FKIE_CVE-2026-99611
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/line6/capture.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3e7f477a9e56b627739832e6cf9b682693a474a9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "705ececd1c60d0f5d6ef2a719008847883516970",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "faf1f471319775e280d959ffbffaa44fd7e5f5b0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "705ececd1c60d0f5d6ef2a719008847883516970",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9885eaa2091335ed181c93f2b406604ee2bf2312",
"status": "affected",
"version": "705ececd1c60d0f5d6ef2a719008847883516970",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "db51425c9eb038a8e40e09b837afde015ae9e3ec",
"status": "affected",
"version": "705ececd1c60d0f5d6ef2a719008847883516970",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/line6/capture.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.30"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.30",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: line6: Reject capture buffers smaller than two packets\n\nline6_capture_copy() splits the copy into the ALSA ring buffer once at\nthe buffer end and wraps pos_done once, which is only correct when one\npacket holds at most buffer_size frames. The packet size comes from the\ndevice\u0027s endpoint, and the per-device hw structs allow 64-byte periods\nwith periods_min 1, so a packet can be larger than the whole buffer.\naudio_in_callback() logs an oversized packet and then copies it anyway.\n\nThe packet size is known at probe time, so constrain\nSNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_BUFFER_BYTES in snd_line6_capture_open() to at least\ntwice the larger of the two endpoints\u0027 packet sizes. Two rather than\none, because pos_done advances by the packet and wraps once, so a buffer\nof exactly one packet leaves the position unchanged after every packet.\nhw_params then rejects a buffer that cannot hold two packets, and the\nsingle wrap is valid for every configuration that gets through. Keep a\nguard in line6_capture_copy() that drops an oversized packet with a\nratelimited error, for the case that should no longer be reachable.\n\nReproduced on 7.3-rc7 with a USB/IP device presenting the GuitarPort\ninterface layout and 1024-byte packets into a 128-byte buffer: ALSA\nlogged \"invalid position: pos = 224, buffer size = 32\" and the driver\nlogged \"driver bug: len\" on every following packet. With this patch a\n1024-byte buffer is refused at hw_params, and a 2048-byte buffer streams\nfor 30 s with no report and with the position moving inside the buffer."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99611",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:17:53.400",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:17:53.400",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e7f477a9e56b627739832e6cf9b682693a474a9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9885eaa2091335ed181c93f2b406604ee2bf2312"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db51425c9eb038a8e40e09b837afde015ae9e3ec"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/faf1f471319775e280d959ffbffaa44fd7e5f5b0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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