FKIE_CVE-2026-99751

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh() The issue: This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric. After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh(). __bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking only that mac_header < network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the redirect goes on to read is linear either. A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do: bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0); bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0); after vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb->len < skb->data_len BUG in __skb_pull(): kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839! RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50 Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -> packet_xmit -> packet_sendmsg Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC header is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0 after the pull, so the network header sits at skb->tail and the route lookup reads ip4h->protocol, ip4h->saddr and ip4h->daddr past the linear area. The Fix: Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of skb->mac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit packets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by pop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers the mac_header >= network_header test it replaces. Use pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read or pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6 path before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken after the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head. Conditions to recreate the bug: On x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration and raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program that calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns bpf_redirect_neigh(skb->ifindex, NULL, 0, 0): ip link set lo up tc qdisc add dev lo clsact tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \ action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action Send an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender's skb has a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth removes that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte. The unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs. Sending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP header in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb->tail.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/core/filter.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a725401dd629c6fdda47e3a02efed539ac0ed6d0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2009032471be8b9622bf2496ce9c6b06a1015905",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "890fd9c4e02bc9e477e6365fef4ac8c2262a3b3c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "23503acb214cbefaf3945d05ab9667ff11ae3de9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/core/filter.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.10"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.10",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()\n\nThe issue:\nThis is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.\nAfter vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call\nbpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().\n\n__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking\nonly that mac_header \u003c network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC\nheader is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the\nredirect goes on to read is linear either.\n\nA SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:\n\n    bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);\n    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);\n\nafter vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of\nlinear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-\u003elen \u003c skb-\u003edata_len BUG in\n__skb_pull():\n\n    kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!\n    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50\n    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -\u003e packet_xmit -\u003e packet_sendmsg\n    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nThe v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC\nheader is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0\nafter the pull, so the network header sits at skb-\u003etail and the route\nlookup reads ip4h-\u003eprotocol, ip4h-\u003esaddr and ip4h-\u003edaddr past the linear\narea.\n\nThe Fix:\nUse skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of\nskb-\u003emac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit\npackets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by\npop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0).  The single check also covers\nthe mac_header \u003e= network_header test it replaces.\n\nUse pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read\nor pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6\npath before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read.  The header pointers are taken\nafter the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb-\u003ehead.\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\nOn x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL,\nCONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and\nCONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF.  Run as root with BPF loading, network administration\nand raw-packet privileges.  Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program\nthat calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns\nbpf_redirect_neigh(skb-\u003eifindex, NULL, 0, 0):\n\n  ip link set lo up\n  tc qdisc add dev lo clsact\n  tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \\\n      action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action\n\nSend an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an\nAF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or\nPACKET_QDISC_BYPASS.  Use a unicast destination MAC.  The sender\u0027s skb\nhas a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth\nremoves that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte.\nThe unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs.\n\nSending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP\nheader in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb-\u003etail."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99751",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:13.117",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:13.117",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2009032471be8b9622bf2496ce9c6b06a1015905"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23503acb214cbefaf3945d05ab9667ff11ae3de9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/890fd9c4e02bc9e477e6365fef4ac8c2262a3b3c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a725401dd629c6fdda47e3a02efed539ac0ed6d0"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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