FKIE_CVE-2026-99691
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8dc77ad4253904eb768f1aff45bb870d6d5a6eb5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2309e9e040fe29469fb85a384636c455b62fe525",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "829a331e1b52053c6f2d880daaa2f2c0ee85580f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2309e9e040fe29469fb85a384636c455b62fe525",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "831f6f917f7e22068d850efc6443eca300a11f95",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2309e9e040fe29469fb85a384636c455b62fe525",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0988f0c0c7c908f0ff77fd8b90ce9918a1f41479",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2309e9e040fe29469fb85a384636c455b62fe525",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.26"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.26",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources\n\nA socket container\u0027s node and socket must remain alive while the\ncontainer is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node\nand sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but\nsc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the\ncontainer.\n\nWith CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last\nsocket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached\nthe connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that\nworkqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node\nremoval can proceed without waiting for the sender\u0027s final sc_put():\n\n Sender (final sc_put) Configfs rmdir Debugfs reader\n -------------------- -------------- --------------\n o2nm_undepend_item()\n Drop node item refs\n o2nm_node_put()\n [node can be freed]\n sc_seq_show()\n Lock debug lock\n Read sc_node-\u003end_name\n Unlock debug lock\n sc_node = NULL\n o2net_debug_del_sc()\n\nThe earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is\nstill selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has\nnot yet been cleared:\n\n Sender (final sc_put) Debugfs reader\n -------------------- --------------\n sock_release(sc-\u003esc_sock)\n [socket can be freed]\n sc_seq_show()\n Lock debug lock\n Read sc_sock-\u003esk fields\n Unlock debug lock\n sc_sock = NULL\n ...\n o2net_debug_del_sc()\n\nMove o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking\nunder the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish\nand prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers\nboth socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats\nformatter.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506\n\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n string+0x42b/0x470\n vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110\n seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260\n sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0\n seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110\n seq_read+0x362/0x5a0\n full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180\n vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20\n ksys_read+0x111/0x200\n do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n(User register dump omitted.)\n\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 497:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610\n o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0\n configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0\n vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0\n filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450\n __x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0\n do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n Freed by task 505:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80\n kfree+0x308/0x580\n config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230\n config_item_put+0x79/0x90\n sc_put+0x454/0x6e0\n o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560\n o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0\n validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0\n full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180\n vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010\n ksys_write+\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99691",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:04.247",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:18:04.247",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0988f0c0c7c908f0ff77fd8b90ce9918a1f41479"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/829a331e1b52053c6f2d880daaa2f2c0ee85580f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/831f6f917f7e22068d850efc6443eca300a11f95"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8dc77ad4253904eb768f1aff45bb870d6d5a6eb5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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