FKIE_CVE-2026-99558
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"block/blk-crypto-fallback.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "6304b40fdc8bdde881e2bf7b7cbe501261e4abd3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c984ff1423ae9f70b1f28ce811856db0d9c99021",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "37c957fbc8ac0bfd85259b37f03e47006c8e35e8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c984ff1423ae9f70b1f28ce811856db0d9c99021",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "11e9f0c8b30a7cf3ba0869ecea7bf784c3f81dab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c984ff1423ae9f70b1f28ce811856db0d9c99021",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c8c53d669d4e45b3a804013251a34387d7e11bfb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c984ff1423ae9f70b1f28ce811856db0d9c99021",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ad3bfdd227e0f644e0c528c9d80d108a74c0f0f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "531c6ed342d9cbfbf55ef1f293fbf11db8d10835",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.4.12",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"block/blk-crypto-fallback.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()\n\nSashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the\nfollowing flow:\n\n dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback\n \u251c\u2500 blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx-\u003ekey.size != 0\n \u251c\u2500 blk_crypto_start_using_key()\n \u2502 \u251c\u2500 hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP\n \u2502 \u2502 # profile never allocated (NULL)\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500 raw key: fallback_start_using_mode()\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500 kfree(profile) # not NULLed\n \u251c\u2500 goto bad\n \u2514\u2500 inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set\n \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_evict_key()\n \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false\n \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key()\n \u2514\u2500 __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile)\n \u2514\u2500 profile-\u003enum_slots # BOOM!!!\n\nThis issue can be reproduced using the following commands:\n\n dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64\n LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing)\n SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP)\n KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d \u0027 \\n\u0027)\n dmsetup create ic --table \"0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \\\n $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped\"\n\nAnd the following oops is triggered:\n\n ==================================================================\n blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f]\n CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0\n Call Trace:\n blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320\n inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160\n inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0\n dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40\n table_load+0x1c4/0x490\n ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0\n dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20\n ==================================================================\n\ndm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never\nstarted, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.\n\nFix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when\ntfms_inited[] is not set for the key\u0027s mode. tfms_inited[] is only set\nafter blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the\nprofile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.\n\nThe bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae (\"blk-crypto:\ndynamically allocate fallback profile\") was merged in v6.5, and only\nbecame actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 (\"dm-inlinecrypt:\nadd target for inline block device encryption\") was merged in v7.2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99558",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.367",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.367",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11e9f0c8b30a7cf3ba0869ecea7bf784c3f81dab"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37c957fbc8ac0bfd85259b37f03e47006c8e35e8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6304b40fdc8bdde881e2bf7b7cbe501261e4abd3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8c53d669d4e45b3a804013251a34387d7e11bfb"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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