FKIE_CVE-2026-99773

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind In [1], sashiko reported the following issue: === snip === Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence() creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC. The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops (like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via synchronize_rcu(). If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device hot-unplug: CPU1 (Userspace) sync_file_get_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops); if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) // Preempted or delayed here CPU2 (Driver Teardown) Signals the fence (setting fence->ops = NULL) Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period CPU1 (Resumes) ops->get_driver_name(fence) -> drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC return crtc->dev->driver->name; // Use-after-free ... Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access the freed CRTC structure? === snap === I believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements the suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding with destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() can still work.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "dd9a96b2271e28340acf2e3764914fe5f32f6102",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6d6003c4b613c93973e4e870d83f4bed2ad9ac34",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "07b2d7a3f2b984c20f5f2630a94f43ede387a8dc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6d6003c4b613c93973e4e870d83f4bed2ad9ac34",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f8e6f4deb868fd9da3eda95db222609ab1edc18d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6d6003c4b613c93973e4e870d83f4bed2ad9ac34",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3be436cbd3d265fe4fcfbb5b650edad7b2108443",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6d6003c4b613c93973e4e870d83f4bed2ad9ac34",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.10"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.10",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind\n\nIn [1], sashiko reported the following issue:\n\n=== snip ===\nLooking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence()\ncreates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or\ndrm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to\nuserspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC.\n\nThe dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops\n(like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after\nthe fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent\nfreeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via\nsynchronize_rcu().\n\nIf userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device\nhot-unplug:\n\nCPU1 (Userspace)\nsync_file_get_name()\n  ops = rcu_dereference(fence-\u003eops);\n  if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag())\n    // Preempted or delayed here\n\nCPU2 (Driver Teardown)\nSignals the fence (setting fence-\u003eops = NULL)\nDestroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period\n\nCPU1 (Resumes)\n  ops-\u003eget_driver_name(fence) -\u003e drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name()\n  crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC\n  return crtc-\u003edev-\u003edriver-\u003ename; // Use-after-free\n\n...\n\nDoes the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace\nperiod, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the\nuse-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access\nthe freed CRTC structure?\n=== snap ===\n\nI believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements\nthe suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding\nwith destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and\nget_timeline_name() can still work."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99773",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:16.143",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:16.143",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07b2d7a3f2b984c20f5f2630a94f43ede387a8dc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3be436cbd3d265fe4fcfbb5b650edad7b2108443"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd9a96b2271e28340acf2e3764914fe5f32f6102"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8e6f4deb868fd9da3eda95db222609ab1edc18d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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