FKIE_CVE-2026-99556

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: serialize directory emptiness checks with readdir SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY holds fp->readdir_lock while it calls iterate_dir() on fp->filp. An SMB2 SET_INFO request with FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION can resolve the same FileId and call ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir() on the same filp without that lock. iterate_dir()'s inode read lock permits concurrent readers and does not serialize per-file iterator state. ext4 stores its dx readdir cursor and fname RB tree in file->private_data. Concurrent reset or refill can therefore free a fname node while the other worker still traverses it or retains its RB-tree link, resulting in use-after-free accesses. An authenticated SMB client with list and delete rights on a directory in a writable KSMBD share backed by ext4 can trigger this when the directory takes the dx readdir path. The client overlaps an SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY request with an SMB2 SET_INFO request carrying FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION on one live FileId. In one x86_64 SMP KASAN multi-shot guest using ksmbd-for-next at 171df27077fb, the unmodified kernel reported a cross-worker use-after-free before a panic. The first report's access and free stacks show the two request paths directly (trimmed): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 Read of size 8 by task kworker/2:0/29 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x535/0x990 ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x319/0xba0 ext4_readdir+0x175a/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 smb2_query_dir+0x1003/0x1cc0 Freed by task 279: free_rb_tree_fname+0x67/0xc0 ext4_readdir+0x13a9/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir+0xa2/0x100 smb2_set_info+0x2ffa/0x45d0 Take fp->readdir_lock across the entire emptiness check. This places both iterators over that handle's filp in the same lock domain while preserving the disposition status handling. The exact code change completed a warning-free x86_64 KASAN bzImage build. Tracing three request pairs showed that the two iterate_dir() calls no longer overlapped and the expected statuses were preserved. A further 1,600 reproducer iterations completed with expected statuses and no KASAN report, Oops, or panic. The reproducer and complete guest configuration are available privately to maintainers on request.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5ad61a34963f32fc1637d26e88cf6e02a3b99d08",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "818a9fd779443b931b05c025d85f29680efb26c2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2a4b6ae380a9f5175f002c1921cf9cbc7ca536ba",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7220980b2423d06a0604516129bfa4cec8a697ae",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.117",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.61",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.4-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: serialize directory emptiness checks with readdir\n\nSMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY holds fp-\u003ereaddir_lock while it calls iterate_dir()\non fp-\u003efilp. An SMB2 SET_INFO request with FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION\ncan resolve the same FileId and call ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir() on the same\nfilp without that lock.\n\niterate_dir()\u0027s inode read lock permits concurrent readers and does not\nserialize per-file iterator state. ext4 stores its dx readdir cursor and\nfname RB tree in file-\u003eprivate_data. Concurrent reset or refill can\ntherefore free a fname node while the other worker still traverses it or\nretains its RB-tree link, resulting in use-after-free accesses.\n\nAn authenticated SMB client with list and delete rights on a directory in\na writable KSMBD share backed by ext4 can trigger this when the directory\ntakes the dx readdir path. The client overlaps an SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY\nrequest with an SMB2 SET_INFO request carrying FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION\non one live FileId.\n\nIn one x86_64 SMP KASAN multi-shot guest using ksmbd-for-next at\n171df27077fb, the unmodified kernel reported a cross-worker use-after-free\nbefore a panic. The first report\u0027s access and free stacks show the two\nrequest paths directly (trimmed):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550\n  Read of size 8 by task kworker/2:0/29\n  Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n  Call Trace:\n   ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550\n   htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x535/0x990\n   ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x319/0xba0\n   ext4_readdir+0x175a/0x2f40\n   iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630\n   smb2_query_dir+0x1003/0x1cc0\n\n  Freed by task 279:\n   free_rb_tree_fname+0x67/0xc0\n   ext4_readdir+0x13a9/0x2f40\n   iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630\n   ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir+0xa2/0x100\n   smb2_set_info+0x2ffa/0x45d0\n\nTake fp-\u003ereaddir_lock across the entire emptiness check. This places both\niterators over that handle\u0027s filp in the same lock domain while\npreserving the disposition status handling. The exact code change\ncompleted a warning-free x86_64 KASAN bzImage build. Tracing three request\npairs showed that the two iterate_dir() calls no longer overlapped and the\nexpected statuses were preserved. A further 1,600 reproducer iterations\ncompleted with expected statuses and no KASAN report, Oops, or panic.\n\nThe reproducer and complete guest configuration are available privately\nto maintainers on request."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-99556",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.100",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.100",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a4b6ae380a9f5175f002c1921cf9cbc7ca536ba"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ad61a34963f32fc1637d26e88cf6e02a3b99d08"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7220980b2423d06a0604516129bfa4cec8a697ae"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/818a9fd779443b931b05c025d85f29680efb26c2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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