FKIE_CVE-2026-99664
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:18 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"mm/gup.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "da57b6bce646946c083a48df644d43bb9d011f5f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1b1676180246232308885c4f37fee01cf898fdb2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9eaedd598cd25eb0e18958e2456153a4c1f3db03",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1b1676180246232308885c4f37fee01cf898fdb2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "79cb51d538abc459f74e046d27797d36b133ce0e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1b1676180246232308885c4f37fee01cf898fdb2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"mm/gup.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/gup: recheck the PUD under PTL in follow_pud_mask()\n\nfollow_pud_mask() reads the PUD without a lock. If it is a leaf, it takes\nthe lock and calls follow_huge_pud(), which reads the entry again, but\nonly tests whether it is present.\n\nA leaf can be zapped concurrently and a page fault can fill the empty\nentry with a page table.\n\nThis currently only applies when device-dax makes use of PUD entries,\nand the fault after e.g., MADV_DONTNEED would find THPs to be disabled.\n\nThat requires a sequence like\n\n1) Fault in the PUD\n2) Disable THP\n3) Have GUP race against concurrent MADV_DONTNEED + refault\n\nWhich is rather unlikely to happen in practice, which is why we never\nreceived a report about such a problem.\n\nBefore commit 1b1676180246 (\"mm/gup: handle huge pud for\nfollow_pud_mask()\"), we performed that check in follow_devmap_pud() by\ntesting for pud_devmap().\n\nLet\u0027s fix it by just structuring follow_pud_mask() similar to\nfollow_pmd_mask(), minus protnone stuff that does not apply and minus\nFOLL_SPLIT_PMD handling. That makes it much easier to spot any such\ninconsistencies.\n\nPerform the pud_bad() check early in follow_pmd_mask() and just forward\nthe PUD value. We can drop the pud_present() check in follow_huge_pud(),\njust like we have in follow_huge_pmd().\n\nEven though we are performing more changes than strictly necessary, the\nfix should be easy to backport."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99664",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:00.630",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:18:00.630",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79cb51d538abc459f74e046d27797d36b133ce0e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9eaedd598cd25eb0e18958e2456153a4c1f3db03"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da57b6bce646946c083a48df644d43bb9d011f5f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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