FKIE_CVE-2026-99751
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a725401dd629c6fdda47e3a02efed539ac0ed6d0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2009032471be8b9622bf2496ce9c6b06a1015905",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "890fd9c4e02bc9e477e6365fef4ac8c2262a3b3c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "23503acb214cbefaf3945d05ab9667ff11ae3de9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ab31414970a7a03a5d55d75083f2c101a30592",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()\n\nThe issue:\nThis is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.\nAfter vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call\nbpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().\n\n__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking\nonly that mac_header \u003c network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC\nheader is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the\nredirect goes on to read is linear either.\n\nA SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:\n\n bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);\n bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);\n\nafter vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of\nlinear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-\u003elen \u003c skb-\u003edata_len BUG in\n__skb_pull():\n\n kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!\n RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50\n Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -\u003e packet_xmit -\u003e packet_sendmsg\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nThe v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC\nheader is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0\nafter the pull, so the network header sits at skb-\u003etail and the route\nlookup reads ip4h-\u003eprotocol, ip4h-\u003esaddr and ip4h-\u003edaddr past the linear\narea.\n\nThe Fix:\nUse skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of\nskb-\u003emac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit\npackets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by\npop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers\nthe mac_header \u003e= network_header test it replaces.\n\nUse pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read\nor pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6\npath before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken\nafter the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb-\u003ehead.\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\nOn x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL,\nCONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and\nCONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration\nand raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program\nthat calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns\nbpf_redirect_neigh(skb-\u003eifindex, NULL, 0, 0):\n\n ip link set lo up\n tc qdisc add dev lo clsact\n tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \\\n action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action\n\nSend an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an\nAF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or\nPACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender\u0027s skb\nhas a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth\nremoves that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte.\nThe unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs.\n\nSending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP\nheader in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb-\u003etail."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99751",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:13.117",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:18:13.117",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2009032471be8b9622bf2496ce9c6b06a1015905"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23503acb214cbefaf3945d05ab9667ff11ae3de9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/890fd9c4e02bc9e477e6365fef4ac8c2262a3b3c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a725401dd629c6fdda47e3a02efed539ac0ed6d0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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