FKIE_CVE-2026-99542
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 - Updated: 2026-11-19 15:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/smbacl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0c96f614876e251ae9d6764e8d52d6544fef0424",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "28db998d396a9b2e6e9ecf69c2a201b8f06df2b2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "be67941493114d1145d16088938bf589e34f111b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/smbacl.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request\n\nsmb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2\nCREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a\nsecurity descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the\nfunction is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no\naccess to anyone except the object owner\u0027s implicit READ_CONTROL and\nWRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).\n\nThe empty-DACL branch only denies when both\n\n - the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)),\n and\n - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.\n\nIn every other case it takes the shared \"goto err_out\" with rc still 0,\nwhich returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants\nthe full requested access. Three problems follow:\n\n - The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner\u0027s implicit\n rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those\n rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For\n READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to\n inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of\n an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.\n\n - A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any\n caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.\n\n - A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes\n (pdacl_size \u003e sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is\n granted whatever was requested.\n\nOn shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g.\n\"force user\" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so\nPOSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.\n\nCompute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an\nempty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than\nREAD_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99542",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:10.287",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:18:10.287",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c96f614876e251ae9d6764e8d52d6544fef0424"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28db998d396a9b2e6e9ecf69c2a201b8f06df2b2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be67941493114d1145d16088938bf589e34f111b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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