n# References\n\n* MSRC submission VULN-198489\n* CWE-16: Configuration\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-16",
"description": "CWE-16",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-07T13:20:20Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/35"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/35"
},
{
"url": "https://bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net/request.txt`"
},
{
"url": "https://bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net`"
},
{
"url": "https://bethesda.net/`"
},
{
"url": "https://crt.sh/?q=bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net`"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/35"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Dangling DNS record for bastion.certb.cdp.bethesda.net",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0019",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/35",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "0bb12a8a2f62ec5315cb65d2653f08b92fa3d56f9fb83b993e49fd47900a5ea1",
"evidenceScore": 8,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/35",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-07-24T09:43:16Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-07T13:20:20Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-07T13:20:20Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0019"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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