FKIE_CVE-2026-99608

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-20 06:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 06:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usx2y: Guard the playback copy usx2y_urb_play_prepare() sums the packet lengths of a whole URB, copies that many frames with a single wrap, and sizes each playback packet from the capture packet's actual_length. Three things are unchecked: that the URB fits in the ring buffer, that a packet fits in the playback endpoint's maxpacksize, from which tmpbuf is allocated, and that actual_length is a whole number of frames. The ISO descriptors take the raw actual_length while transfer_buffer_length and the copies take count * stride, so a packet that is not a multiple of the stride makes the descriptors add up to more than the buffer, by up to stride - 1 bytes per packet. Return -EPIPE, as the existing packet-size check does, when the URB is larger than the buffer or a packet is larger than maxpacksize, and size each descriptor from whole frames, so the descriptors add up to transfer_buffer_length and each stays within maxpacksize. The buffer case is prevented by the previous patch and this is the guard for it; the other two depend only on the device. The first case is reachable on the unpatched driver with ordinary packets: on 7.3-rc7, a USB/IP device presenting the US-122 interface layout and sending 48-frame packets, with a 100-frame playback buffer (two 50-frame periods, inside the stock constraints), KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in i_usx2y_urb_complete+0x79b/0x1ac0 Read of size 18446744073709551280 at addr ffff88800e6b02e0 by task vhci_rx/80 With both patches, the same device and a 200-frame playback buffer is refused at hw_params with EINVAL, and a 400-frame buffer plays for 30 s with the position advancing inside the buffer, no KASAN report and neither guard message. The maxpacksize check is not exercised: the emulated device reports the same wMaxPacketSize on both endpoints. The descriptor case is visible with capture packets of 195 bytes at stride 4 (48 frames and 3 bytes): without this change the four descriptors add up to 780 bytes for 768 bytes of data, and USB/IP's completion check refuses the URB ("total length of iso packets 780 not equal to actual length of buffer 768", -EPROTO), after which the driver stops the streams. With this patch every descriptor is 192 bytes, the descriptors add up to the data in every URB for 30 s, the position advances inside the buffer and KASAN reports nothing. The 48-frame playback run above is unchanged.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "116f158a6f6820a93faa12d46d5a2956cae4e4d2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "38bb5df007a80f81861a79228f7dae29e4e263c6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "deeccc01999ed8982507945e5ca750e75f0437dc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e2c6de52ffacb2c0f4076884ee3fdb744735a4cb",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2yaudio.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.118",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.64",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usx2y: Guard the playback copy\n\nusx2y_urb_play_prepare() sums the packet lengths of a whole URB, copies\nthat many frames with a single wrap, and sizes each playback packet from\nthe capture packet\u0027s actual_length. Three things are unchecked: that the\nURB fits in the ring buffer, that a packet fits in the playback\nendpoint\u0027s maxpacksize, from which tmpbuf is allocated, and that\nactual_length is a whole number of frames. The ISO descriptors take the\nraw actual_length while transfer_buffer_length and the copies take\ncount * stride, so a packet that is not a multiple of the stride makes\nthe descriptors add up to more than the buffer, by up to stride - 1\nbytes per packet.\n\nReturn -EPIPE, as the existing packet-size check does, when the URB is\nlarger than the buffer or a packet is larger than maxpacksize, and size\neach descriptor from whole frames, so the descriptors add up to\ntransfer_buffer_length and each stays within maxpacksize. The buffer\ncase is prevented by the previous patch and this is the guard for it;\nthe other two depend only on the device.\n\nThe first case is reachable on the unpatched driver with ordinary\npackets: on 7.3-rc7, a USB/IP device presenting the US-122 interface\nlayout and sending 48-frame packets, with a 100-frame playback buffer\n(two 50-frame periods, inside the stock constraints), KASAN reports:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in i_usx2y_urb_complete+0x79b/0x1ac0\n  Read of size 18446744073709551280 at addr ffff88800e6b02e0 by task vhci_rx/80\n\nWith both patches, the same device and a 200-frame playback buffer is\nrefused at hw_params with EINVAL, and a 400-frame buffer plays for 30 s\nwith the position advancing inside the buffer, no KASAN report and\nneither guard message. The maxpacksize check is not exercised: the\nemulated device reports the same wMaxPacketSize on both endpoints.\n\nThe descriptor case is visible with capture packets of 195 bytes at\nstride 4 (48 frames and 3 bytes): without this change the four\ndescriptors add up to 780 bytes for 768 bytes of data, and USB/IP\u0027s\ncompletion check refuses the URB (\"total length of iso packets 780 not\nequal to actual length of buffer 768\", -EPROTO), after which the driver\nstops the streams. With this patch every descriptor is 192 bytes, the\ndescriptors add up to the data in every URB for 30 s, the position\nadvances inside the buffer and KASAN reports nothing. The 48-frame\nplayback run above is unchanged."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99608",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:17:52.987",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:17:52.987",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/116f158a6f6820a93faa12d46d5a2956cae4e4d2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38bb5df007a80f81861a79228f7dae29e4e263c6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/deeccc01999ed8982507945e5ca750e75f0437dc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2c6de52ffacb2c0f4076884ee3fdb744735a4cb"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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