GCVE-1-2026-20358 (CVE-2026-132645)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:18 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:19| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:15 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
5be467cde9c7… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fc1ce99a660b
|
fix: [security] Galaxy imports no longer rewrite default or | 5be467cde9c7… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces an object-level authorization check (__mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy) that enforces three rules before any existing galaxy record is modified: default galaxies are never updatable via import or sync; non-default galaxies may only be updated by a site admin, the owning organization, or a sync user who has visibility on the record. The role-level permission check is moved before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call so that no organization or sharing-group data is captured for an unauthorized user. When an update is permitted, the org_id, orgc_id, and default fields are explicitly excluded from the write, preventing ownership transfer or default-flag demotion even by authorized updaters.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Galaxy.php: (1) a new private method __mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy() is added, returning false for default galaxies, true for site admins or same-org users, and true for sync users only if the galaxy passes the user's visibility conditions; (2) the existing-galaxy lookup and the __mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy() gate are moved before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call, so unauthorized users are rejected before any org/SG capture; (3) the role permission check (perm_site_admin / perm_galaxy_editor) is moved to the top of the method, before any data mutation; (4) when an existing galaxy is updated, org_id, orgc_id, and default are unset from the existing record before the field-diff loop, ensuring they are never overwritten; (5) a regression test suite (GalaxyCaptureUpdateGate in tests/testregressions.py) is added covering: other-org editor cannot update visible or hidden galaxies, owner can update own galaxy, sync user can update visible but not hidden galaxies, site admin can update without taking over, a
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attacker only needs to submit a valid import payload with a matching UUID; no race conditions or special timing are required. AT:N: No attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with the perm_galaxy_editor role (a low-privilege role in MISP). UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the import is a server-side operation. VC:N: No confidentiality impact is evident from the patch. VI:H: Integrity of galaxy records is severely compromised: ownership (org_id, orgc_id) is transferred and the default flag is cleared, corrupting shared threat-intelligence metadata. VA:L: Demoting default galaxies may degrade the instance's threat-intelligence functionality for all users, but the service remains operational. SC:N: No secondary confidentiality impact. SI:H: Secondary integrity impact extends to other organizations' galaxy data and the shared default galaxy set. SA:N: No secondary availability impact beyond the primary VA.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The captureGalaxy() method performed only a coarse role-level check (perm_galaxy_editor) without verifying object-level ownership or the default-galaxy status of the target record. Any user with the editor role could overwrite galaxies belonging to other organizations or system default galaxies, which is a missing object-level authorization control.
- CWE-639 The attacker-supplied UUID in the import payload was used as the sole key to locate and overwrite an existing galaxy record. Because no ownership or default-status check was applied to the matched record, a user-controlled key (UUID) effectively bypassed the intended authorization boundary. This is a secondary, more specific manifestation of the missing authorization.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker crafts a galaxy import payload whose UUID field is set to match an existing galaxy (default or another organization's), thereby targeting a specific record for unauthorized modification. The UUID is a user-controlled parameter that the application used to identify the target object without sufficient authorization validation. This is the closest CAPEC pattern: the attacker tampers with a request parameter (UUID) to redirect the application's write operation to an unintended object. Uncertainty: CAPEC-114 is a broad pattern; a more specific 'authorization bypass' CAPEC does not exist in the catalog, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions containing the vulnerable captureGalaxy() logic prior to this commit.
- The perm_galaxy_editor role is assumed to be a low-privilege role available to non-admin users; if it is restricted to admins only, the PR metric would be H rather than L.
- The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers 'authorization bypass via object-level key matching in a CRUD operation', so Parameter Tampering is used as the best approximation.
- The CVSS VA:L rating assumes that demoting default galaxies degrades but does not fully break instance functionality; if default galaxies are critical for core operations, VA could be H.
- The SSVC technical_impact of 'partial' assumes the integrity compromise does not cascade into a full loss of trust in the MISP instance's data; if downstream consumers rely on galaxy ownership for access control, the impact could be 'total'.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability is exploitable via the sync/pull path ($fromPull=true) in addition to the manual import path; both paths share the same captureGalaxy() code and are assumed equally affected.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-11 00:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fc1ce99a660b6f34e936b1947167de6748c11ecd): fix: [security] Galaxy imports no longer rewrite default or https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:15 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
{
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Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.