FKIE_CVE-2026-99639
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/dir.c",
"fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h",
"fs/overlayfs/readdir.c",
"fs/overlayfs/util.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "48bd1823237fb076db6e109e35c59b1bc08f550a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "833d2b3a072f7ff6005bf84c065c7cbda81a8aaa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e803c82dcdd15e87b48fca1ea8d2cfe6a7ed83d4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "833d2b3a072f7ff6005bf84c065c7cbda81a8aaa",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/dir.c",
"fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h",
"fs/overlayfs/readdir.c",
"fs/overlayfs/util.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: fix whiteout creation in casefolded directories\n\nunlink and rmdir fail with EINVAL on an overlay with casefolded\n(case-insensitive) layers, if the name exists in a lower layer.\nCasefolded layers need CONFIG_UNICODE. Root can mount such an overlay,\nand so can an unprivileged user in a user namespace, with tmpfs layers.\n\nOverlayfs does not change a lower layer. To remove a name that exists\nthere, it hides the name with a marker file, a whiteout. It creates the\nwhiteout in the work directory, a scratch directory on the upper\nfilesystem, and renames it over the name in the upper directory:\n\n- ovl_whiteout() creates the whiteout with mknod, or as a hard link to\n an earlier whiteout.\n- ovl_cleanup_and_whiteout() then prepares the rename with\n start_renaming_two_dentries(), which returns -EINVAL if the source or\n the target dentry is unhashed, that is, not in the dentry hash table.\n\nWith casefolded directories, both dentries can be unhashed:\n\n- The target. Lookup in a casefolded directory leaves a negative dentry\n unhashed, so the rename target is unhashed if the name does not exist\n in the upper directory.\n- The source, which is the new whiteout. tmpfs hashes a dentry when\n mknod or link makes it positive, but ext4 does not, so on ext4 the\n source is unhashed as well.\n\nThe cleanup after the failure also refuses an unhashed dentry, so on\next4 the whiteout is left behind in the work directory.\n\nReproduced with rm and rmdir on casefolded tmpfs and ext4 layers, also\nas uid 1000 in a user namespace.\n\nFix this by creating the whiteout with ovl_create_temp(), which repeats\nthe lookup if the new dentry is unhashed. Prepare the rename with\nstart_renaming_dentry(), which looks up the target name with the\ndirectories locked. The caller looked the name up without a lock, so\nreturn -ESTALE if the name now refers to a different inode.\n\n[amir: pass the name used for lookup instead of taking a name snapshot]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99639",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:17:57.257",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:17:57.257",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48bd1823237fb076db6e109e35c59b1bc08f550a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e803c82dcdd15e87b48fca1ea8d2cfe6a7ed83d4"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.