FKIE_CVE-2026-99562

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on a directory handle An authenticated client with a writable tree connection can open a directory with FILE_WRITE_DATA and send FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on that handle. The handler only checks fp->daccess & FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE, but on a directory FILE_WRITE_DATA is the legitimate add-file right, so the check passes. ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() then calls kernel_write() on the directory file, which has no FMODE_WRITE, and __kernel_write_iter() hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)), panicking a panic_on_warn kernel. Before commit 25e414db7033 ("ksmbd: report holes in allocated range queries") the dense-file path used vfs_fallocate(), which rejects directories with -EISDIR. The kernel_write() loop that replaced it has no such check. Reject a directory handle in ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() before writing, as ksmbd_vfs_write() already does for SMB2_WRITE. WARNING: fs/read_write.c:608 at __kernel_write_iter+0x74b/0x8c0 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: kernel_write+0x1ef/0x4d0 ksmbd_vfs_zero_data+0x413/0x590 smb2_ioctl+0x21fa/0x66a0 handle_ksmbd_work+0x61b/0x1ff0
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/server/vfs.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "89092aa492f1ff8cbbca14503a008795251bae6d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "25e414db703334954747cb1b3eedf914b093ff8c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ef85bad39cf273a8377722c9f3078294dcc2fc7a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "25e414db703334954747cb1b3eedf914b093ff8c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/server/vfs.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.3"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.3",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: reject FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on a directory handle\n\nAn authenticated client with a writable tree connection can open a\ndirectory with FILE_WRITE_DATA and send FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on that\nhandle. The handler only checks fp-\u003edaccess \u0026 FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE, but on\na directory FILE_WRITE_DATA is the legitimate add-file right, so the\ncheck passes. ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() then calls kernel_write() on the\ndirectory file, which has no FMODE_WRITE, and __kernel_write_iter()\nhits WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file-\u003ef_mode \u0026 FMODE_WRITE)), panicking a\npanic_on_warn kernel.\n\nBefore commit 25e414db7033 (\"ksmbd: report holes in allocated range\nqueries\") the dense-file path used vfs_fallocate(), which rejects\ndirectories with -EISDIR. The kernel_write() loop that replaced it has\nno such check. Reject a directory handle in ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() before\nwriting, as ksmbd_vfs_write() already does for SMB2_WRITE.\n\n  WARNING: fs/read_write.c:608 at __kernel_write_iter+0x74b/0x8c0\n  Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n  Call Trace:\n   kernel_write+0x1ef/0x4d0\n   ksmbd_vfs_zero_data+0x413/0x590\n   smb2_ioctl+0x21fa/0x66a0\n   handle_ksmbd_work+0x61b/0x1ff0"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99562",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.890",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.890",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89092aa492f1ff8cbbca14503a008795251bae6d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef85bad39cf273a8377722c9f3078294dcc2fc7a"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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