FKIE_CVE-2026-99700

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb_vmemmap: map the shared tail page writable page_ref_add_unless_zero() reads the refcount and then updates it with a cmpxchg. A lockless get, such as a page cache lookup or a PFN scanner, can read a non-zero refcount from a page that is then freed and reused as a hugetlb tail page. If HVO remaps its struct page to the shared tail page in between, the cmpxchg writes to read-only vmemmap: CPU0 (lockless get) CPU1 c = atomic_read(&page->_refcount) page freed page allocated as a hugetlb tail HVO remaps the struct page RO try_cmpxchg(&page->_refcount, &c, c + 1) -> write fault on read-only vmemmap The refcount is zero by then and the compare fails, but a compare-and-swap instruction needs write access whether or not it succeeds. The kernel oopses when hugetlb pages are allocated at runtime with HVO enabled while a lockless get races with it. Commit bd225530a4c7 ("mm/hugetlb_vmemmap: fix race with speculative PFN walkers") closed the window with RCU on both sides. The RCU was removed together with fake heads, on the wrong belief that it was only needed for them. Map the shared tail page writable instead of restoring the RCU. Every struct page on it is a tail with a zero refcount, so a late cmpxchg fails and leaves the page unchanged. RCU would put rcu_read_lock() back around every get and synchronize_rcu() back into hugetlb allocation and freeing. The cost is the protection against stray writes to tail struct pages. The shared page is shared by all hugetlb folios of the same order in the zone, so such a write now corrupts all of them instead of oopsing. Bootmem folios optimized when the memmap is set up keep their tails read-only. Nothing does a lockless get on them before hugetlb takes them over.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "Documentation/mm/vmemmap_dedup.rst",
            "mm/hugetlb_vmemmap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "f96a68bab26183433ea542dfb29ec41125f9fe39",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dba93b8cceb0048071389352fc29dcb0a7fe666f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e570f2c29fc07a1040c3736bf1a1dfa8065d5099",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "32c440d67e6cd96a715007d0e62eb970b0c49abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0120a603afadba8ab4954bb1ce60f8195f80efc8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "32c440d67e6cd96a715007d0e62eb970b0c49abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.18.64",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.18.51",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "Documentation/mm/vmemmap_dedup.rst",
            "mm/hugetlb_vmemmap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb_vmemmap: map the shared tail page writable\n\npage_ref_add_unless_zero() reads the refcount and then updates it with a\ncmpxchg.  A lockless get, such as a page cache lookup or a PFN scanner,\ncan read a non-zero refcount from a page that is then freed and reused as\na hugetlb tail page.  If HVO remaps its struct page to the shared tail\npage in between, the cmpxchg writes to read-only vmemmap:\n\n    CPU0 (lockless get)               CPU1\n    c = atomic_read(\u0026page-\u003e_refcount)\n                                      page freed\n                                      page allocated as a hugetlb tail\n                                      HVO remaps the struct page RO\n    try_cmpxchg(\u0026page-\u003e_refcount, \u0026c, c + 1)\n      -\u003e write fault on read-only vmemmap\n\nThe refcount is zero by then and the compare fails, but a compare-and-swap\ninstruction needs write access whether or not it succeeds.  The kernel\noopses when hugetlb pages are allocated at runtime with HVO enabled while\na lockless get races with it.\n\nCommit bd225530a4c7 (\"mm/hugetlb_vmemmap: fix race with speculative PFN\nwalkers\") closed the window with RCU on both sides.  The RCU was removed\ntogether with fake heads, on the wrong belief that it was only needed for\nthem.\n\nMap the shared tail page writable instead of restoring the RCU.  Every\nstruct page on it is a tail with a zero refcount, so a late cmpxchg\nfails and leaves the page unchanged.  RCU would put rcu_read_lock()\nback around every get and synchronize_rcu() back into hugetlb\nallocation and freeing.\n\nThe cost is the protection against stray writes to tail struct pages.  The\nshared page is shared by all hugetlb folios of the same order in the zone,\nso such a write now corrupts all of them instead of oopsing.\n\nBootmem folios optimized when the memmap is set up keep their tails\nread-only.  Nothing does a lockless get on them before hugetlb takes them\nover."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99700",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:05.563",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:05.563",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0120a603afadba8ab4954bb1ce60f8195f80efc8"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e570f2c29fc07a1040c3736bf1a1dfa8065d5099"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f96a68bab26183433ea542dfb29ec41125f9fe39"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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