FKIE_CVE-2026-99564

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: don't wait for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() waited for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED after smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work() called rdma_disconnect(). That can take very long, e.g. if the peer just disappeared, until the rdma cm gives up, or forever if the event already happened, but the status was overwritten afterwards. This is not needed: smbdirect_socket_destroy() drains the qp under rdma_lock_handler(), destroys it and calls rdma_destroy_id(), which only waits for a currently running event handler and makes sure no further events are delivered. The rest of the disconnect protocol (DREQ/DREP and timewait for IB, abrupt close for iWarp) is handled by the rdma core asynchronously. drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c also just calls rdma_disconnect() and ib_drain_qp() before rdma_destroy_id(). So smbdirect_socket_destroy() now also accepts SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTING and changes the status to SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTED itself under rdma_lock_handler(). We could still get RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in the small windows between rdma_unlock_handler() and rdma_destroy_id(), but in that case smbdirect_connection_rdma_event_handler() is basically a no-op.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/connection.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "e08d8c2a022754e10b6f7d01faf20958665f4c4d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "422a2436697da6cc0f2de812a778ff1d249b5335",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1ce50f83ed13b3147d4a40b50cc71d0dfdcc6d41",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "422a2436697da6cc0f2de812a778ff1d249b5335",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4ca76b89917ad5b317e07ae4f0edc16f7c2a1248",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "422a2436697da6cc0f2de812a778ff1d249b5335",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/connection.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.15",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: smbdirect: don\u0027t wait for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync()\n\nsmbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() waited for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED\nafter smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work() called rdma_disconnect(). That\ncan take very long, e.g. if the peer just disappeared, until the\nrdma cm gives up, or forever if the event already happened, but the\nstatus was overwritten afterwards.\n\nThis is not needed: smbdirect_socket_destroy() drains the qp under\nrdma_lock_handler(), destroys it and calls rdma_destroy_id(), which\nonly waits for a currently running event handler and makes sure no\nfurther events are delivered. The rest of the disconnect protocol\n(DREQ/DREP and timewait for IB, abrupt close for iWarp) is handled\nby the rdma core asynchronously. drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c also just\ncalls rdma_disconnect() and ib_drain_qp() before rdma_destroy_id().\n\nSo smbdirect_socket_destroy() now also accepts\nSMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTING and changes the status to\nSMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTED itself under rdma_lock_handler().\n\nWe could still get RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in the small\nwindows between rdma_unlock_handler() and rdma_destroy_id(),\nbut in that case smbdirect_connection_rdma_event_handler()\nis basically a no-op."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99564",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:13.120",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:13.120",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ce50f83ed13b3147d4a40b50cc71d0dfdcc6d41"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ca76b89917ad5b317e07ae4f0edc16f7c2a1248"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e08d8c2a022754e10b6f7d01faf20958665f4c4d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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