GCVE-1-2026-20181 (CVE-2026-132642)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:04 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:04| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:02 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
1c33ce45dacf… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
de1a25aa0d27
|
fix: [security] Tag endpoints only act on events and | 1c33ce45dacf… |
Fix summary
The tag endpoints now load their target event or attribute using ACL-aware fetch methods (fetchSimpleEvent, fetchAttributeSimple) that apply the calling user's visibility rules before returning the object. A hidden event or attribute now produces the same response as a non-existent one, eliminating both the tag-enumeration information leak and the ability of host-organisation users to modify tags on records they cannot see. A clarifying comment was added to ACLComponent::canModifyTag to document that the caller must load the object with visibility applied first.
Patch summary
In EventsController::addTag (single and bulk paths) and EventsController::removeTag, replaced unscoped $this->Event->find('first', ['recursive' => -1, ...]) calls with $this->Event->fetchSimpleEvent($this->Auth->user(), $id), and added an explicit empty-check in removeTag returning 'Invalid event.' for hidden targets. In AttributesController::removeTag, replaced $this->MispAttribute->find('first', ['recursive' => -1, ...]) with $this->MispAttribute->fetchAttributeSimple($this->Auth->user(), [...]). Added a documentation comment in ACLComponent::canModifyTag noting that the event or attribute must be loaded with the user's visibility applied before the check. Added a regression test class TagEndpointsHiddenTargets covering hidden-event tag enumeration, host-org tag add/remove on hidden and visible records, bulk addTag, and site-admin behaviour.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L: The attack requires only a standard API call with a known or guessable event/attribute ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with at least the tagger role (perm_tagger) or host-organisation membership; this is a low-privilege requirement in MISP's role model. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:L: The removeTag endpoint leaks which tags are present on a hidden event, a limited confidentiality impact on metadata. VI:L: Host-org users can add or remove local tags on hidden events/attributes, a limited integrity impact on tag metadata. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems or resources beyond the MISP instance.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The tag endpoints performed tag add/remove operations on events and attributes without first verifying that the calling user had visibility (ACL) on the target object. The authorization check (canModifyTag) was applied to an unscoped object, effectively missing the visibility authorization step.
- CWE-200 The removeTag endpoint returned different responses for a tag present versus absent on a hidden event, leaking information about the tag set of records the user was not authorized to view.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-128 MISP implements a custom ACL/visibility system for events and attributes. The tag endpoints incorrectly implemented this access control by loading the target object without applying the user's visibility filter before performing the operation. The access control mechanism existed (canModifyTag) but was applied to an unscoped object, making it ineffective. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of a custom authorization check being bypassed due to incorrect implementation. Uncertainty: CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) could also apply since the attacker supplies an ID of a record they cannot see, but the root cause is the missing visibility scoping in the server-side load, making CAPEC-128 the more precise match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs only the tagger role (perm_tagger) or host-org membership, which is a low-privilege role in MISP's model; the exact minimum role was inferred from the test setup.
- VC:L assumes the tag-enumeration information disclosure is a low confidentiality impact; if the tag names themselves are considered sensitive, the impact could be higher.
- CAPEC-128 was selected as the closest match; CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) is a secondary candidate but the root cause is server-side missing visibility scoping rather than client-side parameter manipulation.
- The commit date (2026-11-10) and the presence of 'Claude Opus 5.5' as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.
- No specific MISP release version is identified as the first fixed version; the patch is a single commit without a tag or release reference.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-10 09:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (de1a25aa0d273ce5efcd73e138f8fcdbff9a79b0): fix: [security] Tag endpoints only act on events and https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:01 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
{
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}
],
"title": "MISP Tag Endpoints Bypass ACL Visibility, Allowing Unauthorized Tag Modification and Enumeration on Hidden Events",
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"VC:L assumes the tag-enumeration information disclosure is a low confidentiality impact; if the tag names themselves are considered sensitive, the impact could be higher.",
"CAPEC-128 was selected as the closest match; CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) is a secondary candidate but the root cause is server-side missing visibility scoping rather than client-side parameter manipulation.",
"The commit date (2026-11-10) and the presence of \u0027Claude Opus 5.5\u0027 as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.",
"No specific MISP release version is identified as the first fixed version; the patch is a single commit without a tag or release reference."
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"generatedAt": "2026-11-18T21:02:05.506995Z",
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Solutions
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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