GCVE-1-2026-20150 (CVE-2026-78387)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-08-24 14:03 – Updated: 2026-08-24 14:04- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook/commit/d… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ransomlook | ransomlook |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 2.0.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "ransomlook",
"repo": "https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook",
"vendor": "ransomlook",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.0.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Fafner [_KeyZee_]"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eRansomLook contains an authorization weakness in the web-based configuration editor exposed through the \u003ccode\u003e/admin/config\u003c/code\u003e endpoint. The endpoint requires an authenticated session but does not perform an explicit privilege or administrator authorization check before allowing access to configuration-management functionality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn authenticated low-privileged user able to access the endpoint can submit crafted configuration values that are written directly to the application\u0027s \u003ccode\u003econfig/generic.json\u003c/code\u003e file. The affected functionality permits modification of configuration sections including notification, LDAP, SMTP, and general application settings. Successful exploitation could therefore allow an attacker to alter security-sensitive application behavior, redirect integrations or notifications, modify authentication-related configuration, disrupt external services, or render the RansomLook installation unavailable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe configuration editor also operated on a configuration file containing sensitive values such as passwords, tokens, secrets, and API keys. Although the affected version contains logic intended to prevent recognized secret values from being returned to the browser, exposing configuration management through insufficiently authorized web functionality significantly increases the impact of a compromised or low-privileged account.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe patch resolves the issue by completely removing the \u003ccode\u003e/admin/config\u003c/code\u003e route and associated configuration-editing interface, preventing application configuration from being modified through the web UI.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "RansomLook contains an authorization weakness in the web-based configuration editor exposed through the /admin/config endpoint. The endpoint requires an authenticated session but does not perform an explicit privilege or administrator authorization check before allowing access to configuration-management functionality.\n\nAn authenticated low-privileged user able to access the endpoint can submit crafted configuration values that are written directly to the application\u0027s config/generic.json file. The affected functionality permits modification of configuration sections including notification, LDAP, SMTP, and general application settings. Successful exploitation could therefore allow an attacker to alter security-sensitive application behavior, redirect integrations or notifications, modify authentication-related configuration, disrupt external services, or render the RansomLook installation unavailable.\n\nThe configuration editor also operated on a configuration file containing sensitive values such as passwords, tokens, secrets, and API keys. Although the affected version contains logic intended to prevent recognized secret values from being returned to the browser, exposing configuration management through insufficiently authorized web functionality significantly increases the impact of a compromised or low-privileged account.\n\nThe patch resolves the issue by completely removing the /admin/config route and associated configuration-editing interface, preventing application configuration from being modified through the web UI."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-122",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-122 Privilege Abuse"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 9.4,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook/commit/d411ff51446e9e8b04e15567b46d53e86a3116dd"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "RansomLook Missing Authorization in Web Configuration Editor Allows Application Configuration Modification",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20150"
}
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"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-78387",
"datePublished": "2026-08-24T14:03:49.792546Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-24T14:04:08.566Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-24T14:04:08.948852Z",
"requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"serial": 1,
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20150"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
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