GCVE-1-2026-20356

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-17 16:10 – Updated: 2026-11-17 16:10
VLAI
Title
nginx HTTP/2: Connection-level DoS via stale header field pointers after mid-block stream reset
Summary
A vulnerability exists in the HTTP/2 state machine of nginx (src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c). When a client sends an HTTP/2 header block that triggers a stream reset midway (for example, by including an invalid pseudo-header such as ":status" in a request), the function ngx_http_v2_state_field_len() skips subsequent non-indexed literal fields without properly initializing state.field_start and state.field_end. The downstream function ngx_http_v2_state_process_header() then computes the header name and value lengths from these stale pointers. If the stale pointers happen to be equal (as on a connection where no literal field has yet been read), the skipped field is incorrectly rejected as a zero-length header name, and the entire HTTP/2 connection is terminated with GOAWAY(PROTOCOL_ERROR) rather than only the offending stream being reset. In other cases, skipped fields are charged the encoded length of a previously read field against the header list size limit, leading to incorrect resource accounting. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by sending a single crafted HTTP/2 HEADERS frame containing an invalid pseudo-header followed by a literal header field. The result is the premature termination of the entire HTTP/2 connection, which can be repeated to cause a denial of service against the server's connection capacity. The secondary effect of incorrect header list size accounting could also be leveraged to bypass or distort the server's per-connection header size limits. The fix ensures that when a field is skipped due to a stream reset, state.field_start is explicitly set to NULL and the actual encoded length is recorded in state.header. The process_header function then only derives name and value lengths from the field pointers when the field was actually read (field_start is non-NULL), preserving correct size accounting and preventing the false protocol-error condition that tore down the connection.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 16:08 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
  • CWE-665 - Improper Initialization
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
nginx nginx HTTP/2 module Affected: unspecified
    cpe:2.3:a:nginx:nginx_http\/2_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Not human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-17 16:08
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/kool277/nginx/commit/7b185de7a3f15e545888380cae25b81594f490e1.patch 718197a690d2…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
7b185de7a3f1 HTTP/2: fixed skipped header fields after a stream reset. 718197a690d2…
Fix summary

The fix corrects the HTTP/2 state machine so that when a stream is reset mid-header-block, subsequent literal fields are properly marked as skipped (state.field_start set to NULL) and their true encoded length is recorded in state.header. The header processing function now only computes name/value lengths from field pointers for fields that were actually read, preventing both the false zero-length rejection that caused connection-level GOAWAY and the incorrect header list size accounting for skipped fields.

Patch summary

In ngx_http_v2_state_field_len(), when the stream is NULL and the field is non-indexed (i.e., being skipped), the patch sets state.field_start to NULL and records the field's encoded length into state.header.name.len or state.header.value.len (with data set to NULL) before calling the skip handler. In ngx_http_v2_state_process_header(), the name and value length assignments from field_start/field_end are now guarded by a NULL check on state.field_start, so skipped fields retain the length recorded during the skip phase. A new regression test (tests/regression/h2_reset_stream_skipped_field.t) verifies that a stream reset followed by a literal field does not produce GOAWAY, that the connection remains usable, and that a skipped field with an empty name still triggers PROTOCOL_ERROR.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via a standard HTTP/2 connection. AC:L: The attack requires only sending a single crafted HEADERS frame with an invalid pseudo-header followed by a literal field; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:N: No authentication is needed to send HTTP/2 requests to a server. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:N, VI:N: No confidentiality or integrity impact is evident from the patch. VA:L: The impact is the termination of a single HTTP/2 connection (GOAWAY), which is a limited availability impact per instance; an attacker could repeat the attack across multiple connections but each instance only loses one connection. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No secondary component impact is indicated.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-20 The HTTP/2 state machine does not properly handle the transition from active field parsing to field skipping when a stream is reset mid-header-block. The stale pointer state leads to incorrect validation decisions (false zero-length rejection) and incorrect size accounting, both of which are consequences of failing to properly validate and track the state of skipped input.
  • CWE-665 When entering the field-skip path, state.field_start and state.field_end are not re-initialized to reflect the skipped state. They retain values from a prior field, causing downstream logic to operate on stale data. The fix explicitly sets field_start to NULL to mark the field as skipped.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-107 The attacker sends a crafted HTTP/2 header block that triggers a stream reset (via an invalid pseudo-header) followed by a literal field, manipulating the server's internal HTTP/2 state machine into an inconsistent state where stale pointers cause a false protocol error and connection teardown. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: the attacker exploits the application's state management logic by forcing a specific state transition sequence. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically covers HTTP/2 protocol state manipulation; CAPEC-107 is the best available match for exploiting state machine inconsistencies.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected nginx version range is not specified in the patch; the commit references nginx/nginx#1977 but no version boundary is provided.
  • The CVSS VA:L rating assumes the impact is limited to a single HTTP/2 connection per attack instance; if the server has a very small connection pool, the practical DoS impact could be higher.
  • CAPEC-107 (State Manipulation) is the closest available CAPEC; no CAPEC specifically addresses HTTP/2 protocol state machine manipulation, so this mapping is approximate.
  • The secondary impact of incorrect header list size accounting (skipped fields charged with wrong lengths) is assessed as not independently exploitable for a distinct security impact beyond the primary DoS vector.
  • The patch is from a fork (kool277/nginx); it is assumed to correspond to an upstream nginx fix, but the exact upstream commit and version are not confirmed in the supplied metadata.
  • No evidence of authentication requirements, deployment topology, or multi-tenant context is present; the analysis assumes a standard single-tenant nginx HTTP/2 server.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-14 11:00 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7b185de7a3f15e545888380cae25b81594f490e1): HTTP/2: fixed skipped header fields after a stream reset. https://github.com/kool277/nginx/commit/7b185de7a3f15e545888380cae25b81594f490e1.patch
  2. 2026-11-17 16:07 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/kool277/nginx/commit/7b185de7a3f15e545888380cae25b81594f490e1.patch

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      ],
      "title": "nginx HTTP/2: Connection-level DoS via stale header field pointers after mid-block stream reset",
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Solutions

CNA
The fix corrects the HTTP/2 state machine so that when a stream is reset mid-header-block, subsequent literal fields are properly marked as skipped (state.field_start set to NULL) and their true encoded length is recorded in state.header. The header processing function now only computes name/value lengths from field pointers for fields that were actually read, preventing both the false zero-length rejection that caused connection-level GOAWAY and the incorrect header list size accounting for skipped fields.

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