GCVE-1-2026-20146 (CVE-2026-67178)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-07-28 14:30 – Updated: 2026-07-28 14:30
VLAI
Title
Open Redirect in MISP Installer-Generated Apache Configuration
Summary
MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect: Redirect permanent / https://misp.example Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path. For example, a request resembling: http://misp.example/@attacker.example/ could result in a redirect resembling: https://misp.example@attacker.example/ Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website. The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL. The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host. Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash: Redirect permanent / https://misp.example/ After updating the configuration, validate it with apachectl configtest and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect
CWE
  • CWE-601 - URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 90/100 over 257 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
misp misp Affected: 0 , < 2.5.41 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/",
          "vendor": "misp",
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
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          "value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eRedirect permanent / https://misp.example\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003cp\u003eApache\u2019s \u003ccode\u003eRedirect\u003c/code\u003e directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with \u003ccode\u003e/\u003c/code\u003e, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor example, a request resembling:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003ehttp://misp.example/@attacker.example/\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003cp\u003ecould result in a redirect resembling:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003ehttps://misp.example@attacker.example/\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnder standard URL parsing, \u003ccode\u003emisp.example\u003c/code\u003e is interpreted as user information and \u003ccode\u003eattacker.example\u003c/code\u003e as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch3\u003eExisting installations\u003c/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003eExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eRedirect permanent / https://misp.example/\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter updating the configuration, validate it with \u003ccode\u003eapachectl configtest\u003c/code\u003e and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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          "capecId": "CAPEC-33",
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            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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              "type": "CWE"
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
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      "references": [
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/15becd3b21245ddc6a8b5dad46e983ade405ddf8"
        }
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Open Redirect in MISP Installer-Generated Apache Configuration",
      "x_gcve": [
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-67178",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-28T14:30:07.486165Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-28T14:30:17.943Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T14:30:18.162845Z",
    "requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20146"
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  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}



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