FKIE_CVE-2026-99609
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "44c6971a79efdb46cd5c9f492f0ad65aafe05add",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5356d89f5e581dc207c7a607fe585d3e1cb2471c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "824fdf771cb7cbe9ae50eaec588eaf1acee6da94",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4cbb826b3b36df6c275454287ba1df4564a5370b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usx2y: Require a buffer of two URBs\n\nusx2y_urb_capt_retire() wraps the ring buffer once per packet and\nusx2y_urb_play_prepare() once per URB of nr_of_packs() packets of up to\n50 frames. Both assume that the data fits in the buffer, and the hw\nconstraints only require about two 1 ms periods, so a packet larger\nthan the buffer on capture, or a URB larger than the buffer on playback,\nviolates that assumption.\n\nConstrain SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE in snd_usx2y_pcm_open() to at\nleast two URBs, 2 * nr_of_packs() * 50 frames, for both directions. The\nbound is in frames and derived from the driver\u0027s own packet limit, so it\ndoes not read the endpoint, whose altsetting is only selected in\nprepare. Two URBs rather than one, because the position advances by a\nURB on playback and only moves when a URB is less than the whole buffer.\nKeep a guard in usx2y_urb_capt_retire() that drops a packet larger than\nthe buffer, for the case the constraint makes unreachable.\n\nWith nrpacks above about 163 (S16_LE) or 109 (S24_3LE) the bound exceeds\nthe 64 KiB buffer the substream preallocates (twice that with the\npreallocation raised to its 128 KiB maximum), so hw_params fails for\nthose module settings. That is intended: the driver cannot be safe with\na URB larger than half the largest buffer.\n\nReproduced on 7.3-rc7 with a USB/IP device presenting the US-122\ninterface layout and 1024-byte packets into a 512-byte capture buffer:\n\n BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in i_usx2y_urb_complete+0x1285/0x1ac0\n Read of size 18446744073709551104 at addr ffff88800e448800 by task vhci_rx/83\n\nTested on 7.3-rc7 with the same device, S16_LE at 44100 Hz, nrpacks 4,\nso the bound is 400 frames. A 128-frame capture buffer and a 200-frame\nplayback buffer are refused at hw_params with EINVAL. A 400-frame buffer\nstreams for 30 s in each direction with the position advancing inside\nthe buffer and no KASAN report; the capture guard did not fire. The\nsame 400-frame capture buffer with S24_3LE, which selects altsetting 2\nin prepare, streams for 30 s with the same result."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99609",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:17:53.123",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:17:53.123",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44c6971a79efdb46cd5c9f492f0ad65aafe05add"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cbb826b3b36df6c275454287ba1df4564a5370b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5356d89f5e581dc207c7a607fe585d3e1cb2471c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/824fdf771cb7cbe9ae50eaec588eaf1acee6da94"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.