FKIE_CVE-2026-99759

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: don't drop local events queued during TVLV update batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() read the number of local changes without holding changes_list_lock. batadv_tt_local_event() is not serialized by the commit_lock and can queue new events before the changes_list is flushed: CPU0 CPU1 batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() num = ...local_changes; batadv_tt_local_event() list_add_tail(...); ...local_changes++; spin_lock_bh(&...changes_list_lock); /* only num events copied but all freed */ The additional events were freed without ever being sent. Other nodes will only notice this via a CRC mismatch and must request the full table. The number of changes and the changes_list must therefore be taken atomically. Events queued afterwards then stay in the tt.changes_list for the next TT round. The changes can no longer be kept for the next round when the TVLV buffer allocation fails. But they would be sent with a skipped TTVN anyway, so the other nodes have to request the full table in this case either way. The last changeset is only dropped in this case when the TTVN was incremented. Without new changes, it still describes the current TTVN. Previously, the unconsumed changes caused a retry of the TVLV container update in the next commit round. Since the changes are now consumed, the next round would only take the path without changes and wait for BATADV_TT_OGM_APPEND_MAX rounds before updating the container again. Until then, the outdated container with the previous TTVN would still be announced. The ogm_append_cnt is therefore reset on failure to retry the update in the next OGM interval. This doesn't make the CRC consistent with the announced changeset. The local table modifications are still not serialized with the commit and batadv_tt_local_transition_new() can still make a client part of the CRC for which the event is only part of the next TT round. Such an inconsistency is detected by the CRC check of the other nodes and solved via a full table request.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/batman-adv/translation-table.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "9c456c887ad9c8950097473590923ce8b553d488",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a73105b8d4c765d9ebfb664d0a66802127d8e4c7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5bfa79a27aee75e3f1d84f9b4d4358dbeb9b7505",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a73105b8d4c765d9ebfb664d0a66802127d8e4c7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "cd2ff491c8eed4773f4f50ae10c942e09db1f6c4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a73105b8d4c765d9ebfb664d0a66802127d8e4c7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ed7a0dfdd370acb48be7a281df732c1bebcc7f1d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a73105b8d4c765d9ebfb664d0a66802127d8e4c7",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/batman-adv/translation-table.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: tt: don\u0027t drop local events queued during TVLV update\n\nbatadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() read the number of local changes without\nholding changes_list_lock. batadv_tt_local_event() is not serialized by\nthe commit_lock and can queue new events before the changes_list is\nflushed:\n\n  CPU0                          CPU1\n  batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update()\n    num = ...local_changes;\n                                batadv_tt_local_event()\n                                  list_add_tail(...);\n                                  ...local_changes++;\n    spin_lock_bh(\u0026...changes_list_lock);\n    /* only num events copied but all freed */\n\nThe additional events were freed without ever being sent. Other nodes will\nonly notice this via a CRC mismatch and must request the full table.\n\nThe number of changes and the changes_list must therefore be taken\natomically. Events queued afterwards then stay in the tt.changes_list for\nthe next TT round.\n\nThe changes can no longer be kept for the next round when the TVLV buffer\nallocation fails. But they would be sent with a skipped TTVN anyway, so the\nother nodes have to request the full table in this case either way. The\nlast changeset is only dropped in this case when the TTVN was incremented.\nWithout new changes, it still describes the current TTVN.\n\nPreviously, the unconsumed changes caused a retry of the TVLV container\nupdate in the next commit round. Since the changes are now consumed, the\nnext round would only take the path without changes and wait for\nBATADV_TT_OGM_APPEND_MAX rounds before updating the container again. Until\nthen, the outdated container with the previous TTVN would still be\nannounced. The ogm_append_cnt is therefore reset on failure to retry the\nupdate in the next OGM interval.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t make the CRC consistent with the announced changeset. The\nlocal table modifications are still not serialized with the commit and\nbatadv_tt_local_transition_new() can still make a client part of the CRC\nfor which the event is only part of the next TT round. Such an\ninconsistency is detected by the CRC check of the other nodes and solved\nvia a full table request."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99759",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:14.220",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:14.220",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bfa79a27aee75e3f1d84f9b4d4358dbeb9b7505"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c456c887ad9c8950097473590923ce8b553d488"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd2ff491c8eed4773f4f50ae10c942e09db1f6c4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed7a0dfdd370acb48be7a281df732c1bebcc7f1d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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