FKIE_CVE-2026-99800

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 08:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 08:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: free the task context after a grace period A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work() running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else branch: percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1); if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel))) wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct(tctx->task); The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(), and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed along with the task_struct. It used to work out because io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock. Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in io_put_task() before the count is dropped.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/io_uring_types.h",
            "io_uring/io_uring.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/io_uring_types.h",
            "io_uring/io_uring.c",
            "io_uring/tctx.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: free the task context after a grace period\n\nA task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()\nrunning the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or\nio_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else\nbranch:\n\n    percpu_counter_sub(\u0026tctx-\u003einflight, 1);\n    if (unlikely(atomic_read(\u0026tctx-\u003ein_cancel)))\n            wake_up(\u0026tctx-\u003ewait);\n    put_task_struct(tctx-\u003etask);\n\nThe first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),\nand on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for\nthe remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed\nalong with the task_struct. It used to work out because\nio_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds\nacross io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.\n\nFree the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in\nio_put_task() before the count is dropped."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99800",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T08:18:37.647",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T08:18:37.647",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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