FKIE_CVE-2026-99673

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv() Commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private pointer (dev->ml_priv) to named users like ML_PRIV_CAN. A valid pointer returned by can_get_ml_priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device. The referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this check, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on dev->type == ARPHRD_CAN. The TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware type to ARPHRD_CAN while dev->ml_priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed netdevice passes the ARPHRD_CAN checks. Commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()") already made can_rx_register() reject such devices. But can_rx_unregister() still only checks dev->type and dereferences the NULL ml_priv when it walks the receive lists of the device. CAN_ISOTP reaches this path: isotp_bind() ignores the return values of can_rx_register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is released or the device is unregistered, isotp_release() and isotp_notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and trigger the NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_unregister(). This only requires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP_NET_ADMIN in an unprivileged user namespace. Convert the remaining ARPHRD_CAN checks in af_can, bcm, gw, isotp and raw to can_get_ml_priv().
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/can/af_can.c",
            "net/can/bcm.c",
            "net/can/gw.c",
            "net/can/isotp.c",
            "net/can/raw.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c693cbfbc2ad5ab159c671c58f285aa3d4d8a98b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4e096a18867a5a989b510f6999d9c6b6622e8f7b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f4910431fdf7b2800f0bec9f161900511f9a8bcd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4e096a18867a5a989b510f6999d9c6b6622e8f7b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "27edc672a80ae9d5e7e8aa0cc8f5e3ed2b5dab19",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4e096a18867a5a989b510f6999d9c6b6622e8f7b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "962947b69589881167054bae5accc8abfd5aa4b6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4e096a18867a5a989b510f6999d9c6b6622e8f7b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4ac1feff6ea6495cbfd336f4438a6c6d140544a6",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1a5751d58b14195f763b8c1d9ef33fb8a93e95e7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "96340078d50a54f6a1252c62596bc44321c8bff9",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.4.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.11",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.10.28",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.11.12",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/can/af_can.c",
            "net/can/bcm.c",
            "net/can/gw.c",
            "net/can/isotp.c",
            "net/can/raw.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv()\n\nCommit 4e096a18867a (\"net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct\nnet_device\") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private\npointer (dev-\u003eml_priv) to named users like ML_PRIV_CAN. A valid pointer\nreturned by can_get_ml_priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device.\n\nThe referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this\ncheck, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on\ndev-\u003etype == ARPHRD_CAN.\n\nThe TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware\ntype to ARPHRD_CAN while dev-\u003eml_priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed\nnetdevice passes the ARPHRD_CAN checks.\n\nCommit 8aa59e355949 (\"can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in\ncan_rx_register()\") already made can_rx_register() reject such devices.\nBut can_rx_unregister() still only checks dev-\u003etype and dereferences\nthe NULL ml_priv when it walks the receive lists of the device.\n\nCAN_ISOTP reaches this path: isotp_bind() ignores the return values of\ncan_rx_register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is\nreleased or the device is unregistered, isotp_release() and\nisotp_notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and\ntrigger the NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_unregister(). This only\nrequires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP_NET_ADMIN in an unprivileged\nuser namespace.\n\nConvert the remaining ARPHRD_CAN checks in af_can, bcm, gw, isotp and\nraw to can_get_ml_priv()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99673",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:01.950",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:18:01.950",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27edc672a80ae9d5e7e8aa0cc8f5e3ed2b5dab19"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/962947b69589881167054bae5accc8abfd5aa4b6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c693cbfbc2ad5ab159c671c58f285aa3d4d8a98b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4910431fdf7b2800f0bec9f161900511f9a8bcd"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.