FKIE_CVE-2026-99788

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: CPPC: Validate FFH register fields before hardware access The x86 CPPC FFH accessors construct masks and shift values using the firmware's Bit Width and Bit Offset without checking that the field fits in an MSR. A zero-width field or a field extending beyond bit 63 can therefore cause an invalid shift. The safe MSR accessors only handle an access fault, not invalid field arithmetic after a successful read. Also, the 64-bit GAS address is implicitly narrowed to the 32-bit MSR number. A descriptor with nonzero upper address bits can access a different MSR from the one described by firmware. The arm64 AMU counter readers have the same unchecked field arithmetic. Validate the field bounds before reading a counter, including both descriptors in the paired counter path. Dispatch FFH accesses before decoding the GAS Access Size in the common read and write paths. Otherwise, a large access_width can trigger an invalid shift in GET_BIT_WIDTH() before the architecture validates its register. That field has architecture-specific FFH semantics and is not needed by the generic memory/port accessor on this path. Validate x86 MSR addresses and share the field-bounds checks between related accessors within each architecture.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c",
            "arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c",
            "drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "dd2322d548cc1b424da6d07e69eeab7543020106",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a6cbcdd5ab5f242d49f511127f0a601b71be2cc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "353c0cb4375c57d282449cf87e8e405c2e8bc8ed",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a6cbcdd5ab5f242d49f511127f0a601b71be2cc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4f6a4864308b57cf7aa38ddd07cf4ddcecfbcc41",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a6cbcdd5ab5f242d49f511127f0a601b71be2cc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6b016c5c96448c0a5f09328d37f66562d154a5e5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a6cbcdd5ab5f242d49f511127f0a601b71be2cc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c",
            "arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c",
            "drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.9"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.9",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: CPPC: Validate FFH register fields before hardware access\n\nThe x86 CPPC FFH accessors construct masks and shift values using the\nfirmware\u0027s Bit Width and Bit Offset without checking that the field fits\nin an MSR. A zero-width field or a field extending beyond bit 63 can\ntherefore cause an invalid shift. The safe MSR accessors only handle an\naccess fault, not invalid field arithmetic after a successful read.\n\nAlso, the 64-bit GAS address is implicitly narrowed to the 32-bit MSR\nnumber. A descriptor with nonzero upper address bits can access a different\nMSR from the one described by firmware.\n\nThe arm64 AMU counter readers have the same unchecked field arithmetic.\nValidate the field bounds before reading a counter, including both\ndescriptors in the paired counter path.\n\nDispatch FFH accesses before decoding the GAS Access Size in the common\nread and write paths. Otherwise, a large access_width can trigger an\ninvalid shift in GET_BIT_WIDTH() before the architecture validates its\nregister. That field has architecture-specific FFH semantics and is not\nneeded by the generic memory/port accessor on this path.\n\nValidate x86 MSR addresses and share the field-bounds checks between\nrelated accessors within each architecture."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99788",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:18.103",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:18.103",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/353c0cb4375c57d282449cf87e8e405c2e8bc8ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f6a4864308b57cf7aa38ddd07cf4ddcecfbcc41"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b016c5c96448c0a5f09328d37f66562d154a5e5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd2322d548cc1b424da6d07e69eeab7543020106"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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