GCVE-1-2026-20295 (CVE-2026-132637)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:50 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:51| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 20:48 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
7abc20137170… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
b7c1071d1283
|
fix: [security] Event correlations only for events and | 7abc20137170… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an event-level authorization check in the controller using fetchSimpleEvent, which enforces the user's distribution and sharing-group permissions and returns a uniform 404 for both hidden and non-existent events. The Default correlation engine now applies ACL conditions (organisation, event/attribute/object distribution, sharing-group membership) to the queried event's own attributes in both the correlation collection query and the related-events query. The OnDemand engine now includes the source attribute ID in its post-query ACL filter so that correlations are discarded if either side of the row is invisible to the user.
Patch summary
CorrelationsController.php: added a fetchSimpleEvent call before processing; throws NotFoundException if the event is not visible to the user, and casts the resolved ID to int. DefaultCorrelationBehavior.php: added a new __aclConditions() private method that builds SQL OR/AND conditions for org_id, event_distribution, event_sharing_group_id, object_distribution, object_sharing_group_id, distribution, and sharing_group_id; these conditions are merged into the __collectCorrelations query and the __filterRelatedEvents query. OnDemandCorrelationBehavior.php: __filterCorrelationsByAcl now collects both the target attribute ID and the source_id into the ACL check set, and the visibility test requires both to be present. tests/testregressions.py: added EventCorrelationsAcl test class with four test methods covering invisible-event 404, hidden-attribute filtering, related-event filtering, and owner/admin regression.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: exploitation requires only a valid session and a target event ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L: any authenticated user with the least-privileged role can trigger the issue; no admin or specific role required. UI:N: no victim interaction needed. VC:L: partial confidentiality loss - attribute IDs and values (IPs, domains) of hidden events/attributes are disclosed, but not full database or credential exposure. VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact beyond the vulnerable component itself.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The eventCorrelations action performed no check that the authenticated user was permitted to view the event identified by the event ID parameter before returning its correlations. This is a classic missing authorization check at the resource level.
- CWE-863 The correlation engines applied ACL filtering only to the target (related) side of each correlation row and omitted the queried event's own source attributes. This is an incomplete/incorrect authorization check that allowed hidden attribute data to be exposed.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker manipulates the event ID path parameter in the correlations/eventCorrelations/<id> endpoint to reference an event they are not authorised to view. The server accepted the parameter without validating the caller's access to that specific event. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: the user supplies a parameter value (event ID) that the application fails to authorize. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 (Leveraging Trusted Relationships) is also plausible because the user leverages a valid session, but the core defect is the missing per-resource authorization check triggered by the tampered parameter.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is unknown; the patch does not specify a version boundary. All MISP releases prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- PR:L assumes that any authenticated user with the least-privileged role (perm_add) can trigger the vulnerability, as demonstrated by the regression tests. If a higher privilege level is required in some deployments, PR would be H.
- VC:L assumes the exposed data (attribute values such as IPs and domains) constitutes a partial but not total loss of confidentiality. If the deployment treats all attribute data as highly sensitive, VC could be argued as H.
- CAPEC-114 (Parameter Tampering) is selected as the closest match; CAPEC-126 (Leveraging Trusted Relationships) is an alternative but less precise mapping for the missing per-resource authorization check.
- The commit date (2026-11-09) is taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification of the timeline is performed.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as metadata evidence without independent verification of the contribution.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-09 08:35 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (b7c1071d1283e442ff437970d38434a397b232ac): fix: [security] Event correlations only for events and https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
- 2026-11-18 20:47 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
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"VC:L assumes the exposed data (attribute values such as IPs and domains) constitutes a partial but not total loss of confidentiality. If the deployment treats all attribute data as highly sensitive, VC could be argued as H.",
"CAPEC-114 (Parameter Tampering) is selected as the closest match; CAPEC-126 (Leveraging Trusted Relationships) is an alternative but less precise mapping for the missing per-resource authorization check.",
"The commit date (2026-11-09) is taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification of the timeline is performed.",
"The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as metadata evidence without independent verification of the contribution."
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Solutions
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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